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Introduction  
The current and imminent revenue 
shortfall of the highway financing system, which 
is currently based on motor fuel taxes, has been 
widely diagnosed both at the national and state 
levels. A 2005 needs study assessing highway 
needs and future revenue during 2006-2020 for 
Indiana concluded that the annual funding gap 
during this period would be $0.86-1.12 billion. 
Under the current fuel-tax-based system, it is 
predicted that the shortfall would grow larger in 
the future, primarily because the current fuel tax 
rate is fixed per gallon while vehicle fuel 
economy is improving and the use of alternative 
fuels is increasing. The growing funding gap 
indicates that there is an urgent need to 
improve the current structure of the highway 
financing mechanism or to develop a new 
financing strategy. In this regard, establishing 
new highway pricing schemes are needed that 
satisfactorily attain goals such as adequacy in 
revenue, efficiency of the highway system, 
equity between highway users, and 
technological and financial feasibility. The 
study explored and evaluated alternative 
financing options in order to provide the most 
recommendable strategy to resolve the 
current and future highway funding problem 
of Indiana.  
Findings  
In order to search for alternatives to the current 
fuel-tax-based state highway funding system, 
several types of user charging schemes that 
have been demonstrated or implemented in 
other states and countries were examined. The 
examples were studied to understand financing 
concepts, impacts on users and transportation 
systems, and caveats in their implementations. 
Based on that, possible guidelines for pricing 
implementation were drawn for several aspects, 
such as design of the pricing scheme, 
technology issues, legal and institutional issues, 
and public acceptability. 
By synthesizing previous studies that 
evaluated pricing schemes, a methodological 
framework for evaluation of alternative user 
charging schemes was established. Evaluation 
criteria included: (i) revenue adequacy 
(sufficiency, stability, and accountability), (ii) 
system efficiency, (iii) equity between users, 
(iv) cost of implementation, (v) public 
acceptability, and (vi) policy alignment. For 
each criterion, definitions and measurement 
methods were provided. 
On the basis of the current and 
projected financing situation and highway 
demand of Indiana, the following alternative 
financing schemes were developed: (1) 
enhancement of the current tax system; (2) 
addition of new funding sources to supplement 
the current system; and (3) replacement of the 
current system with new financing schemes. 
The analyses include, for alternative (2), 
forecast of annual toll revenue of a typical new 
interstate for various toll rate scenarios, which 
was estimated to range from $40 million to $90 
million, using the Indiana Statewide Travel 
Demand Model (ISTDM). For alternative (3), a 
distance-based pricing scheme that charges on 
average 2.9 cents for each vehicle-mile-traveled 
was suggested. Separate fee rates were also 
found by road functional class, with which each 
of highway sub-system (road functional class) 
can be self-financed. A more comprehensive 
14-5  2/08 JTRP-2007/2 INDOT Division of Research West Lafayette, IN 47906 
pricing structure, which provides separate rates 
by vehicle class as well as road functional class, 
was also established as a result of the highway 
cost allocation study. Under the suggested 
pricing structure, automobiles are charged 1.21 
cents per mile, single unit trucks 9.18 cents per 
mile, and combination trucks 23.54 cents per 
mile. 
Each alternative was evaluated 
according to the established criteria, either 
quantitatively or qualitatively. By combining 
the evaluation result for each criterion, 
alternatives were comprehensively compared. 
The most innovative approach, to replace the 
current fuel tax system, appears to have the best 
potential in achieving revenue adequacy, 
system efficiency, and equity. On the other 
hand, the implementation of this alternative 
could be cost-prohibitive as well as face strong 
opposition from the public at this time. 
However, experience has shown that the 
implementation costs likely will decline as the 
necessary technologies mature in the market 
and public attitude can change over time. The 
long-term goals proposed at the federal level 
align very well with the comprehensive pricing 
scheme alternative. 
Implementation  
Stepwise adaptation of a new system is 
proposed, targeting a long-term goal of a usage-
based comprehensive road pricing. The study 
outlines short-, medium-, and long-term highway 
financing strategies, which comprise goals, 
possible actions, public outreach, and required 
information. In the short-term, it is suggested to 
implement funding tools that require negligible 
cost to plan and launch, including an increase of 
and inflation-indexing of the fuel tax system, and 
indexing of the vehicle registration fee system, 
supplemented by other minor tax adjustments 
where possible. In the medium-term, a pilot 
study for the Indiana Statewide Comprehensive 
Usage-based Road Pricing (ISCURP) could be 
completed.  In both the short- and medium-term, 
a strategy is needed to inform and educate the 
public as the new system is gradually ushered in. 
In the long-term, a structure needs to be 
designed whereby highway agencies could know 
exactly how much their provision and 
maintenance costs by facility type and user 
classification are. It also should be 
technologically possible to charge users 
fees/taxes distinctively. To implement such a 
system, data acquisition and analyses modules 
that interactively calibrate system costs and 
assist in setting relevant prices for each group of 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
 
For decades, motor fuel taxes have been the major source of revenue for highway construction, 
maintenance, and operations at the state and local levels. However, compared to the budget 
needed to achieve the desired performance levels of highway systems, shortfalls in revenue are an 
increasing occurrence. According to AASHTO (2002), $92.0 billion (in 2002 dollars) is needed 
by state and local governments annually for highways and bridges to maintain both the physical 
condition and the performance characteristics of the system between 2004 and 2009. The 
Conditions and Performance Report (FHWA, 2002), which is a similar needs study, predicts that 
the annual cost to maintain the current condition and performance of highways and bridges will 
be $75.9 billion for 2010-2020 (in 2000 dollars). The current capital investment on highways and 
bridges made by all levels of governments is lower than the assessed needs, although it has been 
increased sharply since TEA-21 was enacted. For example, in 2000, the total capital investment 
on highways and bridges was $64.6 billion across the all levels of governments, only about 85% 
of the assessed needs ($75.9 billion). 
Consistent with the previous studies, the most recent need assessment conducted by the 
U.S. National Chamber Foundation (2005) also noted significant shortfalls in current revenue 
streams to both maintain and improve the U.S. highway and transit systems. According to the 
analysis results, in order to maintain just the current condition, current revenue streams will have 
a cumulative shortfall through 2015 of $0.5 trillion. And if improvements are to be made to a 
level that benefits the national economy, the shortfall will amount to $1.1 trillion in 2015. 
The State of Indiana is no exception to this nationwide insufficiency in transportation 
funding according to a 10-year highway financial forecast included in the recent business plan 
(2006-2007) for Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT, 2005). In this document, future 
revenues were compared with the expected funding needs to complete projects that were planned 




It was estimated that the annual funding gap would be gradually increasing each year, such as 
$152 million in 2008 and $167 million in 2010, until it reached $405 million in 2015. The 
possibility of additional funding gap was indicated as the state highway system targets a higher 
level of mobility and accessibility, requiring completion of larger number of projects. 
Highway needs and funding gap trajectory under several hypothetical scenarios were 
studied in the research conducted by the Joint Transportation Research Program (Sinha et al., 
2005). Including all projects in INDOT’s Long Range Plan and using HERS-ST model, the study 
estimated that the state highways would require $29.8 - 30.2 billion during 2006-2020. On the 
contrary, Indiana’s highway revenue was estimated to be $13.4 - 16.9 billion during the same 
period based on the current trend. Consequently, the JTRP’s 2005 need study concluded that an 
annual funding gap would be $860 – 1,120 million, which is a more aggressive estimation than 
the INDOT’s 2006-2007 business plan. However, regardless of aggressiveness of future scenarios 
that are hypothesized, it is expected that there will be a significant level of future funding needs 
that cannot be covered by the current revenue stream. 
One of the major reasons for the projected deficit in transportation revenue is that while 
travel is increasing vehicle fuel economy is improving, thereby reducing fuel tax revenues for 
each mile of travel. Also, fuel taxes do not automatically increase with rising costs. Another 
factor in the revenue shortfall issue is the increasing use of hybrid vehicles and bio-fuels. The 
traditional fuel tax does not apply in these cases. 
The growing financing gap indicates that a new financing mechanism is needed. A new 
financing mechanism should generally meet the following criteria (TRB, 2005; Whitty, 2003; 
Adams et al., 2001): First, the pricing scheme should be financially effective, that is, it needs to 
generate sufficient revenue not only to replace the fuel tax mechanism, but also to bridge the 
funding gap. Second, it should help the transportation system achieve its efficiency by charging 
users based on their road use, in a way that will support the entire network. Third, the program 
should be able to be implemented with low administrative and enforcement costs. Fourth and last, 
through the mechanism, fairness of the system should be attained in a way that is acceptable to 
the public. By reviewing the suggested criteria in earlier studies and examining the highway 
financing environment in Indiana, the present study develops its own evaluation framework, the 
details for which are discussed in Chapter 3. 
There have been several studies conducted at the national level, as well as in other states 




especially provided a comprehensive review of variable revenue sources including increases in 
current resources, debt financing, toll pricing, and mileage charging. State level research 
conducted, for example, in California (Adams et al., 2001) and South Carolina (SCDOT, 2003), 
has also presented approaches consistent with the national perspective. This report presents 
possible highway financing mechanisms from the perspective of Indiana, in terms of their 
background, implemented examples, issues, and evaluation results. 
 
1.2. Purpose and Scope of the Study 
 
This research explores possible alternative revenue sources for the State of Indiana. Financing 
tools such as fuel tax increases and several user-charging schemes, including toll pricing as well 
as distance-based fees, are considered. The evaluation criteria to select the best plan for Indiana 
are suggested and quantitative and qualitative analyses for each alternative are conducted based 
on the methodological framework developed. The analyses include estimation of fee/toll rates and 
revenue streams and a simulation model based on the Indiana Statewide Travel Demand Model 
(ISTDM). Data acquisition and the analyses are accomplished from the perspectives of the state 
government. 
 
1.3. Report Outline 
 
In Chapter 2, examples of several types of user charges are examined to understand the financing 
concepts, the impacts on users and transportation systems, the caveats in their implementations, 
and possible guidelines for several aspects, including pricing schemes, technological choices, 
institutional issues, and public acceptability. An overall scheme of alternatives is also provided 
for consideration for Indiana. 
Chapter 3 provides a methodological background of the criteria for the evaluation of 
alternatives related to user charging schemes. Chapter 4 is a review of the current financing 




Chapter 3, alternatives are developed and their implementation schemes are discussed in detail. 
Chapter 5 provides a multi-objective decision-making exercise to evaluate the alternatives. In 
Chapter 6, recommendations are made for future financing tools with considerations for the 





CHAPTER 2. EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES 
There are several possible financial tools to secure required revenue. First, the current fuel tax 
rates can be increased. Since fuel taxes have taken a traditional role as user fees, adjusting fuel 
taxes could be an easier policy to implement than introducing new methods. However, political 
reluctance to raise existing fuel taxes is widespread at all levels of government, which can be a 
major barrier of this approach. 
For financing tools other than motor fuel taxes, this research makes the distinction 
between supplementary revenue sources and main revenue sources. In this context, 
supplementary sources are particular facilities or regions where tolls or fees are imposed and can 
act as offsets to budget shortfall. This category of alternatives includes various types of toll 
pricing, such as facility tolls and cordon tolls, which are often referred to as congestion pricing, 
value pricing, etc. This approach, however, cannot be considered a main alternative, not only 
because the revenue generated from individual facilities or particular areas cannot cover the 
financing needs of the entire state, but also because many implementations of this type are valued 
more for their role as demand management and congestion reduction measures rather than as a 
revenue source. To replace current fuel taxes in a more complete manner would require relatively 
innovative approaches such as distance-based charging systems. 
In this chapter, the experiences of other U.S. states and other countries with each revenue 
source category are addressed, including analysis of surrounding conditions, which make the 
implementation of each alternative successful or infeasible. 
 
2.1. Motor Fuel Tax Increase 
 
Motor fuel taxes are the most important source of transportation funding. However, this taxation 




• Fuel taxes are not indexed for inflation, and it is not easy to raise the tax rate because of a 
general reluctance by the public and politicians. 
• Fuel taxes may not be able to generate the necessary revenue to provide quality 
transportation services in future years as alternative energy sources and propulsion 
systems based on them become more common in the near future. 
• Increased fuel efficiency will result in lower fuel tax receipts per mile traveled. 
 
Shortfalls in fuel tax revenue are mainly due to the tax structure, which is not indexed for 
inflation and the overall increase in fuel efficiency. Figure 2.1 shows the trend of fuel prices and 
taxes (federal and states average) in 2004 constant dollars. While fuel prices have fluctuated and 
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Figure 2.1 Trends of Fuel Prices and Fuel Taxes (1960~2005, 2004 dollars) (VTPI, 2005a) 
Figure 2.2 depicts the trends for the average cost and revenue generated per vehicle-mile. 
The upper curve of the figure represents the average cost per vehicle-mile, obtained from the ratio 
of the fuel price to the average miles-traveled per gallon, and shows similar trends to the fuel 
price (the upper curve in Figure 2.1). The lower curve in Figure 2.2 clearly shows the decreasing 
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Figure 2.2 Trends of Average Cost and Tax Revenue per Vehicle-Mile (1960~2005, 2004 dollars) 
(VTPI, 2005a) 
Elected officials are generally reluctant to raise fuel taxes in spite of increases in the cost 
of transportation programs. Instead, they have chosen other sources, especially borrowing and 
local sales taxes. However, many researchers, including Wachs (2003), insist that raising fuel 
taxes would be more effective, efficient, and equitable than other tools to raise revenue. 
The common belief about fuel taxes is that they are well below their theoretical optimal 
levels, which conceivably can cover the all roadway costs, particularly if external costs are 
considered. Compared to motor fuel taxes in other developed countries, those in the U.S. are 
relatively low as illustrated in Figure 2.3. The 1997 Federal Highway Cost Allocation Study 
(FHWA, 1997) found that vehicle user fees, which include the sum of fuel taxes, vehicle 
registration fees, and road tolls, would need to increase by more than 43% to fund all roadway 
expenses. This study also noted that the increment would have to be even more if other 







Figure 2.3 Vehicle Fuel Retail Prices for Selected Countries (Metschies, 2005) 
Methods other than simply raising the overall taxes rates also have been suggested to 
augment fuel tax revenue (VTPI, 2005b): 
• Impose a carbon tax, which reflects the amount of carbon emitted and can act as an 
incentive to reduce emissions. 
• Apply a general sales tax to motor fuel, which is exempted by many jurisdictions 
currently. 






2.2. Value Pricing 
2.2.1. Outline 
 
Toll pricing on transportation facilities comprises tolls on individual facilities and cordon tolls. 
The former are levied on a highway segment, bridge, or tunnel, while the latter are designated on 
a geographical area, such as central business districts. 
The concept of toll pricing has been around for years with a great deal of experience 
available from all over the world, including the U.S. and European and Asian countries. Fixed 
tolls on roadways can act as service fees for those facilities, while tolls based on the congestion 
level can be used as a strategy to manage demand on a limited road network. Facilitated by recent 
developments in information and communication technologies, more innovative and strategic 
attempts have been made in road pricing. In the U.S. the Value Pricing Pilot Program (VPPP), 
authorized by the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) and 
amended by TEA-21, was launched to encourage states to understand the feasibility of various 
road pricing schemes, obtain demonstrated results, or to implement them. A European program 
was also undertaken comparable to VPPP, which is called PRoGRESS (Pricing Road use for 
Greater Responsibility, Efficiency, and Sustainability in citieS). This program was a toll pricing 
demonstration project in eight European cities, from 2000 to 2004, supported by the Directorate 
General for Energy and Transport of the European Commission. Illustrative implementations 
under these programs are discussed in the following sections. Other examples are also studied, 
including the most popular model of cordon tolls, with decades of implementation in Singapore, 
followed by its successors in European countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, and Norway. 
Concepts of various types of tolling, including value pricing, are discussed below: 
 
Road Tolls 
A road toll is a very common and straightforward way to fund highway and bridge maintenance. 
This method is considered to be more equitable and economically efficient than other funding 




exclude contributions by non-users. Tolls on specific roadways are often associated with 
privatization of facilities, that is, private companies who built the roads or bridge collect the toll 
to fund construction and maintenance. 
 
Value Pricing (Congestion Pricing) 
Intended to mitigate peak hour congestion, the core idea of value pricing is to discriminate tolls 
based on the level of congestion. Tolls can vary based on a predetermined schedule or based on 
real-time congestion information. Generally, value pricing has two different objectives: 1) raise 
revenue and 2) manage demand. Some implementations impose tolls on only specific lanes rather 
than the entire road in order to provide choices for drivers to use either a congested toll-free lane 
or congestion-free toll lane. 
 
Cordon (Area) Tolls 
Cordon tolls can be interpreted as entrance fees for a designated area, often a congested center of 
urban areas. It is common to have different tolls according to the congestion level of the cordon 
area; namely, users are charged higher fees during peak hours. 
 
HOT (High Occupancy Toll) Lanes 
HOT lanes allow vehicles not meeting occupancy requirements on HOV lanes if they pay tolls. 
As one approach to a managed lane, HOT lanes give motivation for modal shift, enable more 
efficient use of HOV lanes, and can reduce general purpose lane occupancy. 
 
FAIR (Fast And Intertwined Regular) Lanes 
FAIR lanes divide currently free, general-purpose traffic lanes into two sections: fast lanes and 
regular lanes. Fast lanes would be electronically-tolled express lanes, with tolls set in real time to 
limit traffic to the free-flowing maximum. Under the FAIR lanes scenario, drivers using the 
regular lanes, which are more congested than fast lanes, during rush hour periods, would be 
compensated with credits that could be used as toll payments on days when they choose to use 
express lanes. The express-lane credits would compensate drivers for giving up their right to use 





As noted in the beginning of this chapter, toll pricing can only be supplementary revenue 
source, especially because of its current technological basis, which is not readily applicable to 
area-wide implementation. Although pricing schemes under this category are not quite suitable 
for substituting as a whole funding mechanism based on fuel tax, the richness of experience in 
toll pricing can offer insight to their implications on pricing scheme design, implementation 
policy, and public acceptability issues. 
 
2.2.2. Examples and Case Studies 
 
HOT Lanes on I-15 in San Diego (SDSU, 2001; FWHA, 2007) 
HOV lanes on I-15, which opened in 1988 and experienced underutilization by the mid-1990s, 
were converted to HOT lanes in 1996. During the first phase through March 1998, a limited 
number of solo drivers were provided unlimited use of HOV lanes by paying a flat fee. In April 
1998, the FasTrakTM pricing program, under which customers in single occupant vehicles pay 
tolls varying dynamically with the level of congestion in the HOV lanes, started its operation. 
Fees vary in 25-cent increments as often as every six minutes to yield free-flow speed on the 
HOV lanes (LOS C). Variable message signs located in advance of the entry points inform 
motorists the toll rate, which varies between $0.50 and $4.00 normally. When the congestion 
level is too high, the toll can be as high as $8.00. 
The Phase II third-year evaluation report issued in 2001 concluded that this project was 
successful in that the traffic conditions and revenues balance improved since implementation. The 
post-project HOV volume was significantly higher than before, and the redistribution impact of 
volumes from the peak hours to the peak shoulder was apparent. Also, as the most conspicuous 
benefit, FasTrakTM users could save up to 20 minutes under the worst congestion conditions. At 
the end of the three-year evaluation, enough revenue was raised to fund a new express bus 
service, Inland Breeze. Overall public opinion of this policy was positive with relatively strong 
support from the carpoolers and express bus service users; and most of I-15 respondents agreed 
on the idea of imposing tolls on solo drivers in using HOV lanes. 
However, the current pricing structure did not realize marginal cost since the price did 




concern, the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) is planning expansion of the 
current system to create a 20-mile managed lanes facility with dynamic tolling. The per-mile fees 
will fluctuate on the basis of the value of travel time saved between the managed lanes and 
general purpose lanes (FHWA, 2007). 
 
HOT Lanes on Two Radial Corridors in Houston (I-10 and US 290) (FHWA, 2004b; FHWA, 
2005b; and Burris and Appiah, 2003) 
Houston’s “QuickRide” pricing program was launched for the existing HOV lanes of I-10 in 
January 1998 and in November 2000 for US 290. The reversible HOV lanes are restricted to 
vehicles with three or more occupancy during the peak hours. The pricing program allows two-
person carpool vehicles to use the HOV lanes by paying $2.00 toll per trip, while single-occupant 
vehicles are not allowed to use the HOV lanes. This project sustains only electronic transactions, 
and there is no cash on the facility. Results from surveys conducted on I-10 indicate that the 
primary source of QuickRide participants were persons who formerly traveled in single-occupant 
vehicles in the regular lanes. Toll revenues pay for all the operational costs of the program. 
After five years in operation (three years on US 290), the QuickRide program receives 
comparatively lower patronage than the I-15 HOT lane project. The primary issue limiting 
QuickRide use appears to be the inconvenience of carpooling rather than cost. 
 
Express Lanes on State Route 91 in Orange County (FHWA, 2004b; FHWA, 2005b; and OCTA, 
2004) 
Since December 1995, the S.R. 91 Express Lanes have been operated in a 10-mile section of that 
freeway, which is very congested during peak periods. According to the toll schedule effective 
August 2005, the tolls on the express lanes range between $1.10 and $7.75 based on the time of 
day to maintain free-flow traffic condition for the tolled lanes. Beginning in May 2003, vehicles 
with occupancy of three or more can receive a 50% discount Monday through Friday between 
4:00 pm and 6:00 pm, and can get an exemption on their tolls for the rest of those periods. A toll 
exemption is also applied for zero-emission vehicles and disabled person’s license plates. 
By the end of fiscal year 2005, it was reported that there were over 172,000 transponders 
circulating. During that fiscal year, about 12.7 million vehicles were served, averaging 35,000 




total demand on SR 91 during congested periods, which in turn results in a 33% higher 
throughput than the general purpose lanes. 
 
London Congestion Pricing (Litman, 2005) 
In February 2003, the city of London, England imposed a charge to drive into the city center, an 
eight-square-mile area, as a way to reduce traffic congestion and raise revenues for transport 
improvements. The charging zone was expanded in February, 2007 and the charge for entering 
the zone is about $15 a day during working hours Monday through Friday. An automated system 
checks vehicles entering the charging zone against a database of motorists who have paid the fee. 
Despite considerable controversy, the program was implemented without major problems, and 
has substantially reduced traffic congestion, improved bus and taxi service, and is generating 
revenues. Vehicle traffic speeds have increased and bus transit service has improved, while 
accidents and air pollution have declined in the city center. Public acceptance has grown and the 
mayor was reelected in 2004 largely due to the success of the congestion pricing program. This 
was the first congestion pricing program in a major European city, and its success suggests that 
congestion pricing may become more politically feasible elsewhere.  
 
Highway 407 (www.407etr.com) 
Highway 407, the Express Toll Route (ETR), is a multi-lane, electronic highway running 69 
kilometers across the top of the Greater Toronto Area, from Highway 403 in Oakville to Highway 
48 in Markham. The first phase of the highway opened in 1997 and runs from Highway 410 in 
Brampton to Highway 404 in Markham. It was constructed in a partnership between Canadian 
Highways International Corporation, a private company specializing in highway development, 
and the Province of Ontario. It is now owned by 407-ETR International, Inc. Fees are 10¢ per 
kilometer (16.1¢/mi) during weekday peaks, 8¢ per kilometer (12.9¢/mi) during weekends and 
off-peak periods, and 4¢ per kilometer (6.4¢/mi) at night. About 70% of tolls are collected 
through the use of electronic transponder cards that deduct charges from prepaid accounts, and 
30% using a license plate photography billing system. Speeds on Highway 407 are about double 
that of parallel free highways. Peak-hour traffic volumes average 11,000 to 12,000 vehicles. 






Cordon Tolls in Rome (PRoGRESS, 2004a, 2004b) 
The central area of Rome, Italy, having about 42,000 residents and over 116,000 workers, was 
selected as the site for demonstration project for the Limited Traffic Zone (LTZ)—an example of 
the cordon toll. The access permits were adopted in a systematic way in 1994, and the automatic 
operation started in October 2001. The main objectives of this project were to control the number 
of vehicles entering the congested area and to promote public transport to the historic center. This 
demonstration project was undertaken to assess the impact of different road pricing schemes, 
based on both a per-trip and a time-based charging structure in the LTZ during operation times 
ranging from 6:30 am to 6:00 pm during the weekdays and from 2:00 to 6:00 pm on Saturday.  
The major institutional background that supported road pricing in Rome includes national 
laws on land use and environmental protection, and regional and local regulations on parking 
time and car circulation, the purpose of which are to protect human health, public order, and 
environmental and cultural city heritage. According to a user survey on the acceptance of the 
system, the majority of residents and shop owners perceived the access control of Rome as a good 
idea. As a result of the implementation, considerable changes in trip mode from private to public 
transport have occurred. The area experienced a 10% decrease in traffic during the day with a 
larger reduction of 15% during the morning peak hour, a 10% increase of two-wheelers, and a 6% 
increase in public transport. After the demonstration that was conducted until 2004, access 
restriction to the central area of Rome is being implemented, combined with pricing scheme. 
 
Cordon Tolls in Trondheim (PRoGRESS, 2004a, 2004b) 
A full scale electronic cordon toll scheme in Trondheim, Norway was initiated in 1991 with a 
major upgrade in 1998 when the old toll ring was replaced by a zonal charging system for the 
whole urban area. A technological option based on the dedicated short range communication 
(DSRC) standard was introduced in 2001. The PRoGRESS demonstration in Trondheim consists 
of the long-term effect evaluation of existing tolling system, implementation of a new CBD ring, 
and a stated preference survey for a through-traffic charging system in the city center. 
Evaluation results showed that since the first implementation in 1991, this strategy 
decreased car use for the hours and places where the toll system was operating. Thus, although 
there was not significant decrease in the total number of trips, there were significant changes in 




In 2003, the toll system was revised to induce more reduction of congestion level. With 
the normal charge of 1.5 Euros (2.0 U.S. dollars), traffic level to/from the city center was 
declined by 10-15%. According to the public opinion survey conducted in 2003, the attitudes 
were generally positive toward the pricing scheme. 
 
2.3. Distance-Based Fees 
2.3.1. Outline 
 
Distance-Based Pricing (also called Pay-As-You-Drive and Mileage-Based) is based on how 
much a vehicle is driven. This approach could be the most appropriate alternative to ultimately 
replace the fuel tax and could become the principal revenue source for the nation’s transportation 
system. There are several different funding tools in this category, which are discussed below. 
 
Weight-Distance Truck Tolls 
Weight-distance truck tolls impose fees on freight carriers for their use of the road based on the 
weight and distance traveled (Fwa and Sinha, 1987b). The measurement of weight varies 
depending upon specific programs (i.e., actual weight, maximum laden weight, or axle 
configuration). The intent of such tolls is to recover the full costs associated with the operation of 
heavy vehicles on the road network. As discussed later in Section 3.4.3, the unit costs per mile 
traveled vary drastically according to the vehicle classes and weight. Therefore, the weight-
distance toll is a more equitable pricing method than fuel taxes because the roadway costs 
imposed by individual vehicles are more accurately reflected under this scheme. European 
countries recently began implementing this pricing scheme. 
 
Distance-Based Road User Fees (Vehicle-Mile-Traveled (VMT) Fees) 
Distance-based road user fees, called “VMT” fees, charge road users a fee that is proportional to 
the number of miles driven. Although traveled distances are reflected also in current fuel taxes, 




discriminate fees according to the jurisdiction of the highways and to distribute the revenue 
gained from each highway agency to the relevant governmental authority. 
 
The following section reviews examples and case studies under these pricing schemes, 
including Heavy Vehicle Fees (HVF) in Europe, VMT pilot projects in the U.S., and incubating 
VMT studies in Europe. 
 
2.3.2. Examples and Case Studies 
 
Austria: “GO” Weight-Distance Truck Toll Program (Schwarz-Herda, 2004) 
Launched in January 2004, the GO program charges a toll for all vehicles exceeding weight of 3.5 
tons. Fee rates are determined depending on the weight class and the number of axles. The 
technological system is configured by an on-board unit on each vehicle and 420 gantries 
distributed throughout the network. On the basis of DSRC signals, on-board units communicate 
with gantries for distance and fee rates information. In order to prevent toll evasion, vehicles are 
flagged for investigation when they are not equipped with on-board units or simply when the 
detection is failed. Truckers without equipments have to pay the tolls manually. The system is 
designed to be interoperable with the Swiss tolling program, by allowing automatic payment of 
Swiss drivers when they insert a chip in their on-board units.  
 
German “Toll Collect” Truck Toll (operational 2005) (PRoGRESS, 2004a, 2004b) 
Plans to introduce tolls on trucks beginning in 2003 were approved by the German cabinet in 
August 2001. Vehicles over 12 tons are charged 0.14-0.19 Euros per kilometers (0.31-0.42 U.S. 
dollars per mile), depending on the levels of emission and the number of axles. It was stated that 
the rationale of this plan is to transfer the financial burden to sustain roadway system from the 
general taxpayers to commercial heavy vehicles. The toll rates were designed to reflect road wear 
caused by incremental weights. The revenues generated from this toll project are dedicated to 






Swiss “HVF” Truck Toll (PRoGRESS, 2004a, 2004b; Werder, 2004) 
Heavy goods vehicle fee (HVF) of Switzerland charges all vehicles using any link of Swiss road 
network (not just highways) with a maximum laden weight exceeding 3.5 tons, since its 
launching in January 2001. The fees are calculated on the basis of distance traveled, maximum 
laden weight, and the emission class of the vehicle. Intending to motivate a freight modal shift 
from road to rail, the pricing structure is designed to reflect both the direct and external costs of 
truck travels. Fee calculation and collection are taken place by the technological configuration 
based on on-board units featuring GPS and DSRC signals, supported by vehicle’s tachometer 
(including odometer information). Installment of on-board unit is mandatory for all Swiss 
vehicles and optional but encouraged for foreign vehicles. The DSRC signals are used for 
communication on the primary arterial network, while communication on the minor network is 
based on the GPS signals. In both cases, odometer information is used to meter the distance 
traveled on Swiss roads. Truck traffic, which had increased by 5-6 % annually before introduction 
of the toll, is now significantly decreasing (e.g., an average reduction was 5% in each of the first 
two years). 
 
RUFTF (Road User Fee Task Force) in Oregon (Whitty, 2003; FHWA, 2007) 
Under a mandate from the state legislature, the Oregon Department of Transportation has 
organized a Road User Fee Task Force conducting a pilot study of mileage-based user fees and 
area-wide congestion tolls, facilitated by on-board units featuring GPS receivers and short wave 
radio communications. The technology platform was demonstrated successfully in May 2004. In 
the fall of 2005, 20 trial vehicles were equipped with the on-board technology for an initial trial 
run of six months. After the verification of technological functionality, 260 trial vehicles in 
Portland were equipped with on-board units to participate in a one-year period demonstration. 
During the period, participants paid distance charges instead of the fuel tax by receiving rebates 
on the standard fuel tax at gas stations where they are charged mileage fees. The demonstration 
was completed in summer 2007. Depending on the evaluation of study results, legislation to enact 








GPS Based Pricing in the Puget Sound Region, Washington (FHWA, 2005b; FHWA, 2007) 
The Puget Sound Regional Council is conducting a test of congestion tolls at network level. 
Approximately 350 households, collectively owning close to 500 vehicles, participated in the 
study. Each vehicle owned by a participating household was equipped with an on-board unit, 
complete with cellular communications and a GPS receiver. The proposed technological 
configuration enables detection of vehicle location, calculation of the ensuring charge, and 
periodic uploading of the data to a central computer center. The study does not include time-
dependent distance-based user fees, but instead is designed to evaluate the behavioral response of 
drivers to congestion-adjusted distance pricing (the study includes a built-in mechanism to 
provide a financial reward for drivers who reduce their level of travel during peak congestion 
periods). A prototype for the on-board unit was demonstrated successfully during the summer of 
2004, and the operational portion of the project was completed in the spring of 2006. As a result 
of the demonstration, drivers’ behavioral data was collected and analyzed to obtain demand 
elasticity with respect to distance-based charging. It was found that such a toll system could 
reduce vehicle use during peak travel times by approximately 10%. 
 
ARMAS Pan European Tolling Project (Gomes et al., 2004; Sorensen and Taylor, 2005) 
On behalf of the European Union, the European Space Agency has initiated the Active Road 
Management Assisted by Satellite (ARMAS) program. ARMAS involves the use of on-board 
vehicle equipment incorporating satellite-based positioning information and cellular 
communications. Initial trial applications focus on electronic road tolling, which may be 
implemented across all of Europe as early as 2010. Additional applications envisioned for the 
technology include improved safety (obstacle detection and avoidance, incident warnings, etc.), 
increased traffic management capabilities (e.g., electronic speed advisory and enforcement), fleet 
management support, and dynamic route guidance services. The preliminary feasibility study for 
ARMAS was completed successfully in November 2003. Upon the completion of trial projects in 
October 2006, architecture definition, feasibility assessment, and the demonstration of a test-bed 
focused on electronic fee collection were covered. In the next phase of the project, extensive trials 
with a larger number of vehicles will be performed, supported by engagement of several 
stakeholders both from public and private sectors in Portugal, Netherlands, and Ireland. This 




2.4. Toll Roads and Privatization 
2.4.1. Outline 
 
Privatization offers the potential to increase governmental revenue through lease arrangements 
for right-of-way access along interstates or other highway access points. Public-private 
partnerships and private infrastructure investments are most likely to result in toll roads to recover 
investments that may also tackle congestion problem (SCDOT, 2003). In this section, examples 
are discussed to identify possible directions for implementation. 
 
2.4.2. Examples and Case Studies 
 
The Dulles Greenway (Samuel, 2005) 
A 14-mile toll road in Loudoun County, Virginia between VA-28 near the entrance of 
Washington Dulles International Airport and US 15 in Leesburg was sold to a private company. 
Designated as State Route VA-267, the Greenway toll road and the land on which it is built are 
owned by TRIP-II, a company owned by local investors. In the Greenway’s early years, traffic 
was well below projections, leading to a financial restructuring. But over the past five years, as 
development has boomed in Loudon County, traffic has increased to such an extent that the 
Greenway is being widened. 
 
The 91 Express Lanes (Samuel, 2005) 
The 91 Express Lanes project is a 10-mile long toll road within a freeway built by the California 
Private Transportation Company (CPTC) in the median of SR 91 (the Riverside Freeway). CPTC 
was successful financially but ran into heavy political trouble over a non-compete clause in its 
contract with the state of California. The Express Lanes were purchased by the Orange County 




publicly owned. The toll road has received awards and other recognition for excellence in 
customer service. 
 
The Camino-Colombia Toll Road (Samuel, 2005) 
The Camino-Colombia Toll Road (CCTR) near Laredo, Texas is 22 miles long and extends from 
I-35 to the Colombia Solidarity Bridge on the Rio Grande River, one of four Mexico-U.S. toll 
bridges in the Laredo-Nuevo Laredo area. The bridge was built for $90 million by a company 
formed by large landowners along its route led by a businessman from a long-established local 
family. It opened in October 2000 hoping to attract significant truck traffic at a $16 toll for 18-
wheelers. The project was a dismal financial failure. The borrowers foreclosed and Camino 
Colombia is now owned by the Texas Department of Transportation for the price of $20 million. 
The state has a brand new toll road for the cost of 22 cents on the dollar. 
 
SR 125-South (Samuel, 2005) 
SR 125-South is a 9.3-mile north-south toll road under construction along the eastern fringe of the 
San Diego, California metro area. As well as providing connectivity to the area freeways for 
residents, the toll road will provide an alternative for international traffic using the well-equipped 
Otay Mesa border crossing to Mexico. Owned by the Sydney, Australia-based Macquarie 
Infrastructure Group, SR 125-South is expected to cost about $650 million. 
 
Chicago Skyway (SCC, 2005; MIG, 2007) 
The Chicago Skyway in Illinois is a 7.8-mile toll road connecting Interstate 90 at the Dan Ryan 
Expressway on the west end, and the Indiana Toll Road on the east end. Previously a publicly-
owned toll road, which served 17.4 million motorists to yield $39.7 million dollars in 2003, was 
leased to a private operator in 2005. The Skyway Concession Company (SCC), a joint-venture 
between Australian Macquarie Infrastructure Group and Spanish Cintra Concesiones de 
Infraestructuras de Transporte S.A., paid $1.83 billion to the City of Chicago for a 99-year 
operating lease. This agreement is the first privatization of an existing toll road in the U.S. The 
toll is $2.50 for passenger cars and other two-axle vehicles with higher rates for vehicles, with 






Indiana Toll Road (MIG, 2007) 
The Indiana Toll Road is a tolled freeway which runs the full length (157 miles) of the northern 
part of Indiana and is a part of the New York-Chicago toll road system. Carrying 145,000 
transactions on an average day and having been operated by the Indiana Department of 
Transportation for the past two decades, the toll road is now owned by the Indiana Finance 
Authority and operated by the Indiana Toll Road Concession Company. The Concession 
Company, a joint-venture between Spanish Cintra Concesiones de Infraestructuras de Transporte 
S.A. and Australian Macquarie Infrastructure Group offered $3.85 billion for a 75-year lease. The 
concessionaire agreement includes implementation of over $770 million in planned upgrades to 
the expressway. Standard passenger cars are charged a toll of $4.15 along the section from 






2.5. Possible Guidelines for Implementation 
 
Guidelines for implementation can be drawn by observing experiences of other states and 
countries. The following sections synthesize considerations and suggestions that could lead to 
successful implementation of pricing schemes, including their design, technology used, legal and 
institutional issues, and public acceptability. 
2.5.1. Design of Pricing Schemes 
 
Congestion Pricing 
1. The optimal pricing: 
In order to pursue efficiency of the transportation sector and to maximize social welfare, toll/fee 
rates should reflect as closely as possible the marginal cost of each trip taking into account its 
impact on others. Charges may be set to exceed marginal costs as a means of obtaining additional 
revenues at a slightly excess burden, justified possibly in naive terms as a surcharge. However, 
there is no excuse for charges below the marginal social cost as it would obstruct efficient 
allocation of resources (Vickrey, 1994). 
2. Dynamic structure of tolls: 
Tolls should be time-variable and should vary smoothly over time in a way that users can predict 
the changes. Only in this way can all travelers be given an incentive to shift the time of travel, if 
only by small amounts, away from the peak. If charges vary drastically over periods, it is likely 
that there will be spikes in demand before and after the period during which the fee is high 
(Vickrey, 1994). Consequently, it can hardly be expected that peak period travelers would be 
willing to make substantial shift in departure time to pay a lower toll. On the contrary, when tolls 
are designed to vary smoothly, more travelers would consider change in departure time (small 
amount in this case, e.g., 10 minutes), and eventually travel demand would be more evenly 





3. Selection of congestion-pricing-applicable corridors: 
Applicability of congestion pricing scheme is determined by several factors. First of all, it is 
applicable to roadways where there exists a certain level of congestion. In understanding levels of 
congestion, the Travel Time Index (TTI), which measures the ratio of the average travel time to 
the free flow travel time, can be referred to. Table 2.1 provides comparison of TTI values 
between major corridors of Indiana (I-65 and I-70) and I-10. It is noted that congestion level of I-
70 is higher than that of I-10, where congestion pricing is being successfully implemented. 
Table 2.1 TTI for Selected Corridors, April-June 2004 




Source: FHWA (2004a) 
 
A level of highway congestion cannot act as a sole determining factor, however, as there 
are several other aspects that influence outcome of pricing.  FHWA (2003) notes that congestion 
pricing schemes that include HOT lanes work best in large metropolitan areas in high density 
corridors where there are limited travel options. The lack of free-flowing parallel routes, together 
with limited transit options, makes toll lane options more attractive when revenue generation is 
the major objective of pricing. More importantly, it should be noted that the notion of successful 
implementation should be used carefully, considering all the objectives of pricing projects. 
Tolling may return a great deal of revenue but may not have a significant impact on congestion 
mitigation due to excessive restrictions on travel alternatives to avoid the tolls. 
4. Demand impact outlook: 
Changes in the prices of transportation options will cause changes in their demand. Different 
types of pricing will cause different types of travel changes. Road pricing in general would shift 
traffic to alternative non-tolled roads, while time-variable congestion pricing could also cause 
changes in departure time.  If travel alternatives such as public transits are attractive to the current 




pricing are used to expand roadway capacity that would otherwise not occur, it may increase total 
demand (rebound effect) (VTPI, 2005a). 
In short, the travel impacts of pricing depend on many factors, including the price 
structure, the quality of the alternatives (competing routes, destinations, and modes), and 
allocation of the toll/fee revenues. Demand elasticity values with respect to travel cost (including 
gas price and road tolls) under various circumstances are reviewed in Section 3.2.3. 
5. Support of public transit: 
In most cases, where the tolled section of highway is acting as a major commuting route, agencies 
usually provide a public transit system with appropriate toll charging. Most recent cases have 
introduced a new rapid/express service, adding express options to the current service structure or 
changing the existing services to express level. Basically, this approach is about providing a 
higher level of service for alternative modes, even with new tolls to pay. This is also one of the 
key challenges of the public acceptability issue. 
 
Weight-Distance Truck Tolls 
6. Determining toll levels by looking at cost study: 
The fundamental reasons to have this type of pricing scheme are to control truck demand and to 
realize the full user costs of heavy vehicles including the externalities they are imposing on the 
system. In order to set up accurate bases of tolling, the costs per vehicle weights and types should 
be established based on a cost study of each vehicle class. A cost allocation study by FHWA 
(1997, 2000a) calculated the equity ratio for each vehicle class by comparing the revenue 
generated from and cost introduced to the system by each vehicle class. For example, in Table 
2.2, single unit trucks that weigh more than 50,000 pounds pay only 40% of the costs they are 
bringing to the system. Pickups, single unit trucks smaller than 25,000 pounds, and combination 




Table 2.2 Highway Costs and Equity Ratios by Vehicle Classes 
Vehicle Class/ Registered Weight Cents per Mile Equity Ratio 
Passenger Vehicles   
Autos 0.81 1.0 
Pickups/Vans 1.11 1.5 
Buses 0.67 0.2 
All Passenger Vehicles 0.89 1.1 
Single Unit Trucks   
<25,000 pounds 3.28 1.5 
25,001 - 50,000 pounds 3.88 0.7 
>50,000 pounds 7.32 0.4 
All Single Unit Trucks 3.78 0.9 
Combination Trucks   
<50,000 pounds 4.92 1.4 
50,001 - 70,000 pounds 5.25 1.0 
70,001 - 75,000 pounds 6.78 0.9 
75,001 - 80,000 pounds 6.97 0.8 
80,001 - 100,000 pounds 7.74 0.5 
>100,001 pounds 9.01 0.4 
All Combination Trucks 6.75 0.8 
All Classes 1.23 1.0 
Source: FHWA (2000a) 
 
7. Alternative freight modes: 
Once truck tolls are implemented, a certain portion of freight demand might seek some other 
mode to be shipped. This parallels providing public transit to toll pricing schemes. It is easily 
expected that other modes, such as railways, waterways, etc. will see increased demand. 
 
Distance-Based Fees 
8. Determining toll levels through a pilot study: 
The Road User Fee Task Force of Oregon set up a fee rate of passenger cars to be 1.2 cents per 
mile (in 2004 dollars) for its pilot study on VMT fees (Whitty et al., 2006). The unit rate was 
calculated by dividing the Oregon’s current state fuel tax of 24 cents per gallon by the 2004 




Given that the objective of the VMT fees is to bridge the revenue deficit gap of current 
fuel taxes, the fee rates based on the revenue needed and the vehicle-miles driven could be higher 
than the current fuel taxes. However, during the phase-in period, 20 years in Oregon’s case, it 
would be necessary for the state to operate both the fuel tax and the mileage fee. Therefore, if the 
VMT rate is a great deal higher than the fuel tax, it would be difficult to induce users to pay the 
new fees replacing fuel taxes. 
 
Privatizing Toll Roads 
9. Determining franchising price: 
The ratio of price to current revenue for the Chicago Skyway and Indiana Toll Road, which were 
recently franchised for a 99-year and 75-year concession period respectively, can provide 
guidance on the franchise purchase price. The franchise price for the Chicago Skyway, of which 
the annual revenue was $43 million in 2004, was $1.8 billion, while the Indiana Toll Road that 
collected $85 million in 2004 was contracted out for $3.8 billion. Assuming 4% of interest rate, 
the ratios of the annuity of the franchise price to the annual revenue can be calculated and 
compared as exhibited in Table 2.3. The ratios of the two highways are comparable with each 
other and could be referred to as guidelines. 
Table 2.3 Comparison of Ratios of Franchise Prices to Annual Revenues 
 a. Franchise Price b. Annuity c. Annual Revenue d. Ratio b/c 
Chicago Skyway $1.8B (99 years) $73.5M $43M in 2004 1.71 
Indiana Toll Road $3.8B (75 years) $160.5M $85M in 2004 1.89 
 
2.5.2. Technological Concerns 
 
The processing within an electronic charging system comprises several technological 
components. In the case of distance-based fees, the system needs to measure the traveled distance 




with considerable concerns for privacy protection. As far as toll charging for individual facilities, 
necessary instant detection and payment processes have been successfully implemented in many 
real applications. The system also needs to be equipped with sufficient tools to deter users from 
avoiding payment. Following are the most commonly embedded technologies for these tasks 
(Sorensen and Taylor, 2005): 
 
• On-Board Unit (OBU): The OBU is a computer module that is used for storing vehicle-
specific information, recording distances driven, and calculating user charges. It can be 
designed to cooperate with other technologies such as DSRC or GPS.  
• Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC): DSRC is a microwave-based short-
distance communication between receivers installed in vehicles and roadside 
transponders. This technology is commonly used to identify vehicles entering or exiting 
road sections or geographical areas and to charge user fees on the basis of the pre-coded 
rates.  
• Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM): GSM is a satellite-based cellular 
communication that may be used to replace DSRC. It is commonly known that GSM 
costs more than DSRC, but it does not require construction of roadside gantries. 
Advantages of this technology include multi-purpose usage, real-time communication, 
and flexibility for potential system expansion.  
• Global Positioning System (GPS): GPS is a satellite-based location technology. When 
integrated with the OBU, it can be used to collect vehicle location and travel information 
such as distance and speed.  
• Odometer: Odometers installed in individual vehicle may be useful in distance-based 
pricing as they record distance information. Some see its potential to be paired with the 
GPS system.  
• Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR): Based on digital photography and 
optical character recognition (OCR) algorithm, the ALPR system identifies vehicle on 
roads.  
• Internet and On-Line Billing: These technologies often are used to automate the billing 






Guidelines on DSRC Application 
1. Applicability of DSRC system: 
DSRC can be used to measure the distance traveled across a limited part of road network, which 
is equipped with gantries or road-side beacons; to toggle the status of the on-board unit between 
when entering or leaving a particular area (in case of cordon pricing); to verify that an on-board 
unit is functioning as required; or to communicate billing data (Sorensen and Taylor, 2005). 
2. Reliability of DSRC system: 
DSRC has been used successfully in I-15 HOT lanes in San Diego, cordon tolls in Singapore, and 
in weight-distance truck tolls in Austria and Switzerland. Also in Europe, both Trondheim and 
Rome have implemented tag-based DSRC systems, which have proven to be very reliable. The 
capture rate of the DSRC and on-board unit suite in the Trondheim implementation is better than 
99.5%, which satisfies the specification requirements. In spite of some remaining issues including 
signals distortion with metalized windshield and the limited battery life, it was shown that DSRC 
systems generally provide a robust and well-tested technology (PRoGRESS, 2004b). 
 
Guidelines on ALPR Application 
3. Accuracy of ALPR system: 
ALPR system is advantageous in that it does not require equipment of on-board units at each 
individual vehicle. However, ALPR system can have unresolved problems caused by different 
shapes and sizes of license plate numbers, plates which are not retro-reflective, difficulties in 
reading under poor weather condition, non-standardized fonts, similarities between some 
letters/numbers, and insufficient control of ambient light at camera positions. 
In Rome, the overall reliability of the system was such that 73.6% of license plate 
numbers were identified successfully. Of the remainder, 6.9% were captured by the camera but 
could not be identified by the optical character recognition system, and 19.5% of the data were 
not useable (PRoGRESS, 2004b). 
4. Suitability of ALPR system for enforcement purposes: 
Given the limited accuracy of the ALPR system, its primary applicability is as an enforcement 
tool, targeting those who are trying to avoid a charge or who have forgotten to register. As in the 




system for incoming vehicles (PRoGRESS, 2004b). This approach is also used in the London 
cordon toll and for enforcement on the SR-91 HOT lanes near Los Angeles, California. On the 
other hand, applicability of ALPR for distance-based pricing schemes is limited due to its 
incapability to communicate with a vehicle’s on-board unit (Sorensen and Taylor, 2005). 
 
Guidelines on GSM Application 
5. Communication capability of GSM system: 
Unlike DSRC or chip cards, communications with GSM can occur at any time from any location 
on the road network. This GSM feature can be used in real-time routing and for emergency 
distress signals (Sorensen and Taylor, 2005). Gothenburg and Copenhagen experienced success 
in their cordon pricing demonstrations with GSM (PRoGRESS, 2003). Yet, a GSM system 
usually has higher costs than other simpler communication technology options; also, due to its 
longer distance of information transmission, the probability of unauthorized interception could be 
higher. 
 
Guidelines on GPS Application 
6. Applicability of GPS system: 
GPS is essential to large-scale road pricing schemes especially when it is required to distinguish 
regions or road types with different toll/fee rates. Generally, GPS works well in a wide-area 
pricing scheme, especially when there is a need to track vehicles, as in Oregon’s VMT pilot study 
(Whitty, 2003). Other systems, where GPS is employed or tested, including Swiss truck tolls 
(Balmer, 2004) and Bristol, Copenhagen, and Gothenburg (PRoGRESS, 2004b), proved that GPS 
can work well in region-wide pricing schemes. 
Although stand alone GPS can be used in usage metering, experience in the Oregon pilot 
study suggests that systems having a backup of an odometer toggle perform better in terms of 
measurement accuracy. Actually, GPS system can lose signal intermittently with the presence of 
tall obstacles such as trees and buildings. Therefore, a technological suite that uses an odometer 
toggle as a tool to meter the distance according to the location information sent through GPS was 





7. Resolution of GPS system: 
At the broadest level, GPS can be used to measure whether a vehicle is within or without a given 
geographic region, as in the Swiss truck toll (Balmer, 2004). At the intermediate level, it can be 
used to identify whether a vehicle is on a specific link (or, by extension, on a particular class of 
road), such as in the German truck toll (Rothengatter and Doll, 2002). Finally, at the most refined 
level, GPS potentially can be used to detect the presence of vehicles within specific lanes on a 
given road (for example, to implement HOT lane pricing (Sorensen and Taylor, 2005). 
 
Guidelines for General Technology Issues 
In choosing technological solution to road pricing, it should be considered cost-effectiveness, user 
convenience, and accuracy (Vickrey, 1994). Critical issues are as the following: 
8. Initial stage system design: 
It is often observed that technological complexity can adversely affect punctuality and financial 
efficiency of a project delivery. For example, several projects that sought integration of GPS and 
GSM systems, such as German truck toll project and field trials of road pricing scheme in 
Copenhagen and Gothenburg, technical difficulties resulted in significant delay of the projects 
and cost overrun (PRoGRESS, 2003). 
9. Cost of system deployment: 
The larger the boundary to apply electronic toll collection technologies, the greater will be the 
initial costs. It is inevitable that governments will pass on the costs to deploy the system to the 
public as they will equip individual vehicles with devices such as OBU free of charge. 
10. Enforcement accuracy vs. costs: 
The ways to enforce a system efficiently can be one of the most critical issues in implementation. 
Costs can be prohibitive if the accuracy desired is very high. The experience with the existing 
systems indicates that there is no need to have a perfect enforcement system with 100% violation 
detection. After achieving a certain level of accuracy, that is, after people recognize that there is a 







11. Flexibility of future expansion: 
Although the current effect on VMT fees is limited to measuring and charging the distance 
traveled, the system may need to be enhanced in the future to distinguish travel by jurisdiction in 
order to distribute revenues to the relevant authorities for the facilities utilized. Preparation is 
therefore required to guarantee sufficient flexibility within the system so that it can be expanded 
without major alterations or expenditures. 
2.5.3. Legal and Institutional Issues 
 
Federal Level Legal Background of Pricing and Tolling 
The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act – A Legacy for Users 
(SAFETEA-LU) has provided increased flexibility to use tolling in a way not only to manage 
congestion, but also to finance infrastructure improvements. SAFETEA-LU specifies the 
following programs under which pilot or demonstration of toll projects are available (FHWA, 
2005a): 
• Under the new Interstate System Construction Toll Pilot Program, the Secretary may 
permit a State or compact of States to collect tolls on an Interstate highway, bridge, or 
tunnel for the purpose of constructing Interstate highways. This program is limited to 3 
projects in total (nationwide), and prohibits a participating State from entering into an 
agreement with a private entity which would prevent the State from improving adjacent 
public roads to accommodate diverted traffic. 
• The Interstate System Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Toll Pilot Program was 
established in TEA-21 to allow up to 3 Interstate tolling projects for the purpose of 
reconstructing or rehabilitating Interstate highway corridors that could not be adequately 
maintained or improved without the collection of tolls. SAFETEA-LU makes no 
revisions to the program, therefore it continues without change, as it was authorized for 
“a term to be determined by the Secretary, but not less than 10 years.” 
• The Value Pricing Pilot Program, which was authorized by the Transportation Equity Act 
for the 21st Century (TEA-21), is continued, funded at $59 million through 2009, to 




manage congestion and benefit air quality, energy use, and efficiency. A new set-aside 
totaling $12 million through 2009 must be used for projects not involving highway tolls. 
• The new Express Lanes Demonstration Program will allow a total of 15 demonstration 
projects through 2009 to permit tolling to manage high levels of congestion, reduce 
emissions in a nonattainment or maintenance area, or finance added Interstate lanes for 
the purpose of reducing congestion. A State, public authority, or public or private entity 
designated by a State may apply. Eligible toll facilities include existing toll facilities, 
existing HOV facilities, and a newly created toll lane. Tolls charged on HOV facilities 
under this program must use pricing that varies according to time of day or level of 
traffic; for non-HOV, variable pricing is optional. Automatic toll collection is required, 
and the Secretary must promulgate a final rule specifying requirements, standards, or 
performance specifications to ensure interoperability within 180 days. 
 
Federal Level Support for Seeking Innovative Funding Source 
A long-term strategy to finance highway and public transportation has been outlined by the 
Transportation Research Board (TRB, 2005) and the National Chamber Foundation (NCF, 2005). 
As discussed in detail in Sections 3.7 and 5.5, the long-term federal strategy for transportation 
funding is to eventually replace the current fuel tax with a federal VMT tax. 
In SAFETEA-LU, institutional efforts to help close the gap between highway 
infrastructure investment needs and resources available from traditional sources are encouraged. 
In addition to the tolling options addressed above, SAFETEA-LU includes the following 
provisions that would lead to development of innovative financing tools including ones through 
private sector participation (FHWA, 2005a): 
• Private Activity Bonds – SAFETEA-LU expands opportunity for new capital sources to 
finance nation’s transportation infrastructure system, especially bonding authority for 
private activity bonds, by adding highway facility and surface freight transfer facilities to 
a list of activities eligible for exempt facility bonds. Qualified projects, which must 
already be receiving Federal assistance, include surface transportation projects eligible 
under Title 23, international bridge or tunnel projects for which an international entity 
authorized under Federal or State law is responsible, and facilities for the transfer of 
freight from truck to rail or rail to truck (including any temporary storage facilities related 




activity bonds for State agencies and other issuers, but are subject to a separate National 
cap of $15 billion. 
• Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) – The TIFIA program 
provides Federal credit assistance to nationally or regionally significant surface 
transportation projects, including highway, transit and rail. This program was established 
in TEA-21 to fill market gaps and leverage substantial private co- investment by 
providing projects with supplemental or subordinate debt. SAFETEA-LU authorizes a 
total of $610 million through 2009 to pay the subsidy cost (similar to a commercial 
bank’s loan reserve requirement) of supporting Federal credit under TIFIA. To encourage 
broader use of TIFIA financing, the threshold required for total project cost is lowered to 
$50 million ($15 million for ITS projects), and eligibility is expanded to include public 
freight rail facilities or private facilities providing public benefit for highway users, 
intermodal freight transfer facilities, access to such freight facilities and service 
improvements to such facilities including capital investment for intelligent transportation 
systems. 
• State Infrastructure Banks (SIBS) – SAFETEA-LU establishes a new SIB program which 
allows all States to enter into cooperative agreements with the Secretary to establish 
infrastructure revolving funds eligible to be capitalized with Federal transportation funds 
authorized for fiscal years 2005-2009. This program gives States the capacity to increase 
the efficiency of their transportation investment and significantly leverage Federal 
resources by attracting non-Federal public and private investment. 
 
 
Guidelines for Institutional Issues  
1. Establishment of policy goals: 
Design of a road pricing scheme varies depending on policy goals such as revenue generation, 
congestion management, emission reduction, and so forth. In defining goals of road pricing 
projects, it is crucial to get key stakeholders involved in the process. It is observed that, at often 
times, congestion pricing projects have local advisory committees, which are made up of critical 
stakeholders from public, private, and nonprofit sectors, participate in goal establishment process. 




environmental impacts, public-private partnerships, and land use and equity impacts (Haltum and 
Zimmerman, 1996). 
2. Concerns at the initial stage of implementation: 
Generally, it is recommended that changes in public policy should be made in an incremental 
fashion. As a road pricing scheme is still a relatively innovative concept to the majority of the 
population, an incremental approach is best applied for it. Usually, actions involved with an 
incremental approach include small-scale demonstration or pilot study, pre-implementation 
analysis of traffic and revenue impacts, and public hearings or similar consensus building 
process. 
In procuring necessary pricing technologies, several contracting techniques can be 
considered. A single provider can be selected and assigned contractual obligation to deliver. 
Alternatively, when a pricing project can provide sufficient incentives for multiple companies to 
enter the market and compete with each other, free market provisions can be considered (Haltum 
and Zimmerman, 1996; Sorensen and Taylor, 2005). 
3. Interoperability between jurisdictions: 
Implementation of road pricing schemes entails more complicated issues when multiple 
jurisdictions involved than single one. It is therefore required to allow flexibility when initially 
designing a pricing project within the boundary of a single jurisdiction, expecting future 
expansion of the programs to adjacent jurisdictions. For example, a distance-based pricing 
scheme in Indiana, discussed later in the Section 4.3, may begin with the Indianapolis 
metropolitan area, then expanded to the entire state, and, in the long-term, to adjacent states. 
2.5.4. Public Acceptability 
 
Inherently, tax policies, as well as road user charging schemes, often face public reluctance in 
their implementation. In a democratic society, common consensus and public support is essential 
for policy-making; therefore, it is necessary to understand which factors affect public 




It is widely perceived that two of the major concerns in obtaining public acceptance are 
equity and privacy issues. For each of these issues, critical lessons were drawn from the pricing 
implementation cases described in Sections 2.2 through 2.4. 
 
Equity Concerns 
1. Equity concerns as a key factor to win public acceptance: 
It is advised that equity concerns should be paid attention as a key factor to gain public support 
for pricing projects. Relevant actions thus should be conducted in ways to ensure that all groups 
receive benefits, either through financial compensation or improved travel choices (Vickrey, 
1994). 
2. Equity impacts of revenue allocation: 
It is often argued that road pricing concepts are regressive, rather than progressive, since users are 
charged the same fees regardless of their income level. Decisions on toll revenue allocation, 
however, would have significant impacts on equity between users. For example, by returning the 
revenues to projects that could provide more and better travel options to low income groups, the 
regressiveness of the pricing structure could be offset. This approach is observed in several 
projects, including I-15 HOT lanes (SDSU, 2001) and London congestion toll (Litman, 2005) 
where public transportation systems are invested in. Alternatively, as proposed in the Fast And 
Intertwined Regular (FAIR) lanes approach, a portion of revenue can be allocated to offer credits 
for frequent users of general-purpose lanes so they can get benefits of using other transportation 
services such as public transits or parking facilities (Kockelman and Kalmanje, 2005). 
3. Suggestions on Revenue Allocation: 
The “rule of three,” as noted by Goodwin (1989) and reiterated by Farrell and Saleh (2005), 
allocates 1/3 of the revenues as a general tax revenue to decrease existing taxes or increase social 
spending; 1/3 for funding new road infrastructure and its maintenance (both according to national 
and local priorities); and the remaining 1/3 for improving the effectiveness of public 
transportation, through a combination of fare and service level improvements. 
Comparably, Small (1992) suggested tripartite divisions: 1/3 to reimburse to travelers as 
a group; 1/3 as a substitution for general taxes which are currently used to pay for transport 




widespread and thus alleviate the negative impacts. Small also asserted that this rule needs to be 
associated with other measures to achieve equity in financing. Those measures are: 1) to finance 
an employee commuting allowance program; 2) to remove all or part of any dedicated (to 
transportation) sales-tax that may apply in the region; 3) to rebate a portion of property taxes; 4) 
to finance new road capacity; 5) to finance public transportation improvements; and 6) to finance 
improvements in transportation-related facilities and services in business areas (Farrell and Saleh, 
2005). 
In spite of the general rules suggested, revenue portfolios can be differently designed 
depending on the primary purpose of a pricing project. When a pricing scheme mainly aims to 
generate revenue, the revenue can be allocated to transportation projects that are not directly 
related to the priced roadway. On the other hand, when the main goal of pricing is to manage 
congestion, the probability to achieve the goal would be high if the revenue is allocated to 
investments in alternative travel options. 
 
Privacy Issue 
As noted in the guidelines for technology, some of the technologies that collect individual travel 
information may infringe on a user’s right to privacy. Issues and suggested solutions are 
summarized below. 
4. Public attitude toward the privacy issue: 
In the initial stage of pricing projects, users are reluctant in revealing their travel pattern 
information. It is leant from the recent implementations, however, that users show reduced 
reluctance as they are more accustomed to the technologies that gather individual activity 
information, such as credit cards and cell phones. For example, in road pricing projects including 
SR-91 Express Lanes (Orange County, California) and Highway 407 Toll Road (Toronto, 
Canada), majority of the users (about 99%) used the transponders system that keeps the travel 
records (Poole, 2005). Also, in the Copenhagen and Gothenburg distance-pricing demonstration 
projects, surveillance was not considered by participants to be a major issue (PRoGRESS, 
2004b). 
5. Technological and legal protection of user’s privacy: 
Two complimentary approaches, technological solution and legal support, were suggested to 




technological configuration was designed to have an on-board unit store the toll rate information 
and calculate charges and only transmits the final bill to the concerned authorities. Under this 
technological specification, intermediate travel data are purged from the memory after being used 
in fee calculation and bill submission, never leaving the vehicle (Whitty, 2003). As an additional 
protection, it can be considered contract provisions with the concerned agents that guarantee the 
data will never be released or used for any purposes other than billing without a court order 
(Sorensen and Taylor, 2005). 
 
Building a Public Support 
6. Public outreach: 
It is necessary to insure that road pricing decisions are transparent and built on public 
participation and trust to avoid political interference (Vickrey, 1994). For public outreach, three 
important groups need to be targeted: citizens, elected officials, and institutional leaders from the 
transportation and planning professions and business and community organizations. These groups 
should be dealt with having different focuses: outreach to citizens should focus on understanding 
and involvement; communication with elected officials should aim to get leadership support from 
them; leadership coalition should be discussed with institutional leaders (Haltum and 
Zimmerman, 1996). 
At often times, pricing projects need the help of the media, especially at the early stage of 
implementations. It is critical to inform the media beforehand so distortion or inaccuracy of 
coverage could be avoided (Haltum and Zimmerman, 1996). Furthermore, the media can be used 
as a vehicle to educate the public about relevant topics including true costs imposed on the 
society due to congestion and high and increasing trend of costs to construct and maintain 
transportation infrastructure. 
7. Use of referendum: 
Referendum can be an effective means to gain public support as evidenced most recently. In 
2004, voters were asked to vote on 56 state and local transportation related ballots in the U.S., 
80% of which were approved by the voters. Especially in California at the 2004 elections, 9 of 12 
county measures approved even with the state-mandated 2/3 supermajority that is required to pass 




2.6. Development of Alternative Strategies 
 
Based on the information gathered, we can construct a system of alternatives to analyze and 
compare. The financing tools we have examined in this chapter, summarized in Table 2.4, can 
either complement or replace the current fuel tax system. 
Table 2.4 Road Pricing Categories 
Category Definition Primary Objectives 
Road  toll (fixed) Fixed fees imposed on particular 
road sections or bridges 
To generate revenue; to recover 
construction cost of new facilities 
Road toll 
(time-variable) 
Fees imposed on road sections or 
bridges in a manner that varies over 
time; variations could be pre-timed 
or responsive to congestion level 
To generate revenue; to manage 
congestion by shifting traffic to other 
routes, time periods, or modes 
Lane-specific pricing  
(HOT lanes, Express 
lanes) 
Fees differentiated by lanes of 
particular road sections 
To generate revenue; to maximize 
utilization of the road capacity both on 
priced lanes and general-purpose (GP) 
lanes; to manage congestion on GP lanes 
Area licensing Fees imposed for entering particular 
areas 
To manage congestion in major urban 
areas; to reduce parking demand 
Weight-distance fees Fees particularly associated with 
commercial heavy vehicles and 
imposed on the basis of combined 
measurement of weight and distance 
To generate revenue; to realize true 
highway cost incurred by heavy vehicles 
Distance-based fees Fees that directly charge the amount 
of highway usage on the basis of 
distance driven 
To generate revenue; to correct inequity 
between vehicles with different levels of 
fuel economy under the current fuel tax 
system 
 
The present study proposes three approaches. First, the current tax system, including fuel 
taxes, vehicle registration fees, and other general purpose taxes, is adjusted to meet funding 
needs. Second, the current fuel tax system is maintained and other revenue sources are considered 
to meet the expected deficit. With this approach, two types of user fees are considered: toll roads 
(by the public sector and by private concessionaires) and VMT fees. Third, the complete 
replacement of the fuel tax system is considered. In this approach, given that the state no longer 




Also, as a more elaborated version of the VMT fee scheme, a statewide comprehensive usage-




Figure 2.4 Alternatives for the State of Indiana 
In the following chapters, an evaluation framework is designed and alternatives are 
developed with detailed descriptions of their features. Also, each developed alternative is 





CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK FOR THE EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES 
3.1. Methodological Framework for Evaluation 
 
The present study identified the major evaluation categories and their criteria, upon which both 
quantitative and qualitative analyses for each alternative can be based. In measuring quantifiable 
factors, suitable computing tools are used. To understand the underlying features of the problem 
that are not easily quantified, results from qualitative analyses that include surveys or interviews 
are referred to. Evaluations on all the criteria are integrated to determine the desirable 
alternatives. 
 
3.1.1. Developing Evaluation Criteria 
 
Five major goals of a pricing and funding system were selected in the present study, as shown in 
Table 3.1. The first goal would be to yield the targeted revenue in a predictable way. Therefore, 
the sufficiency, stability, and accountability of revenue should be assessed from the agency’s 
perspective.  
The second goal of a funding system is to allocate resources in an efficient way.  
Theoretically and ideally, the efficiency of a system can be quantified by measuring the social 
welfare based on the consumer surplus theory. As discussed in Section 3.3, selection of optimal 
fees and attainment of system efficiency are intertwined and can be addressed under the same 
framework. 
In addition, the present study provides a methodological framework to evaluate equity 
implication of pricing schemes. Equity between users is evaluated by breaking down highway 




Allocation Study can be used as an analysis tool to allocate highway cost responsibility between 
various user groups and to establish equitable pricing structure.  
Usually, innovative approaches associated with new technologies require additional costs 
for initial installation, deployment, operation, and administration. If a funding scheme requires 
prohibitive system costs, then it will considerably lose its value as a revenue-generating tool. 
Therefore, the costs of a system need to be considered in selecting the best option from the 
agency’s perspective. Public acceptability and policy alignment with federal policies are both 
important aspects and should be considered, although development of rigorous methods to assess 
these criteria is lacking.  
The goals, criteria, and broad possible outcomes for each of the alternatives are shown in 
Table 3.1. This chapter presented an information search to find methodologies to fill up each cell 
in this table, and the present study will conclude in Chapter 5 with a completed table addressing 
all possible alternatives. 




Tax increase (fuel taxes, 
vehicle registration fees, 
etc.) 
Alternatives to replace 
current system (VMT 
fees) (partly or fully) 
Revenue 
Sufficiency Less achievable Achievable Achievable 
Stability Less achievable Need analysis Depends on fee rates 
Accountability Less achievable Less achievable More achievable 
Efficiency Total social welfare Less efficiency 
Less efficiency can be 
expected 
More efficiency can be 
expected 
Equity User-pay principle Not fully addressed Not fully addressed Fully addressed 
Implementation 
Costs 
Physical costs of 
system None Little High 
Cost of 
administration None Modest High 
Public 
Acceptability Public reluctance None 
Will depend on the tax 
increase rate, and public 
awareness/sensitivity 












3.2. Adequacy of a Funding Mechanism 
3.2.1. Revenue Sufficiency and Stability 
 
As need studies at federal and state levels have shown, a budget is required that provides an 
optimal level of transportation facilities and services. By projecting revenues generated from each 
of the alternatives and comparing them with need study results, the revenue sufficiency of 
alternatives can be appraised. 
There is common doubt regarding the stability of motor fuel tax revenues because of the 
way the tax is levied. The number of gallons consumed, which is the basis of fuel tax revenue, 
continues to grow since VMTs have increased more than fuel economy enhancements in recent 
years. Along with the fuel consumption increase, current dollar receipts from the state motor fuel 
tax have increased steadily in recent years, but at a much lower rate compared to road 
construction prices (SCDOT, 2003). Furthermore, because the motor fuel tax rate has not changed 
much since the mid-1980s, revenues in constant dollars have even decreased for the last decade. 
To secure stability of the revenue streams, competition between jurisdictions also needs 
to be considered. For example, if the motor fuel tax of a state, and thus the fuel price, is 
significantly higher than adjacent jurisdictions, then it is highly probably that the residents on the 
border might fuel their vehicles in neighboring states with lower prices, even though they mainly 
use facilities within their state of residence. In this situation, neither the revenue aimed nor the 




Accountability is defined as the ability to ensure the degree to which taxpayers are able to get 
their money’s worth from the government. In this respect, it needs to be asked whether 




targeted to priority transportation needs. For transportation funding alternatives to enhance 
accountability, a clear connection between revenue sources and program expenditures is required. 
That is, an increase in transportation taxes or fees should be earmarked specifically for 
transportation system improvements that are deemed to be priority issues (Goldman et el., 2001; 
SCDOT, 2003). 
From this perspective, income and other general taxes are not preferred since those taxes 
are not solely dedicated to transportation purposes. Very often the transportation sector faces 
competition with other sectors for general tax revenues, such as education, medical service, etc. 
On the other hand, a pricing scheme that is designed to adhere to the user-pay-principle more 
strictly will secure better accountability. The revenue distribution strategy also influences the 
level of accountability attained by a pricing scheme. Usually, if a certain charging scheme can 
distinguish users based on their use intensity and the revenues generated are assigned to relevant 
sub-systems in the transportation sector, then the system is considered a very accountable one. 
 
3.2.3. Impacts on Demand 
 
In the market economy, prices can have significant impacts on demand, or particularly, travel 
behavior in the context of the present study. Therefore, in order to assess revenue impact of a 
pricing scheme, demand elasticity values obtained from other pricing implementations can to be 
referred to. It should be noted that pricing impact on demand may vary according to project-
specific factors such as alternatives other than tolled roads, travel time of competing modes, 
demographic characteristics, and so on. In this regard, demand elasticity values with respect to 
tolls are reviewed under various circumstances as the following. 
Table 3.2 indicates the elasticity values for US toll roads from the review made by Matas 
and Raymond (2003), most of which were calibrated with short-run analyses. The values show 
that the elasticity ranges from -0.03 to -0.5 overall, provided that it is lower for monopolistic 





Table 3.2 Elasticity of Traffic Demand with respect to Tolls 
Authors Results Context 
Wuestefeld and Regan 
(1981) 
Roads between –0.03 and –0.31 
Bridges between –0.15 and –0.31 
Average value = –0.21 
16 tolled infrastructures in the 
U.S. (roads, bridges, and tunnels) 
Harvey (1994) Bridges between –0.05 and –0.15 
Roads –0.10 
Golden Gate Bridge, San 
Francisco Bay Bridge, and Everett 
Turnpike in New Hampshire 
(U.S.). 
Hirschman, McNight, 
Paaswell, Pucher, and 
Berechman (1995) 
Between –0.09 and –0.50 Average 
value –0.25 (only significant values 
quoted) 
Six bridges and two tunnels in the 
New York City area, U.S. 
Gifford and Talkington 
(1996) 
Own-elasticity of Friday–Saturday 
traffic –0.18 Cross-elasticity of 
Monday–Thursday traffic with 
respect to Friday toll –0.09 




–0.20 New Jersey Turnpike, U.S. 
Burris, Cain, and 
Pendyala  (2001) 
Off-peak period elasticity with 
respect to off-peak toll discount 
between –0.03 and –0.36 
Lee County, Florida, U.S. 
Source: Matas and Raymond (2003) 
 
 
Table 3.3 shows traffic demand elasticity with respect to fuel prices (Goodwin et al., 
2004). For example, 1% of the increase in fuel prices would yield a 0.1% decrease in traffic 
demand in the short-run, 0.3% in the long-run. Although the impacts of tolls cannot be identical 
to those of fuel prices since tolls are more site-specific, congestion-sensitive, and straightforward, 
they can be referred to in understanding the demand shifts with respect to cost changes because 
fuel prices represent the greatest part of vehicle operating costs. 
Table 3.3 Elasticity of Traffic Demand with respect to Fuel Prices 
Elasticities Short-term Long-term 
Vehicle-km (total) –0.10 –0.29 
Vehicle-km (per vehicle) –0.10 –0.30 





Harvey and Deakin (1998) studied California toll roads and estimated that two cents of 
increment in toll per mile would cause an average of a 4% reduction in the number of trips, as in 
Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 Impacts of 2¢ per mile Fee in Year 2010 
Region VMT Trips Delay Fuel VOC 
Bay Area -3.9% -3.7% -9.0% -4.1% -3.8% 
Sacramento -4.4% -4.1% -7.5% -4.4% -4.3% 
San Diego -4.2% -4.0% -8.5% -4.2% -4.1% 
South Coast -4.3% -4.1% -10.5% -5.2% -4.2% 
Average -4.2% -4.0% -8.9% -4.5% -4.1% 
Source: Harvey and Deakin (1998) 
 
 
Table 3.5 provides demand reduction impacts with respect to VMT fees by each income 
group. It is clear that, even with the same amount of fees, the demand reduction impact is 
significantly larger in lower income groups. Also, the gap between income groups expands as the 
unit charge increases. 
Table 3.5 Vehicle Travel Reduction of VMT Fee by Income Quintile (%) 
VMT Fees Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Overall 2001 
1¢ -7.0 -4.2 -2.6 -1.5 -0.5 -2.3 -1.8 
2¢ -13.3 -8.2 -5.1 -3.1 -1.0 -4.5 -3.5 
3¢ -19.1 -12.0 -7.5 -4.6 -1.6 -6.6 -5.1 
4¢ -24.3 -15.6 -10.0 -6.2 -2.2 -8.7 -6.7 
5¢ -29.1 -19.1 -12.4 -7.7 -2.8 -10.7 -8.2 
6¢ -33.5 -22.4 -14.7 -9.3 -3.5 -12.6 -9.7 
7¢ -37.4 -25.6 -17.0 -10.8 -4.1 -14.5 -11.2 
8¢ -41.0 -28.7 -19.2 -12.4 -4.8 -16.3 -12.5 
9¢ -44.2 -31.5 -21.4 -13.9 -5.5 -18.0 -13.8 
10¢ -47.2 -34.3 -23.5 -15.4 -6.3 -19.7 -15.2 






A quintile is one-fifth of the population. Values are based on 1991 dollars, except the last 
column, labeled 2001, which indicates travel reductions taking into account 30% inflation 
between 1991 and 2001. 
Different demand elasticity ranges under different circumstances and pricing schemes 
have been observed. However, more detailed analysis is needed to understand the demand shifts 
from peak periods to adjacent time periods after and before peaks and shifts between modes. 
 
3.3. Efficiency of Resource Allocation 
3.3.1. Definition of Economic Efficiency 
 
Economic efficiency refers to the net benefit of the society, which is the result of resource 
allocation. Thus, maximizing efficiency is equivalent to maximizing the total welfare of all the 
inhabitants within that society. 
A competitive market (e.g., the private sector) achieves its efficiency through market 
transactions with prices at the equilibrium. Prices convey signals to both the demand and supply 
sides about resource shortages, technological change, and consumer demand. Similarly, 
transportation market operated by the public sector mimic the competitive market by having user 
fees as proxies of market prices. Fuel taxes, road tolls, and other related fees are user fees that 
charge for transportation system use. 
The key to achieving efficiency in the public sector is to set the right prices to reflect the 
true costs. When true costs are not reflected in a pricing scheme, facilities and services that are 
underpriced are often overused and deteriorate more rapidly. Especially in transportation systems, 
the current market price structure does not include costs related to externalities such as safety, the 
environment, and congestion. For example, under congestion, when traffic demand exceeds road 
capacity, marginal costs are higher than average costs, indicating system inefficiency. The notion 
of value pricing is to address this inefficiency. 
Economic efficiency has two aspects. First, optimal tolls/fees should be determined 




changes in demand, thus the impacts of tolls/fees on demand are to be studied. Replicating the 
market mechanism, welfare changes in the system can be analyzed based on consumer surplus 
theory. 
 
3.3.2. Costs in Consideration 
 
In the previous section, it was indicated that efficiency is attainable when market prices are 
adequately set to reflect true system costs. Yet, exactly which components of costs should be 
considered as true costs can vary depending on objectives of pricing: allocative efficiency, cost 
recovery, adherence to the user-pays-principle, or income redistribution. Much debate has taken 
place among economists about short-run marginal cost (SRMC), long-run marginal cost (LRMC), 
and fully allocated cost (FAC). 
Many economists have defended SRMC, which would require price differentiation with 
respect to space, time, and vehicle characteristics, for its best potential to achieve allocative 
efficiency (Lindsey, 2006). As Rannaker (2004) noted, the full cost of an individual trip down a 
congested highway includes the personal cost of the traveler’s own time, cost of the vehicle 
operation, and the impacted costs to other travelers trying to use the highway at the same time 
(external cost). From that perspective, SRMC-based pricing scheme would resemble the 
competitive market economy with the most similarity. However, it should be noted that SRMC-
based pricing does not always guarantee recovery of cost for highway construction and 
maintenance. In this regard, LRMC or FAC, which takes into account capital costs, are favored. 
These various perspectives and charging concepts are compared in Table 3.6. 
In the next section, suggestion on pricing scheme by Mohring and Harwitz (1962) that 






Table 3.6 Comparison of Costs and Charge Concepts 
Category SRMC LRMC FAC 
Costs    
Return on capital Not relevant Not relevant Return on capital employed 
Infrastructure costs Facility wear caused by 
use 
Facility wear caused by use, 
and capital costs to increase 
capacity to accommodate 
growing demand 
All ongoing infrastructure 




Cost of an additional 
vehicle mile 
Cost of an additional vehicle 
mile 
All costs associated with 
providing services 
Congestion Costs imposed by one user 
on other transport system 
users 
Not included if capacity 
expansion leaves existing 
traffic unaffected 
Not relevant, since this cost is 
imposed and borne by 
infrastructure users as a group 
Mohring effect Benefits of increased 
public transport service 
frequencies due to 
additional demand 
Benefits of increased public 
transport service frequencies 
due to additional demand 
Not relevant, since this impact 
is imposed and borne by 
infrastructure users as a group 
Accidents External crash risk costs 
of an additional unit of 
travel 
External crash risk costs of an 
additional unit of travel 
External costs attributed to 




Cost of an additional unit 
of travel 
Cost of an additional unit of 
travel 
Costs of total vehicle travel 
Charges    
Fuel excise tax and 
road user charges 
Revenue associated with 
an additional vehicle mile 
Revenue associated with an 
additional vehicle mile 
Total revenue from fuel taxes 




If related to additional 
vehicle travel 
If related to additional vehicle 
travel 
All motor vehicle registration 
charges 
Goods and Services 
Tax (GST) 
On all costs On all costs On all costs 
Fares, freight tariffs 
and traffic fines 
Associated with an 
additional unit of travel 
Associated with an additional 
unit of travel 
All fares, taxes 
Source: VTPI (2005d) 
 
3.3.3. Optimal Pricing – Concept of Self-Financing 
 
Mohring and Harwitz (1962) established an important relationship between demand management 
and capacity policies which evolved into the self-financing theorem. The theorem states that 
revenue from optimal congestion pricing is equal to the cost of supplying the optimal road 




capacity can be expanded at constant marginal cost; and (iii) trip costs are homogenous of degree 
zero in usage and capacity. Past literature suggest that the second and third conditions may 
generally hold when the ratio of long-run average and marginal costs are often relatively close to 
unity, in a range of circumstances. The first condition also holds if the analysis is not for a single 
road segment but for a large-scale road network because capacity is considered divisible in a 
large network (Verhoef and Rouwendal, 2004). 
While the theorem may seem somewhat pedantic, it actually is conceptually simple. 
When it is carefully applied to a realistically represented transportation network, the resulting 
pricing scheme and capacity provision can yield a market equilibrium that ensures maximum 
efficiency. Furthermore, any concept that involves self-financing of a highway system lends 
increased transparency to the highway financing process. Therefore, transportation finance, when 
based on self-financing strategy, can be expected to receive greater support from the general 
public. The overall concept has often been referred to as the user-pay-principle. The critical first 
step of the transportation network representation is discussed below. 
Several studies have investigated the application of social welfare maximization to 
systems susceptible to congestion, for example, highways. These studies represent social welfare 
as a function of benefits from the use of highways and cost of its provision, and the maximization 
problem is solved for pricing and capacity choice of road networks. 
Arnott and Kraus (1995) constructed a social surplus maximization problem formulation 
for public goods such as highways, as follows: 
The price of using highways, including the user cost and any imposed toll, or “VMT fee” 
in this context, is denoted as p. The demand function and user cost function are written as N(p) 
and c(N, K), respectively. The user cost function increases with demand: N (i.e., ∂c/∂N, written as 
cN, is greater than 0); and decreases with capacity: K (i.e., ∂c/∂K, written as cK, is less than 0). It is 
noted that cN > 0 captures the impact of road congestion. On the supply side, F(K) denotes the 
cost function for construction and operation. The social surplus is equal to the consumers’ surplus 
plus toll revenue less construction/operation costs. The objective of this problem is to maximize 
the social surplus associated with the facility, as shown below: 




KFpNKpNcppdpNS ,  Eq 3.1 
The first-order condition gives: 




where Np = ∂N/∂p and F'  = ∂F/∂K. 
Assuming that the total cost function, ( ) ( ) ( )KFNKNcKN +⋅= ,,ϕ , which is the sum of 
the costs of all users and of the agency (construction and maintenance costs), is homogenous with 
degree one in N and K, then it is deduced from Euler’s Theorem that, 
ϕ=′+++ NFKNcNccN KN
2 ; 
Combining this with the first-order condition, the revenue at equilibrium is: 
( ) ( ) ( )******** , KFNcKNNcpR =−=−= ϕ  Eq 3.2 
In other words, with the optimal toll *** cp −=τ  and optimal capacity *K , with which 
the total revenue is equal to the total construction/operation costs, social surplus is maximized. 
Yang and Meng (2000, 2002) suggested an alternative approach that tailored the problem 
to a highway network. Their approach, which incorporates the concept of social net benefit 
maximization in a fundamentally similar manner to the Arnott and Kraus model, is described as 
follows: 
Consider a highway network with a set of directed links, A, a set of origin-destination 
pairs W and given link capacities ya. In this network, the demand function Dw maps the 
generalized cost of any given O-D pair, cw, onto its demand, dw; that is, dw = Dw(cw). Also, travel 
time on a link ta is determined by link volume va and capacity ya, in turn, the total link travel time 








ara fv δ , where 
w
arδ  is 1, if route r is between O-D pair w, and 0 otherwise. The link 
construction and operation cost, whose principal determinant is link capacity, is represented by 
the function ( )aa yI . 
On the basis of the notations above, the social net benefit function SS(f, y), similar to Eq 
3.1, is formulated as the consumer surplus plus toll revenue less the cost of providing the system. 
Thus, the maximization problem is represented as follows: 












1  Eq 3.3 
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v ,  Aa∈  Eq 3.4 
Assuming a “fee” on a link aτ , the generalized user cost at can be written as 











τ . If ( )aaa yvt , , the link cost function, is 
homogenous of degree zero and the construction cost is a linear function with respect to capacity, 
that is, ( ) aaaa yyI κ= , where κa is a constant, then we obtain: 
























κ= ,  Aa∈  Eq 3.5 
Eq 3.4 and Eq 3.5 yield: 
aaaa yv κτ = ,  Aa∈  Eq 3.6 
 
This conclusion implies that the revenue from the optimal user fee is equal to the agency 
cost (of preservation, operations, and maintenance). This holds for each link in the network. 
 
Computation of Optimal Pricing 
From the above discussion, and given a set of technical assumptions regarding the functional 
form of user demand (utility) and costs, the maximum social surplus is attained at the highway-
usage price at which total revenue equals the total cost. This is the core philosophy of self-
financing highway system. Furthermore, as concluded by Yang and Meng’s approach (2000, 
2002), if each link of highway system is assigned an adequate “fee” to cover the facility agency 
costs, in other words, if every link is self-financed, then the system attains the maximum 
efficiency. 
It can be noted that extensions of the maximization problem, which consider pricing 
differentiation between modes and continuously-incurred costs such as maintenance and 
operation expenses, are also possible. At the current time, however, this analytical tool has been 
usually applied for small and/or hypothetical networks where this complicated formulation of 
optimization problem can be solved in a closed form. The present study adopts the conclusion 
drawn from the problem formulations above and applies it to establish the optimum price of using 




Applying this concept, the unit rate of optimal pricing can be calculated based on 
expenditure and demand data. It is equivalent to the calculation of τa, when we know va (demand) 
and κaya (capital cost). Calculation results using expenditure and demand data available for 
Indiana are presented in Section 4.3 for several scenarios. 
One important issue that remains, as discussed in Section 3.3.2, is the determination of 
whether a particular pricing scheme is optimal or not and depends on the scope of the cost that 
needs to be covered by the revenue, such as short-term marginal costs, long-term marginal costs, 
and fully allocated costs. At the current stage, an optimal pricing scheme will be sought for fully 
allocated costs, as such data are readily available. 
 
 
3.4. Equity Impacts 
3.4.1. Definition of Equity 
 
Unlike efficiency, which deals with impacts of pricing on the system as a whole, equity—also 
called distributional—effect is considered in terms of specific user groups. A particular pricing 
strategy may work in a way to improve certain groups of people at the cost of others. It is 
alternatively also possible that even when a policy benefits every user in the system, the amount 
of benefit distributed to each user group may not be equitable. Pricing strategies often succeed or 
fail based on how the equity impacts are perceived by the stakeholders, and how well the equity 
concerns are addressed in the planning process (VTPI, 2005a). 
In order to address the equity issue related to a pricing scheme, it is required first to 
classify user groups to well represent the heterogeneity and homogeneity of the users, and then a 
measurement of the distributional impacts can be selected. There are three dimensions of equity, 
or classification of user groups, that are generally used in the transportation field: spatial equity, 
modal equity, and equity between income groups. These dimensions can be specified on the basis 
of cost, benefit, or ability-to-pay. These three dimensions of user classification and three 







The concept of spatial equity corresponds to Rawls’ “principle of liberty,” which states that 
society should guarantee the right of access to jobs, goods, and services from any location (Raux 
and Souche, 2003). In this research, spatial equity is evaluated by categorizing users based on 
their location of residence or jobs. 
 
Modal Equity 
The concept corresponds to the “principle of equal opportunity,” and involves the equality of 
treatment of different users and, in particular, the user-pays principle (Raux and Souche, 2003). It 
assumes that policies must not favor particular groups of people over others and thus implies that 
users should be charged the costs incurred to the system by their usage, i.e., “get what you pay for 
and pay for what you get” (VTPI, 2005a). Thus, by setting up a pricing scheme that charges users 
for the exact cost they impose, modal equity can be better achieved. Modal equity, however, can 
be compromised if a policy intends specific cross-subsidies between user groups, as exemplified 
in Section 5.2.2. 
 
Equity between Different Income Groups 
The concept corresponds to the “principle of difference,” which explicitly considers social 
inequalities and their consequences with regard to transportation (Raux and Souche, 2003). This 
concept deals with redistribution of the outcome between groups with different needs and abilities 
(VTPI, 2005a). Also, it entails an ideological and philosophical question as to what extent society 
should support those who are economically, socially, or physically disadvantaged. Often quoted 
definitions as guidelines for this question are progressivity and regressivity, which measure the 
extent a policy favors or disfavors economically and socially disadvantaged members of a 
society. Given that, equity between income groups is more complex to evaluate than modal equity 
since it requires knowing one more factor, the target level of progressivity/regressivity. In other 
words, we can conclude if a policy is desirably progressive only when the desirable level of 
progressivity is well defined in a measurable manner. 
Many transportation pricing policies are considered regressive since the pricing scheme 




fuel tax, a proportional burden to income is inherently higher for lower-income users than higher 
income users. However, the regressivity of pricing also depends on available travel options and 
revenue dedication policies (Wachs, 2003). For example, if toll revenues collected from relatively 
higher-income users are used in financing a public transit system for those who are less able to 
afford paying the tolls, it can be neutral or progressive with respect to income. 
 
Three Measurements of Equity 
Intertwined with these three dimensions (spatial, modal, and between income groups) are three 
different measurements of equity: cost, benefit, and ability-to-pay (Adams et el., 2001).  First, it is 
often argued that the system costs should be fairly distributed among users based on the amount 
of usage. Usage, in turn, is considered as a gauge of the damage or degradation brought to the 
system by its use. This concept is well represented in the Highway Cost Allocation Study in 
Section 3.4.3, which is an example of cost-basis modal equity evaluation. Another perspective of 
the equity issue is to pursue pricing schemes that charge users on the basis of the benefits they 
accrue from the system. The third approach is to duly consider users’ ability-to-pay by designing 
a progressive taxation and pricing policy so that lower-income users pay proportionately lower 
prices compared to other users. 
The quantitative analysis (Section 5.2.2) accomplished in the present study restricts its 
scope to spatial and modal equity on the basis of user costs measurement. It is because there is 
greater difficulty and less precision in measuring user benefits compared to costs. Also, 
determining the level of regressiveness/progressiveness of a taxation mechanism is not only a 
technical problem but also a political issue that requires legal support and public consensus. 
However, the impacts of alternative financing schemes on equity between different income 
groups are also discussed in Section 5.2.3. 
3.4.2. Self-Financing Concept and Equity Measurement 
 
In this study, the equity problem is viewed as the “breaking-down” of the efficiency problem, 
which means that the formulation described in the efficiency context in Section 3.3.3 can be 
applied. In the equity problem however, it is sought to maximize social surplus, albeit not for the 




be determined and the relative equity between groups can be computed. Equity will be measured 
or evaluated for each alternative on the basis of the system cost incurred by each user group. For 
quantitative evaluation (results presented in Section 5.2.2), the self-financing ratio concept is 
introduced. There are three dimensions under consideration: 
 
Spatial Equity 
A transportation policy may, by design or by default, discriminate among users according to the 
geographic locations of their residences and/or jobs. It is not rare for higher level governments 
(federal or state) to subsidize highway construction in areas that have small populations that may 
be “unprofitable” considering the population size or for other reasons. Equity is sought, thus in 
this research, between regional subgroups by population levels (rural and urban). 
 
Modal Equity 
Equity between modes secured by a particular pricing scheme can be appraised and compared by 
breaking down the entire system into modal subgroups to have separate welfare functions. Two 
different classifications of vehicle types are used in Section 4.3.2. 
 
Jurisdictional and Functional Independence 
A state’s highway system is administered and maintained by different levels of government, but 
not every governmental unit is self-financed. Usually, lower level governments are subsidized by 
those at a higher level based on the amount of current assets they need for operation and 
preservation. A discussion of governmental units securing financial independence to sustain their 
own transportation systems is beyond the scope of this study. However, given the concept of 
direct user charging, it is still meaningful to establish user fee rates for each jurisdictional or 
functional highway class to cover the expense so that the revenue generated can be dedicated to 
its own source. Again, this coincides with the user-pay principle. 
3.4.3. Highway Cost Allocation Study 
 
Highway cost allocation studies (HCAS) provide a framework that quantifies highway-related 




study was conducted at the federal level in 1997 and it was updated and extended in 2000 
(FHWA, 1997; FHWA, 2000c). As a part of the study, a spreadsheet-based tool was developed 
for state-level analyses. This tool, with updated Indiana-specific input values, was used to provide 
referable calculation of a future VMT fee structure (Section 4.3.2). A cost allocation study was 
also conducted for the State of Indiana in 1984 (Sinha et al., 1984), and was updated in 1989 
(Sinha et al., 1989). 
As results of the federal level HCAS, equity ratios, which measure the ratio of the 
revenue collected through fees and taxes to the costs imposed on the system for each vehicle 
class, were calculated (Table 3.7). The methodology used in highway allocation study, described 
in Appendix B, has limitations such that highway agency costs are used instead of economic 
costs; and that the costs used do not reflect what transportation agencies should spend, but what 
are actually being spent (FHWA, 1997). Yet, the values obtained here can give an idea of the 
equity status between vehicle classes. 
Table 3.7 Equity Ratios Obtained from FHWA Highway Cost Allocation Study in 1997 and 2000 
Vehicle Class/ Registered Weight 1997 2000 
Passenger Vehicles 
Autos 1.0 1.0 
Pickups/Vans 1.4 1.5 
Buses 0.1 0.2 
All Passenger Vehicles 1.1 1.1 
Single Unit Trucks 
<25,000 pounds 1.5 1.5 
25,001 - 50,000 pounds 0.7 0.7 
>50,000 pounds 0.5 0.4 
All Single Unit Trucks 0.9 0.9 
Combination Trucks 
<50,000 pounds 1.6 1.4 
50,001 - 70,000 pounds 1.1 1.0 
70,001 - 75,000 pounds 1.0 0.9 
75,001 - 80,000 pounds 0.9 0.8 
80,001 - 100,000 pounds 0.6 0.5 
>100,001 pounds 0.5 0.4 
All Combination Trucks 0.9 0.8 





Table 3.7 shows the estimated federal equity ratios of the 2000 HCAS under the current 
highway user charge structure, compared to the values estimated in 1997. It is noted that 
automobiles pay about the same share of federal highway user fees as their share of highway 
costs, while pickups and vans pay substantially more than their cost responsibility. This 
difference is primarily attributable to automobile’s better fuel economy, which means lower fuel 
tax payment. Equity for single unit and combination trucks is highly dependent on the weight of 
the vehicles. As a class, single units pay about 90% of their federal highway cost responsibility. 
Equity ratios for combination trucks as a group dropped from 90% to 80% of their cost 
responsibility from 1997 to 2000. This reduction mainly arises because combination trucks pay a 
smaller share of federal user fees under the TEA-21 program structure. 
Table 3.8 summarizes the results of Indiana’s highway cost allocation studies. The results 
indicate that passenger vehicles and single unit trucks pay more than their cost responsibility, 
while combination trucks pay considerably less than their cost shares. 
Table 3.8 Equity Ratios Obtained from Indiana Highway Cost Allocation Studies 
Vehicle Class/ Registered Weight 1985/86 1988 
Passenger Car 
Small passenger cars 0.764 1.071 
Standard/compact passenger cars, pickup 1.382 
1.385 Cars with 1-axle trailer 1.075 
Cars with 2-axle trailer 0.878 
All Passenger Vehicles 1.249 1.289 
Buses 0.977 0.909 
Single Unit Trucks 
2-axle trucks 1.446 1.222 
3-axle single unit trucks 0.820 1.044 
4-axle single unit trucks 1.029 0.910 
All Single Unit Trucks 1.241 1.050 
Combination Trucks 
2S1 tractor-trailer 0.522 
0.695 3S1 tractor-trailer 0.667 
2S2 tractor-trailer 0.475 
3S2 tractor-trailer 0.513 0.643 
Other 5-axle 1.196 0.871 
6 or more axle 0.550 0.652 7 or more axle 0.625 
All Combination Trucks 0.536 0.655 




3.5. Implementation Costs 
3.5.1. Cost Structure of Pricing Schemes 
 
Physical Costs of System 
The physical costs of a system are borne by several items, including the initial installation, 
equipment deployment, and operation. 
• Installation costs occur at the initial construction stage. 
• Deployment costs occur when there is a need to distribute equipment to individual 
vehicles. As demonstrated in Oregon’s VMT fees system, the users may need to be given 
on-board units at low or no cost in the initial stage before all vehicle manufacturers are 
obliged to install one for each vehicle. 
• Operation and maintenance costs are required on a regular basis. 
Cost of Administration 
• Bureaucratic costs occur when a new system is introduced. 
• Enforcement costs can vary depending upon system configuration. Usually, the greater 
the accuracy in detecting violations the authority pursues, the larger are the enforcement 
costs required. 
User Inconvenience 
User inconvenience arises when it is necessary to stop at toll booths to pay tolls, to purchase and 
install equipment on their vehicles, or to pay additional bills. 
 
Various technological options entail different levels of implementation costs and 
difficulties as discussed in Section 2.5.2. For each alternative, implementation costs are estimated 




3.6. Public Acceptability 
3.6.1. Factors that Affect Public Acceptability 
 
Important factors that have influence on public acceptability of road pricing policies are defined 
by Schade and Schlag (2003) as the following: 
Problem perception: For a road pricing scheme to be successfully implemented, there 
should be high level of problem awareness that would eventually lead to willingness for the 
public to accept solutions suggested by public agencies. 
Knowledge about options: At often times, it is the lack of knowledge/information that 
causes opposition to a road pricing policy. It is argued that public outreach and education is 
critical in obtaining acceptability. 
Perceived effectiveness of the proposed measures: Especially when the community has 
not been exposed to any similar pricing and taxation measures before, thus when they do not 
believe that those measures could solve transportation-related problems, it becomes more possible 
for a pricing policy to face low public acceptability. This phenomenon is called the “strategic 
response” hypothesis when respondents try to justify their rejection of a policy by claiming that 
they perceive it as ineffective (Rienstra et al., 1999). 
Socio-economic factors: Factors such as income, education, gender, age, and political 
affiliation are known to have influence on acceptability. Hamideh et al., (2006) found that 
population groups who present high acceptability towards local option transportation sales tax are 
characterized as those with higher levels of education, Democratic Party affiliations, and 
relatively lower household incomes. 
 
For a successful implementation of a pricing scheme, public acceptability first should be 
understood; any hindrances or obstacles should be sorted out; and appropriate remedies should be 
taken place. The following section discusses tools to communicate public opinion. 





3.6.2. Public Opinion Survey 
 
Public opinion surveys can be a good tool to understand the perception and attitude of users. 
However, unless caution is paid to the following issues, results from survey may lead to wrong 
observations and conclusions. First, a sample should be selected carefully so it can well represent 
the entire population. The sampling needs to be designed to have enough observations for each 
subgroup of the population; for example, with respect to geographic regions, and demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics. 
Also, given that surveys often inquire about a respondent’s attitude toward options that 
have not yet been implemented, the features and possible problems of the stated preference data 
should be noted. Unlike revealed preferences, actual observations on choices can occur, and 
answers to hypothetical questions can be biased for several reasons including: (a) a respondent 
may not have enough information/knowledge that he/she would have needed if it were an actual 
situation; (b) one may conjecture the intentions of a survey and manipulate his/her answers 
assuming that they can influence the outcome decision; and (c) one may exaggerate the 
importance of specific attributes of hypothetical options when they are emphasized in the survey 
questionnaire. For example, if a survey asking the pros and cons of a toll road were held in a 
region where toll roads have never been implemented, large difference could be observed 
between answers to the survey questions and actual responses to the toll road when it is 
implemented. 
Being aware of these problems, focus groups for a smaller number of respondents have 
been tried in several cases as supplements or substitutes for questionnaire-based surveys of a 
large number sample. This approach enables a decision-maker to uncover detailed information on 
respondents’ experiences and perceptions and their interaction, in advance in order to conclude a 





3.7. Policy Alignment 
3.7.1. National Perspectives 
 
It has been suggested that federal level strategies for transportation funding should eventually 
phase out the federal motor fuel tax and replace it with a federal VMT tax (NCF, 2005; TRB 
2005; NCHRP 2006). Strategies in the short-, medium-, and long-term are summarized below:  
 
Short-Term Strategies 
Indexing federal motor fuel taxes would have the most immediate impact. The motor fuel tax is 
the only major existing tax that is not indexed to inflation. Other strategies include: 
• Closing exemptions to the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) so that revenues dedicated to 
transportation are spent on transportation. 
• Recrediting interest to the HTF so that the HTF can reap the full benefit of the revenue 
paid into the fund by users. 
• Dedicating 10% of U.S. Customs import revenues to transportation to account for 
transportation’s contribution to the facilitation of international commerce. 
• Giving state and local governments more revenue and investment options by authorizing 
the expanded use of tolling and by encouraging states to index their motor fuel taxes to 
account for inflation. 
• Stimulating greater use of innovative finance tools so that states can make transformative 
investments in their transportation infrastructure. These tools include federal loan 
guarantees, private activity bonds, tax-credit bond financing, and investment tax credits. 
 
Medium-Term Strategies 
A new approach to transportation user fees should help meet the nation’s transportation needs 
from 2010 to 2015. These strategies include: 
• Broadening the base of user payments to the HTF by collecting a vehicle fee to capture 




• Ensuring that any subsidies for the purchase of hybrid and nonpetroleum-powered 
vehicles come from the general fund, as was done for ethanol fuel subsidies, rather than 
the HTF. 
• Recommending that the recently authorized National Surface Transportation 
Infrastructure Financing Commission oversee a new cost allocation study, setting 
principles and guidelines for the efficient and equitable allocation of HTF fees. 
 
Long-Term Strategies 
The federal government should provide leadership for state and local governments to implement 
new systems of financing transportation funding that reduce reliance on the motor fuel tax. These 
strategies include: 
• Implementing a mileage-based transportation revenue system to help address long-term 
revenue shortfalls. 
• Adopting two vehicle miles of travel (VMT) fees: a state VMT fee as well as a local-
option VMT fee to help ease metropolitan congestion. 
• Indexing VMT fees to inflation to help close the annual gap between transportation needs 
and revenues. 
• Consider varying the VMT by vehicle weight, fuel type and consumption, environmental 
impact, road system, and/or geography to account for different levels of use and impact 
and to ensure that all users of the system pay their fair share of infrastructure costs. 
 
3.7.2. Compatibility with Federal Strategy 
 
Under the current structure of highway finance, where a large portion of state expenditures is 
provided by federal funding, the effectiveness and efficiency of a state’s policy is essentially 
affected by federal programs. Therefore, policies of a state government will perform most 
effectively and will return the best outcome when they coincide well with federal policies, 
especially regarding a long-term strategy. A proper alignment of the overall direction of a state 




However, on the other hand, the coming decade will observe constraints in the federal 
budget, which has been amplified recently, as well as increasing demands of the states for 
autonomy. These conditions will presumably lead to the leveling or a decline of federal funding 
and introduction of new charging schemes. TRB has provided a reassessment of federal 
responsibilities and concluded that federal funding should be based on user fees (TRB, 2005): 
• Providing aid to ensure that the states do not underinvest in routes of major national 
significance for commerce, travel, and public safety and security. For example, a state 
may be unwilling to invest in such a route if sufficient user fee revenue cannot be 
collected from out-of-state vehicle operators to pay for the cost of serving them because 
travelers buy fuel outside the state. 
• Standards setting, in cooperation with states and local governments, to gain efficiencies 
in construction and operation and to ensure uniformity of highway features needed to 
allow efficient nationwide passenger and freight traffic (for example, compatibility of 
road design with vehicle). 
• Research and development, since all highway agencies share an interest in innovation, 
especially in the development of improved forms of charging. 
 
In other words, a major alteration is foreseen in the relationship between federal, state, 
and local governments. When the federal long-run blueprint of nationwide usage-based charging, 
described in the previous section, is realized, state and local governments would have higher 
discretionary power to control revenue and pricing. Within the context of this new relationship, 
the federal government might be required to take a new role, oversight of possible abuse of 
monopoly power by governments. 
 
Restating the above, compatibility with federal policy should be assessed based on two 
criteria. First, we need to know whether execution of an alternative aligns well with federal level 
strategy. And second, it needs to be appraised if an alternative is eligible to meet the listed federal 
goals, including adequate investment in significant routes and rebuff of misusing monopolistic 
power. Section 5.5 scrutinizes short-term and long-term strategies proposed at the federal level 





CHAPTER 4. DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVES 
This chapter characterizes each of the alternatives proposed in Chapter 2 in terms of its adequacy 
as a revenue source, the impact on system efficiency, start-up/operation/administration cost, the 
impact on system equity, and public/political acceptability. The first alternative is to make 
relevant adjustments in the existing highway taxation system, such as motor fuel taxes, vehicle 
registration and licensing fees, local option sales tax, and other general taxes. The second 
alternative does not include any changes in the current taxation system; rather it tries to match the 
deficit with revenues from new financing tools. The last alternative is to completely replace the 
current fuel taxes with an innovative pricing method, usage-based charging. The basic structure 
of this innovative approach, as well as possible variations that aim to provide more 
comprehensive highway pricing, is argued. 
For numerical analysis, highway system information for the State of Indiana, including 
the current budget balance, assets, demand, and future needs of highway financing was reviewed. 
Table 4.1 summarizes highway expenditure information for the most recent three years and their 
averages, which were obtained from the highway statistics. Also, the Highway Performance 
Monitoring System (HPMS) database was utilized to obtain the highway asset information 
clustered by road function class and by pavement type, as summarized in Table 4.2. In order to 
obtain the demand data by vehicle type and road functional class in Table 4.3, Indiana Statewide 





Table 4.1  Disbursements for the Indiana State-Administered Highways by Road Functional Class 
(thousand dollars) 
Location Functional Class 
Disbursements for State-Administered 
Highways (including Federal-Aid) 
Estimated Disbursements for State-
Administered Highways Supported by State 
Generated Funds Only 
2004 2003 2002 Average 2004 2003 2002 Average 
Rural Interstate 164,861 145,527 165,139 158,509 109,860 35,545 73,196 72,867
 Other Principal Arterial 279,368 202,461 165,315 215,715 186,912 157,946 101,234 148,697
 Major Arterial 238,753 142,377 148,057 176,396 183,020 109,649 96,840 129,836
 Major Collector 289,947 589,948 260,622 380,172 262,384 568,276 245,394 358,685
  Rural Subtotal 972,929 1,080,313 739,133 930,792 742,177 871,415 516,664 710,085
Urban Interstate 280,424 267,396 218,646 255,489 152,064 144,119 68,688 121,624
 Other Freeway/Expressway 12,419 11,484 15,465 13,123 4,468 3,533 4,216 4,072
 Other Principal Arterial 239,930 121,401 184,506 181,946 158,353 66,225 92,224 105,601
 Major Arterial 32,797 14,692 10,578 19,355 28,004 11,361 8,933 16,099
  Urban Subtotal 565,571 414,973 429,195 469,913 350,889 217,238 174,061 247,396
Total   1,538,500 1,495,286 1,168,328 1,400,705 1,093,066 1,088,653 690,725 957,481
Source: Highway Statistics 2002, 2003, 2004 
Table 4.2 State Highway Asset Information by Road Functional Class and Pavement Type 
Location Functional Class 
Number of Miles by Pavement Type Lane-Miles by Pavement Type 
Flexible Composite Rigid Total Flexible Composite Rigid Total 
Rural Interstate 179 91 499 770 358 183 1,019 1,560
 Other Principal Arterial 450 102 1,001 1,553 900 203 2,002 3,106
 Major Arterial 1,257 35 892 2,185 2,515 71 1,784 4,370
 Major Collector 3,999 19 657 4,675 7,999 37 1,314 9,350
  Rural Subtotal 5,918 247 3,050 9,215 11,836 494 6,120 18,385
Urban Interstate 110 75 214 399 292 205 491 988
 Other Freeway/Expressway 12 24 69 105 25 46 143 213
 Other Principal Arterial 173 66 874 1,112 258 133 1,351 1,741
 Major Arterial 36 4 141 181 38 7 162 207
  Urban Subtotal 336 169 1,301 1,806 617 390 2,151 3,154
Total   6,254 416 4,351 11,021 12,454 885 8,270 21,539





Table 4.3 Annual Vehicle-Miles-Traveled on State Highway System 
Location Functional Class 
Total VMT in million Automobile VMT in million 
Flexible Composite Rigid Total Flexible Composite Rigid Total 
Rural Interstate 2,020.3 1,058.1 6,165.4 9,243.8 1,455.0 717.1 4,620.3 6,792.4
 Other Principal Arterial 1,094.6 428.0 4,280.5 5,803.1 932.6 370.0 3,618.2 4,920.9
 Major Arterial 1,777.3 75.2 2,711.2 4,563.7 1,576.7 67.0 2,396.4 4,040.1
 Major Collector 5,361.0 66.2 2,820.6 8,247.8 4,842.1 59.7 2,531.3 7,433.2
 Minor Collector 210.5 0.0 56.5 267.0 186.8 0.0 48.9 235.8
  Rural Subtotal 10,463.7 1,627.5 16,034.2 28,125.4 8,993.3 1,213.9 13,215.1 23,422.3
Urban Interstate 2,243.3 1,684.4 3,301.2 7,228.9 1,876.9 1,438.9 2,688.6 6,004.4
 Other Freeway/Expressway 95.8 238.2 680.5 1,014.6 85.8 201.8 586.9 874.5
 Other Principal Arterial 1,098.1 822.1 6,813.0 8,733.1 1,020.7 794.0 6,327.8 8,142.5
 Minor Arterial 390.5 125.4 2,982.8 3,498.6 373.8 120.6 2,833.2 3,327.6
 Collectors 35.4 0.0 347.6 383.0 33.4 0.0 325.9 359.4
  Urban Subtotal 3,863.1 2,870.1 14,125.1 20,858.3 3,390.7 2,555.2 12,762.4 18,708.4
Total   14,326.8 4,497.6 30,159.2 48,983.6 12,384.0 3,769.2 25,977.5 42,130.7
Location Functional Class 
Single Unit Truck VMT in million Combination Truck VMT in million 
Flexible Composite Rigid Total Flexible Composite Rigid Total 
Rural Interstate 123.8 167.8 645.0 936.7 429.1 164.5 921.2 1,514.8
 Other Principal Arterial 108.2 38.9 437.7 584.8 53.8 19.2 224.4 297.4
 Major Arterial 146.0 7.1 236.9 389.9 54.3 1.1 78.3 133.6
 Major Collector 438.4 6.0 260.1 704.5 79.0 0.5 30.6 110.0
 Minor Collector 21.1 0.0 7.9 29.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 2.3
  Rural Subtotal 837.6 219.9 1,587.5 2,644.9 618.4 185.3 1,254.5 2,058.1
Urban Interstate 193.3 147.0 283.6 623.9 174.3 101.8 324.6 600.7
 Other Freeway/Expressway 8.7 29.4 70.2 108.3 1.8 6.7 23.3 31.8
 Other Principal Arterial 66.1 27.8 406.2 500.1 11.1 5.1 74.3 90.5
 Minor Arterial 15.3 4.5 139.5 159.2 1.7 0.6 9.5 11.8
 Collectors 1.7 0.0 20.7 22.4 0.2 0.0 1.1 1.2
  Urban Subtotal 285.0 208.7 920.2 1,413.9 189.1 114.1 432.8 736.1
Total   1,122.6 428.5 2,507.7 4,058.8 807.5 299.4 1,687.3 2,794.2






The present study mainly focuses on evaluation of revenue generating options that can 
sustain the current expenditure level with the given current highway demand. In addition, future 
highway needs are also considered to provide financing strategies that can not only maintain and 
preserve the current state highway system but also expand and improve it.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, previous need studies provided a range of future highway 
needs varied by approaches and assumed scenarios. The most recent business plan for INDOT 
estimated that the annual funding gap would be gradually increasing each year to reach $167 
million in 2010 and $405 million in 2015 (INDOT, 2005). The analysis was conducted for a 
future scenario which assumed completion of projects that are planned not only to preserve the 
existing facilities but also to improve mobility and accessibility. A separate highway needs study 
conducted by JTRP (Sinha et al., 2005) provided another set of future financial needs. 
Considering all projects in the INDOT long range plan and those generated by HERS modeling 
system, the JTRP study estimated that the annual funding gap could range between $860 and 
$1,120 billion. The present study primarily refers to the results from the INDOT’s business plan. 
The quantitative analyses carried out in this chapter are based on the following four major 





4.1. Alternative 1 – Adjusting Current Tax System 
 
In Indiana, the revenues from several state and local taxes are used for highway-related purposes. 
Some taxes, including fuel taxes and vehicle registration fees, are earmarked for transportation 
funding. The first alternative will consider how to target the transportation budget needed by 
adjusting the rates or charging mechanisms for these existing revenue sources. 
 
4.1.1. Increase in Fuel Tax Rates 
 
Discussion in this section regarding a fuel tax amendment as an alternative to fuel tax may seem 
contradictory. The following analysis is, however, still meaningful in that it provides a basis for 
the analysis of other alternatives and comparison between them. 
The fuel tax increase that would be required to meet the assessed needs can be estimated 
based on revenue projections. First, in terms of the state gasoline tax, considering the 3.1 billion 
gallons of gasoline consumed in fiscal year 2003 and an annual revenue gap that ranges from 
$167 to $405 million during the period of 2010 through 2015, simple calculation ($167-405 
million ÷  3.1 billion gallons) returns 5.4 to 13.1 cents per gallon of increment. In Indiana, the 
gasoline tax rate, which remained at 15 cents per gallon between 1988 and 2002, was raised to 18 
cents/gallon in January 2003. Reflecting the inflation impact by using the CPI (Consumer Price 
Index), however, the rate of 15 cents in 1988 can be converted into 26 cents in 2006, which is 8 
cents higher than the current level. Although this simple reasoning shows that the motor fuel tax 
rate is below the buying power it used to have, an increase in the tax rate up to 13.1 cents per 
gallon would be drastic, considering the strong emotional reluctance to fuel tax increases. 
The second option considers adjustment of the state diesel tax rate. Currently, diesel fuel 
users pay two separate user fees: 1) 16 cents per gallon motor carrier fuel use tax; and 2) 11 cents 
per gallon motor carrier surtax. The combined 27 cents per gallon total user fee on diesel fuel 
based on 830 millions gallons of annual average consumption (in 2003) yields $224 million per 




cover the entire annual deficit ($167-405 million) only from diesel users, it would be necessary to 
increase the fees on diesel fuel by a range of 20.1 to 48.8 cents per gallon, which would be about 
at least 80% of the current rate. 
Third approach consists of raising both the gasoline and diesel fuel taxes, keeping the 
current ratio of 18 cents to 27 cents unchanged. Under this condition, it is calculated that we need 
3.8 to 9.2 cents per gallon of increase in the gasoline tax and 5.7 to 13.8 cents per gallon of 
increase in diesel fuel tax. The calculations are shown in Table 4.4. The result is modest 
compared to the previous two examples. 
Table 4.4  Fuel Tax Increases Needed to Bridge Funding Gap 
 Gasoline Diesel 
Annual consumption (base 2003) 3.1 billion gallons 0.86 billion gallons 
Current tax ratio 18 cents/gallon 27 cents/gallon 
Rate increase α 1.5α 
Revenue generated with raised rates (3.1)(α) (0.86)(1.5α) = (1.29)(α) 
Increase in per gallon rate 3.8 ~ 9.2 cents 5.7 ~ 13.8 cents 
 
It is noteworthy that the figures above only provide reference values if we consider 
modification of the current fuel tax rates. For actual implementation, a rate plan will have to be 
established deliberately, taking into account the trends and the predictions of fuel consumption by 
fuel type, the ratio between different types of motor fuels, and the new rates for alternative fuels. 
The general features of this alternative are summarized below: 
Revenue Generation: This alternative inherits advantages and disadvantages of the 
current fuel tax as a revenue source. As is well known, fuel taxes as a dedicated source for 
transportation needs can be evaluated to be accountable and, assuming continuous adjustment 
with inflation, can be relatively stable. Sufficiency will depend on how much these rates can be 
increased. 
System Efficiency: Since a fuel tax is closer to being a perfect direct use charging method 
than other existing funding sources, such as vehicle registration fees and appropriations from 
general taxes, this alternative will secure more system efficiency. However, there still remains a 
problem of unfairness between vehicles with different fuel efficiency and vehicles with traditional 




Equity: The fuel tax system essentially follows the user-pay-principle, and in that regard, 
it is more equitable than other general taxes. Yet, it is still possible to improve the equity between 
users with different geographical locations, vehicle classes, costs imposed on the system, etc. 
Start-up/Operation/Administration Cost: Minimal operation and administration costs will 
be added to the existing tax collection system. However, there will be some costs incurred to 
promote and make the change. 
Public/Political Acceptability: As perceived, an increase in fuel taxes is difficult to 
implement due to political reasons. In order to execute this alternative, much effort will be needed 
to persuade the public to accept its necessity and to promote the efficiency brought to the system. 
4.1.2. Increase in Other Taxes 
 
As another option under this category, more general forms of taxes are subject to analysis, 
namely, vehicle registration and licensing fees, and for local agencies, local option sales taxes and 
property taxes. Assessment of these alternatives will follow the same framework as the fuel tax 
increase. 
 
Vehicle Registration and Licensing Fees 
Currently, revenues from vehicle registration and licensing taxes contribute to 25% of Indiana’s 
state highway budget, being the second largest source following fuel taxes. Being earmarked for 
transportation-related purposes, the revenues from these sources are distributed to the Motor 
Vehicle Highway Account, Motorcycle Operators Safety Education Fund, State Highway Fund, 
and Local Road and Street Fund. There are also contributions from service charges, title fees, 
transfer fees, etc. (Sinha et al., 2005). 
Revenue Generation: Mathematically, it is possible to adjust the current rates of these 
fees to meet the financial needs assessed, assuming no public opposition to a tax increase. 
Looking at the actual numbers, given that the current revenue from registration and licensing is 
around $300 million and assessed annual deficit reaches $405 million dollars in 2015 (INDOT, 
2005), a 135% increase in these fees will be required to bridge the financial gap. In this regard, it 
seems neither possible nor wise to pursue the financial effectiveness by charging users four times 




revenues by raising the current rates, and moreover, these are quite accountable sources that are 
earmarked for transportation purposes. On the other hand, since these are one-time fees, it is 
acceptable to assume that there will be little or no impact on the demand per vehicle, which is 
interpreted as the distance-traveled of each registered vehicle. It could be the case, however, that 
the number of registrations will decrease due to increased fees, and thus the total number of 
vehicle-miles traveled will decrease. Assuming that the elasticity of vehicle ownership with 
respect to vehicle registration fees is very small, the revenues from these fees can be considered 
stable. 
System Efficiency: Charging users regardless of their usage of facilities does not 
necessarily encourage users to use system resources efficiently. 
Equity: This measure has nothing to do with equity between users based on either 
benefits gained or costs they impose on the system. Assuming that higher income taxpayers have 
more expensive vehicles (i.e., they will pay more of such fees), this scheme can be seen as a 
relatively progressive taxation mechanism. 
Start-up/Operation/Administration Cost: There will be no start-up costs and little 
additional operation costs. This alternative will add only a small amount of administration cost 
since the only effort needed will be adjusting the fee rates accordingly. However, it may entail 
costs for public outreach. 
Public/Political Acceptability: When an increase is modest enough, it is expected to face 
little or no resistance/argument from the public since they are already paying such fees and expect 
occasional increases. But when drastic change is being considered, sufficient efforts will be 
needed to explain the rationale of fee increases. 
 
Options for Local Agencies 
Given that considerable portion of state highway revenues is distributed to local governments to 
sustain local highway systems, measures that can increase local highway revenues are estimated. 
First, Local Option Transportation Sales Taxes temporarily increase the sales tax rate to dedicate 
the additional revenue exclusively to transportation purposes and are authorized in 33 states of the 
U.S. In many states, sales tax is one of the most politically feasible financing tools for 
transportation investments among existing ones. It was observed in counties in California that 
taxpayers are more willing to approve sales taxes options than any other source (Goldman et al., 




requires political steps such as appropriate legislation by the state government, placement of 
referenda on the election ballot by county governments, and approval by voters (that requires 
one-half or two-third approval). Many measures were found to propose a half-percent or quarter-
percent increase in sales taxes, in most cases with “sunset dates,” which means they are in effect 
only during a specified period of time (Adams et al., 2001). 
Sales taxes are advantageous in that the government can promote relatively small rate 
adjustments in order to target the same amount of tax revenue increase because sales taxes are 
applied to a variety of items; thus, its increment appears to be less than the others. For example, if 
the government charges 0.5% more sales tax and uses the revenues for transportation purposes, 
then an average household that spends $2,000 monthly on sales-tax-applied products (BTS, 
2005a), will contribute $10 more per month to the transportation budget through this local option. 
On the other hand, assuming that the expenditures on motor fuels of that household are $100 per 
month (BTS, 2005a), which is approximately equivalent to 50 gallons, the fuel tax would need to 
be raised by 20 cents/gallon to achieve that same $10 of tax revenue. Generally, when people face 
two different types of tax increase measures, one of which is a sales tax increase of 0.5% point 
and the other a fuel tax increase of 20 cents/gallon (111% raise), they will likely perceive the 
former to be a lesser burden. 
In Indiana, the total revenue from sales tax is approximately $5 billion, of which 0.76% is 
distributed to the Public Mass Transportation Fund, 0.04% to the Industrial Rail Service Fund, 
and 0.17% to the Commuter Rail Service Fund (ILSA & OFMA, 2005). The recent five-year 
trend is summarized in Table 4.5. Supposing 0.5% point of increase in sales tax as a local option, 
$25 million could be collected annually through this account. 
Table 4.5 Revenue and Distribution of Sales Tax, Indiana (thousand dollars, %) 
Fiscal Year GF PTRF PMTF IRSF CRSF TOTAL 
2001 (000’s) 2,187,582 1,499,201 28,485 1,499 6,372 3,723,139 
2003 (000’s) 2,270,542 1,902,007 29,589 1,549 6,576 4,210,262 
2005 (000’s) 2,443,612 2,516,766 31,963 1,661 7,047 5,001,049 
Avg. (01~05) 2,290,041 1,970,337 29,897 1,563 6,639 4,298,477 
Ratio % (2005) 53.28 45.84 0.70 0.04 0.15 100.00 
Ratio % (avg.) 48.86 50.32 0.64 0.03 0.14 100.00 
Source: ILSA & OFMA (2005) 
GF (General Fund); PTRF (Property Tax Replacement Fund); PMTF (Public Mass Transportation Fund); 




Currently, only a part of the 92 counties in Indiana have enacted local option wheel taxes 
for transportation. Revenue collected from this source is not significant. 
The features of this alternative are summarized below: 
Revenue Generation: As roughly calculated above, the local option sales tax can provide 
a certain amount of funding deficit ($25 million per year through a 0.5% point of an option). 
However, it is generally noticed that the revenue from sales tax might not be as stable as desired 
since retail sales are sensitive to economic conditions. Also, as mentioned above, since it is 
usually endorsed with an expiration date that comes in 5~10 years, another referendum would be 
needed to extend the effective period. In terms of accountability, unlike a simple subsidy from 
sales tax revenue to the transportation budget, the local option sales tax has the advantage that the 
revenue dedication is specified from the initiation. 
System Efficiency: The amount of an individual’s payment of sales taxes is rarely 
connected with transportation system use. Thus, charging sales taxes cannot act as a direct 
incentive to efficient use of the transportation system. In that regard, the local option sales taxes 
cannot secure system efficiency. 
Equity: We can hardly say that funding the transportation system with sales tax revenues 
satisfies the user-pay principle. It is rather a subsidy from the buying public to transportation 
system users. Although those two groups could be identical as a whole, individually it is not a 
system where people pay for what they use. 
Start-up/Operation/Administration Cost: This alternative requires minimal operation and 
administration costs since sales taxes for other purposes are being collected already. Some initial 
costs will be needed in promotion and public outreach before going through the voting process. 
Public/Political Acceptability: Knowing that people are generally more comfortable with 
existing taxes than something unfamiliar, this alternative is expected to face less reluctance from 
the public, but it may require substantial efforts to explain the necessity of such financial tools 
and the expected benefits to the public. 
 
For local agencies, use of property tax revenue can also be considered. The rationale to 
subsidize the local transportation system with revenue from their local property taxes is that, 
without access by local roads, individual properties would be less valuable. The access is not only 
for property owners to enter and egress from their properties, but also to provide access to public 




collection, postal delivery, public transit, and police and fire services) (Adams et al., 2001). In 
this respect, property tax can be considered a user fee for local streets and roads. 
The characteristics of this alternative are as follows: 
Revenue Generation: The major problem with using property tax is that there is great 
pressure to dedicate this revenue for non-transportation intentions, such as libraries, parks, 
schools, and low-income housing (Adams et al., 2001). Given that, its sufficiency, accountability, 
or stability as a revenue stream cannot be ascertained. 
System Efficiency: As discussed above, property tax can be considered as one type of 
user charging. However, the charging mechanism is not as obviously connected with the exact 
usage of the system as other taxes, such as gas taxes or vehicle registration fees. Therefore, its 
role as a market price that can result in efficient resource allocation is not accomplished. 
Equity: Since the amount of property tax an individual pays does not necessarily reflect 
the amount used or the benefit gained from the transportation system, it could be less equitable 
than more direct user fees. On the other hand, being aware that more property tax is collected 
from the wealthier, we can say that this is a more progressive way to fund the transportation 
system. 
Start-up/Operation/Administration Cost: No start-up cost and very little operational and 
administration costs are involved. 
Public/Political Acceptability: Distributing tax revenue after collection is not publicly 
seen, and there is thus less chance to face strong resistance from the public. However, it is still 
important to establish a clear principle that advocates appropriation of property tax revenue to 
local transportation projects. 
 
4.1.3. Overall Assessment of Alternative 1: Base Case 
 
Adequacy as Revenue Sources 
It is numerically probable to generate enough revenue that eliminates the needs gap through any 
of the four types of incumbent taxes discussed in this section. As witnessed in the approximate 
calculations above, however, a financing strategy depending upon the existing source results in 




be chosen to capture the same revenue with less severe increases in their rates. For example, 
Indiana could establish a ballot measure for 1.0% increase in the local option sales tax that would 
fund local roads and public transit, which would gain approval from a majority of the public. 
Securing $50 million annually with the local option tax, the state could also raise the vehicle 
registration and licensing fees by 10% to add $30 million, while adjusting the fuel taxes to 35 
cents for gasoline and 50 cents for diesel per gallon. However, before determining the amounts of 
tax increases, the impacts should be carefully studied. Different mixtures of tax treatments can 
cause different impacts on the revenue stream from the perspectives of stability and 
accountability. 
 
Cost of Implementation 
Since the current collection system will be expanded or adjusted, these alternatives will have little 
significant costs for initiation, operation, or administration. There could be some cases where 
public outreach may require not only money, but also considerable investment of time and effort. 
 
System Efficiency and Equity 
Since taxes other than motor fuel taxes do not directly measure and charge for transportation 
system usage, it is not evident that adjustment of those taxes will help the system achieve more 
efficiency. Thus, the impact on transportation system efficiency will be affected by a selected 
mixture of tax treatments. Moreover, all of the taxation tools have different impacts on each user 
group, bringing about different equity impacts. For example, a combination treatment that 
depends more on a fuel tax increase and less on a sale tax increase reflects better the cost each 
user imposes on the system and avoids cross-subsidy from non-users to users. On the other hand, 
a mixture consisting of more subsidies from property tax is a more progressive alternative that 






4.2. Alternative 2 – Current Tax System Supplemented by Other User Fees 
 
Instead of making changes in the current tax system, including fuel taxes, other types of user fees 
can be considered as supplements to it. As explored in Chapter 2, road tolls and distance-based 
fees are two of the most promising types of user fees. Road tolls also can be implemented either 
by the public sector or through road section privatization. This category includes three options, all 
of which maintain the current fuel tax system and pursue additional revenue: first would be 
establishing tolls on some roads; secondly, by the long-term leasing of road sections to private 
consortium; and, finally, adding a distance-based charging in addition to fuel taxes. 
 
4.2.1. Fuel Tax Supplemented by Toll Pricing 
 
Examples from many states in the U.S. and other countries implementing road tolls were reported 
in Chapter 2. As discussed, caution is required in determining toll levels, which are subject to the 
objectives of tolling. For example, if the purpose of tolling is to reduce road congestion, the 
marginal cost a user imposes on the system needs to be referred to as the basis of pricing. On the 
contrary, if tolls aim to recover the costs of construction and operation, the rates need to be 
determined in order to yield equilibrium of the balance sheet. These two objectives often conflict 
with each other, and thus, the objectives of a tolling scheme should be specified before planning 
the toll structure. 
It has been generally learned that there exists an interrelationship between the objective 
of tolling, the types of facilities that are tolled and public acceptability on the implementation. 
The concept of cost compensation seems to make more sense to the public when tolls are 
established on newly-built highways or bridges. Since congestion has not been realized yet on the 
new roads in this case, a marginal cost pricing scheme is not really relevant. Regarding this type 
of projects, there are some issues that require discussion. First, the period for charging tolls to pay 
back the construction costs should be determined. Second, the impact on users’ travel choices 




construction projects usually entail higher risk (i.e., uncertainty) than those for existing facilities. 
On the other hand, converting currently free highways into tolled facilities does not seem to be 
easily supported by the users unless they are congested enough (definition of “enough” 
congestion can be different in each case). Users generally believe that the roads they are using are 
already paid for. Rephrasing this phenomenon, introducing tolls on existing highways requires 
some rationale other than revenue seeking. Most commonly that reason is: it will lower 
congestion by controlling demand. 
Following is a discussion on the general features of this alternative: 
Revenue Generation: Toll roads in the U.S. generally do not run in debt, which means 
that the revenues usually cover at least their initial setup and operation costs. It is often doubted, 
however, whether revenues from toll roads can significantly contribute to the transportation 
budget. In Indiana, 157 miles of Indiana Toll Road earns $36 million per year after paying off its 
operation and maintenance costs, which is as much as 3.7% of the total state needed highway 
revenue. Assuming first that there is an additional annual need ranged from $167 to $405 million 
during 2010-2015 period and secondly that road tolls are the only revenue source, road miles that 
need to be tolled can be approximated. Using the net cash value per mile of the Indiana Toll 
Road, we need approximately 750 to 1816 more miles of toll road assuming a similar net profit 
rate ($167~405 million ÷  $35 million = 4.77~11.57; 4.77~11.57 times of 157 mile toll road = 
749~1816 miles). It means that about 7% to 17% of the entire state highway system would have 
to be tolled with similar toll rates as in the Indiana Toll Road. 
On the other hand, since toll revenues can be earmarked for transportation purposes, this 
alternative is advantageous in terms of its accountability. To assure the stability of the revenue 
stream, a demand study should be performed in great detail so that user responses to toll pricing, 
such as modal shift, route change, and departure time adjustment, can be precisely captured. 
Especially in the case of constructing new toll facilities, it is difficult to predict demand, and 
conservative forecasts therefore may be required. 
As an illustration purpose, the present study conducted macroscopic transportation 
simulation for scenarios that impose tolls on a typical interstate corridor of Indiana. Typical 
interstate corridor is defined by the following characteristics: 
- Two-way four- or six-lane interstate highway system; 
- Urban section length ratio is about 20% of the entire corridor; 




- Approximate composition of AADT is 75% of automobiles, 10~15% SUT, and 
10~15% CT 
 
Detailed description of the analysis procedure is given in Appendix A. Based on two 
assumptions on monetary value of travel time, $16.44 and $23.03 per hour, ranges of demand 
elasticity with respect to toll rates by vehicle type were obtained as presented in Table 4.6. It is 
observed that, the higher the travel time value, the less elastic the demand becomes. It is also 
noted that single unit truck (SUT) is the user group with the least elastic demand, while 
combination trucks (CT) present very elastic demand especially when travel time value is low. 
Demand elasticity values obtained in the present study is comparable with those reviewed in 
Section 3.2.3. 
Table 4.6  Demand Elasticity of Indiana’s Interstate Users with Respect to Toll Rate 
Vehicle Type Travel Time Value = $16.44/hr Travel Time Value = $23.03/hr 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
Automobile -0.245 -0.487 -0.166 -0.314 
Single Unit Trucks -0.100 -0.206 -0.061 -0.150 
Combination Trucks -0.306 -1.219 -0.142 -0.264 
Average -0.250 -0.665 -0.149 -0.284 
 
 
On the basis of the elasticity values, annual toll revenues were calculated for various toll 
schedules. The minimum and maximum of the revenue for each scenario are summarized in 
Table 4.7. For example, if toll rates are set up 3, 8, and 16 cents per mile for automobiles, single 
unit trucks, and combination trucks, respectively, the annual revenue would range either between 




Table 4.7  Forecast of Toll Revenues from a Typical Indiana Interstate (in thousand dollars) 
Toll Schedule Scenarios Travel Time Value = $16.44/hr Travel Time Value = $23.03/hr 
Min Revenue Max Revenue Min Revenue Max Revenue 
1 
Auto: 2¢/mile 26,916 26,916 26,916 26,916 
SUT: 7¢/mile 12,946 15,588 13,718 16,094 
CT: 14¢/mile   3,653 15,548 11,232 19,327 
Total 43,515 58,053 51,866 62,337 
2 
Auto: 3¢/mile 36,424 36,424 36,424 36,424 
SUT: 8¢/mile 15,827 17,621 16,367 18,272 
CT: 16¢/mile   2,406 17,352 13,055 21,855 
Total 54,657 71,397 65,846 76,550 
3 
Auto: 3.5¢/mile 39,424 40,921 40,489 41,421 
SUT: 9¢/mile 17,405 19,643 18,144 20,443 
CT: 18¢/mile  2,068 25,881 14,413 27,331 
Total 58,897 86,445 73,046 89,194 
4 
Auto: 4¢/mile 43,390 43,390 43,390 43,390 
SUT: 10¢/mile 18,960 20,894 19,685 21,621 
CT: 20¢/mile   2,804 23,388 14,989 25,001 
Total 65,155 87,673 78,064 90,013 
* The length of the corridor was set as about 160 miles. 
 
System Efficiency: Ideally, if we can charge the exact marginal cost of highway use in a 
perfectly demand-responsive manner, then the system will experience maximum efficiency. 
System efficiency can be improved considerably by having a well-designed toll plan regardless. 
Narrowing down the scope of analysis to only the tolled facilities, ignoring the equity problem 
against other toll-free facilities, tolls are an excellent form of direct usage-based charging. If 
facilities and regions to be tolled are reasonably selected, then the tolls will be good user fees in 
the system as a whole. 
Equity: It is often argued that most tolls are very regressive pricing mechanisms in the 
sense that users are identically charged regardless of their ability to pay. By collecting the same 
amount of money from everyone, users with a higher monetary value of their travel time, who 
generally belong to a higher income group, will get more benefit than others. As seen in many 
congestion toll examples, however, by having the toll revenue contribute to driving alternatives, 





Start-up/Operation/Administration Cost: Any necessary roadside equipment should be 
installed for an electronic toll collection system. Also, a communication counterpart on each 
vehicle should be deployed. Costs vary according to the technology suite selected. Generally, 
DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communication) with road gantry facilities, equipped with a 
smart-card-type on-board unit, is associated with higher costs for roadside infrastructure and 
lower cost for vehicle equipment. On the other hand, technology based on GPS communication is 
characterized by less expensive roadside facilities and more expensive devices on each vehicle. 
Public/Political Acceptability: Many public opinion surveys on toll pricing projects have 
found that users are more willing to accept tolls if they have already experienced congestion 
reduction after toll implementation. However, if the tolls do not have a significant impact on 
demand management, intending to raise revenue rather than to reduce congestion, then people 





4.2.2. Fuel Tax Supplemented by Privatization of Road Segments 
 
Constructing a highway system and operating it has long been considered as a governmental 
authority as well as responsibility. Getting the private sector involved in highway provision, 
especially in the form of long-term lease, however, is receiving much attention. As mentioned 
and illustrated in Chapter 2, it is generally believed by proponents that privatization offers an 
opportunity to leverage governmental funding by collecting lump sum revenue at the point of 
leasing. However, there is strong objection to road privatization and some of the criticisms 
include the following: First, its segments having different ownership and/or operationship, 
integration and cohesion of the highway system is not likely to be achieved. Second, being aware 
that public sector is more eligible for low-interest or interest-free loans than its private 
counterpart, it could be cheaper to publicly finance highway projects. Third, non-compete 
clauses, as often included in concession agreements, legal approval for monopolistic business, 
which is not promising for the efficiency of market economy. Fourth, by accepting unsolicited 
proposals, state governments are opening profitable road segments to private consortia only to 
take the responsibility for the rest of the system (Samuel, 2005). 
Most of the criticisms of this option are rooted in the fact that the private sector aims to 
maximize its profit, not to benefit society. The difference in objectives causes differences in 
decision-making, and in turn, different outcomes. For example, when the use of toll profit is 
completely at the discretion of a private consortium, it would not contribute to, say, improve the 
National Highway System or to enhance the mobility of low-income or elderly citizens, which 
could have been an objective through a state government. In addition, supposing a 30-year 
contact between a state government and a private consortium that involves lump sum payments, a 
state government would not have any funding source after spending that money. Also, the public 
and private sectors have different incentives for toll discount and/or exemption, which are 
incompatible with each other: social welfare and market drive. The public sector would 
implement a discount/exemption for particular users with intention to subsidize the low-income 
population or public transportation. On the other hand, unless it is enforced, the only inducement 




competition. Finally, considering from the users’ perspectives, it is expected that toll increases 
will be generally higher when a toll road is privatized. 
In spite of those concerns, there are several incentives for the public sector to bring in 
private interests. First of all, motivated by profit seeking, the private sector can access and invest 
much larger amounts of money secured from bank loans and equity capital than can the public 
sector (Samuel, 2005). Also, by having a private consortium finance, construct, and operate 
highways, it can become more possible to introduce innovative and efficient delivery of projects. 
Carefully structured concession agreements may enable governments to prevent many of the 
aforementioned problems as well as to fully enjoy advantages of public-private partnership 
(Samuel, 2005). The government can effectively control toll level, for example, by having a 
clause that caps the toll increase at a rate less than or equal to the inflation rate captured by the 
consumer price index (CPI). Also, to prevent the private sector from leasing out the most 
profitable routes and avoid lower demand routes, the government can contract out a bundle of 
roads. When demands on the roads are interdependent between one another, integrated operation 
can better secure user benefits. 
Considering privatization as a revenue source, supplementing the current fuel tax-based 
public finance system, the features of this alternative are as follows: 
Revenue Generation: This alternative may have a revenue leverage effect, but it is often 
doubted whether long-term leasing to the private sector can fundamentally solve the resource 
problem, i.e., that privatization may facilitate the use of innovative procurement, management 
and finance techniques but they are not revenue sources per se (NCHRP, 2006). As observed in 
the recent examples of a long-term lease (Chicago Skyway and Indiana Toll Road), such an 
arrangement is in fact a short-term cash infusion at the cost of long-term toll revenue, and its role 
as a revenue source is secured only when it can be associated with new projects. 
System Efficiency and Equity: When the authority to determine toll schedules belongs 
solely to the private concessionaire, the efficiency and equity of the entire highway system will 
likely not be pursued. It can help more efficient use of resources, however, by fostering 
innovative and cost-saving project delivery methods. 
Start-up/Operation/Administration Cost: Governments should bear some costs, but they 
are generally insignificant and include the costs incurred during the course of bidding, negotiating 




Public/Political Acceptability: This alternative is relatively new and generally not a 
preferred option to the public. Acceptability on this issue is known to be related to how a project 
is advertised and where and how to spend the cash influx. 
 
4.2.3. Fuel Tax Supplemented by Usage-Based Fees 
 
This option considers imposing usage-based fees in addition to the current fuel tax, in the form of 
distance-based or weight-distance-based charging in a statewide manner. Additional fee rates that 
are required to satisfy the financing needs can be calculated by studying demand and funding gap 
after the fuel tax, similarly as outlined and applied in Section 4.3. 
However, compared to the rather simpler option of increasing fuel tax, or to a completely 
new approach, which is discussed in the next section, the significance of this alternative can be 
blurred for several reasons. First, although institution and implementation of additional fees will 
be costly and very research-intensive, the outcome strategy will not be able to solve all the 
drawbacks of the current fuel tax system, i.e., the problems of the fuel tax structure remain with 
previous options as well, but they do not require as massive and demanding studies as needed in 
this state-wide application. Secondly, it is more likely for users to perceive this pricing structure 
as “double taxation” despite the fact that they are paying the same amount in total. Therefore, it 
will be harder to win public acceptability. Thirdly, the cost of operating and maintaining two 
systems, e.g., fuel taxes and weight-distance fees, will be generally higher than for a single and 
integrated system. The overall features of this alternative are summarized below: 
Revenue Generation: Fee rates can be adjusted to generate targeted revenue, can be 
considered a revenue deficit after the revenues received from fuel taxes. Since it would be 
earmarked for transportation purposes, the accountability of this combined funding source would 
be secure. With an expected decrease in revenue per vehicle-miles of fuel taxes, the rates of 
additional VMT fees would need to be adjusted accordingly. 
System Efficiency: Being a user fee system, this combined alternative would better 
address the efficiency issue. Usage charging and system efficiency is discussed in more detail in 




Equity: User charging and price discrimination between user groups are discussed in the 
following sections. 
Start-up/Operation/Administration Cost: Generally, there will be a considerable amount 
of system deployment and installment costs, although costs vary according to the technology 
configuration options. There are not enough actual data thus far for predicting the cost of 
implementation. However, the cost comparisons of each technological option in the pilot study of 
the State of Oregon (Kim et al., 2002) are a good reference. Table 4.8 summarizes the comparison 
of total cost for four different scenarios: center collection with GPS base; center collection with 
odometer; gas pump collection with GPS; and gas pump collection with odometer. 
Table 4.8 Estimated Cost of Implementation for Technology Options 
Cost elements/task On-vehicle equipment 
Getting Data Off 
Vehicle Computing Tax Collecting Tax 
Center + GPS based High High Medium Medium 
Center + odometer High Very high Low Low 
Gas pump + GPS Medium High Medium Medium 
Gas pump + odometer Medium Very high Low Low 
Source: Kim et al. (2002) 
 
 
A GPS-based system was determined to have more initial hardware costs than an 
odometer-based system. When the option is chosen to have a center collect the data, the initial 
cost of data collection decreased, but center establishment costs are required. On the other hand, 
the method to collect at gas pumps, which is based on a Point-of-Sale system, was characterized 
as having large setup costs for data collection and a relatively easier tax computing and collecting 
process facilitated by software that would be run by oil companies. 
Public/Political Acceptability: It is highly probable that users would have the impression 
that their highway usage is double-taxed both by fuel taxes and additional VMT fees. To acquire 
public acceptance, substantial efforts need to be made in public outreach and communications so 





4.2.4. Overall Assessment of Alternative 2 
 
Adequacy as Revenue Sources 
Planning a pricing scheme, which includes selection of which services to charge (e.g., a specific 
road section to be tolled or a particular area to be access-charged) and selection of charging rates, 
is one of the most important tasks. What makes the problem more complicated is that the two 
objectives of the pricing scheme, revenue generation and system efficiency, can sometimes 
conflict with each other, resulting in different levels of charging rates. 
 
Cost of Implementation 
Such new systems usually incur high start-up costs associated with new infrastructure and in-
vehicle devices. As observed from other markets of cutting-edge technologies, the prices of 
devices will gradually decrease as the market matures. In most cases, implementation of new 
systems entails a considerable amount of cost and effort in demonstrations and results analysis. 
Having a transitory period of adaptation is preferred to making a sudden change to a new system. 
The costs therefore should be analyzed, not only for the design of the final and stabilized stage of 
the system but also for the intermediate steps of implementation. Establishment of a transition 
strategy and estimation of costs are shown in Section 4.3 and further discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
System Efficiency and Equity 
User fees are generally superior to non-user taxes in achieving system efficiency. However, since 
this alternative is combined with current fuel taxes, there will be a relative loss in terms of 
efficiency compared to the next alternative, which replaces the existing system with a completely 
new scheme. The equity impact varies depending on the fee structure, revenue dedication, and 






4.3. Alternative 3 – Replacing Fuel Taxes with New Pricing Schemes 
 
The last alternative is the most innovative and the least dependent upon traditional funding 
mechanisms. It considers abandoning the current fuel tax system completely and introducing a 
usage-based charging scheme and possible adaptation of this basic philosophy, in advance, to a 
more comprehensive pricing strategy. 
 
4.3.1. VMT Fees 
 
To follow up the self-financing theorem discussion in Chapter 3, the following paragraphs 
summarize the numerical analysis results that can be referenced in designing the VMT fee rates 
as a replacement for the current fuel tax structure. Due to insufficient data, the following analysis 
was done only for the state highway system. Local analysis should be accomplished as data are 
prepared. 
The data was collected from the FHWA reports on highway statistics, a highway 
financing needs study (Sinha et al., 2005), and Indiana Statewide Travel Demand Model 
(ISTDM) results (INDOT 2004, 2005). Recent records of Indiana’s expenditures for state 
highway system, including reimbursement from the federal government, were obtained from the 
highway statistics. Regarding historical information for the state’s revenue account, its forecast, 
and future gaps in funding, the results of the highway financing needs study were consulted. A 
four-step transportation planning model was completed in ISTDM to calculate the vehicle miles 
traveled by road functional classes. 
Incorporating all information available, the average unit rates (in dollars per mile) for the 
suggested distance-based charging schemes were calculated using several different scenarios. The 
basic unit rate calculation is described in the following equation: 
 
 UsageofAmount  Total





The appropriate unit rates (in cents/mile) for the distance-based charging scheme were 
calculated for each of three scenarios: 
• Scenario 1: The proposed scheme covers the current state highway expenditure, on the 
assumption that the VMT fee would replace fuel tax, vehicle registration, and all other 
revenue sources. 
• Scenario 2: The proposed scheme covers the current state highway while maintaining 
revenue from vehicle registration. 
• Scenario 3: The proposed scheme covers not only the current state highway expenditure 
but also addresses the future funding gap as identified by Indiana’s highway needs study 
(2) to attain desired level of system performance. 
Each scenario involves two sub-scenarios: (i) the proposed financing system covers all 
expenses that are currently incurred through federal-aid apportioned to the state as well as state-
generated funds, (ii) federal aid is maintained at current level, and thus the proposed financing 
system is needed to replace only those expenditures that are supported by state-generated funds. It 
can be stated that the former refers to a VMT fee that replaces both the federal and state fuel 
taxes, while the latter to a VMT fee that substitutes the state fuel tax only. Tables 4.9 through 
4.11 summarize the results for each scenario. 
 
 
Scenario 1: Distance-Based Fees to Cover the Current Expenditure 
Under this scenario, users pay a price that corresponds to the level of highway usage. As 
aforementioned, a unit rate can be established for two cases: to establish “state plus federal” VMT 
fee; or to establish state VMT fee only. In the former case, it is determined that users will need to 
pay 2.9 cents/mile of VMT fee instead of combined 36.4 cents/gallon of federal and state gasoline 
tax (51.4 cents/gallon for diesel). On the other hand, when this new pricing method replaces the 
state fuel tax system, users need to pay 2.0 cents/mile of VMT fee as well as the federal fuel tax, 
which is currently 18.4 cents per gallon for gasoline and 24.4 cents for diesel. If the suggested 
pricing strategy aims to discriminate price between different services, then each road functional 




Table 4.9 VMT Values and VMT Fee Rates to Cover State Highway Disbursements 
Location Functional Class VMT per year Unit Rate (¢/VMT) (State + Federal VMT fee)  
Unit Rate (¢/VMT) 
(State VMT fee) 
Rural Interstate 9,243,841,445 1.7 0.8 
 Other Principal Arterial 5,803,052,510 3.7 2.6 
 Minor Arterial 4,563,686,615 3.9 2.8 
 Major Collector 8,514,769,640 4.5 4.2 
  Rural Subtotal (Average) 28,125,350,210 3.3 2.5 
Urban Interstate 7,228,927,565 3.5 1.7 
 Other Freeway/Expressway 1,014,585,025 1.3 0.4 
 Other Principal Arterial 8,733,145,490 2.1 1.2 
 Minor Arterial 3,498,646,180 0.6 0.5 
  Urban Subtotal (Average) 20,475,304,260 2.3 1.2 
Total (Average Rate) 48,600,654,470 2.9 2.0 
 
Scenario 2: Distance-Based Fees While Maintaining Vehicle Registration Revenue 
The same logic is applied as in the previous case, except that revenue from vehicle registrations is 
kept at its current level (which averaged $339 million per annum over the past three years and 
formed approximately 25% of total State highway receipt). As such, only a part of the overall 
highway expenditure is expected to be covered by the proposed VMT fee scheme. As seen in 
Table 4.10, average unit rates for the VMT fee are lower than those for Scenario 1: 2.2 cents/mile 
to replace both the state and federal fuel taxes and 1.3 cents/mile to replace state fuel tax. 
Table 4.10 Mileage Fee Rate to Cover Highway Expenditure, Maintaining Vehicle Registration 
Fee (thousand dollars, cents per mile) 





supported by State Fund
Unit Rate (¢/VMT) 
(State + Federal VMT 
fee) 
Unit Rate (¢/VMT) 
(State VMT Fee) 
Rural Interstate 119,527 45,849 1.3 0.5 
 OPA 163,738 96,304 2.8 1.7 
 Minor Arterial 133,657 83,571 2.9 1.8 
 Major Collector 289,154 232,755 3.4 2.7 
  Rural Subtotal 706,076 458,479 2.5 1.6 
Urban Interstate 193,519 79,546 2.7 1.1 
 OFE 9,863 2,538 1.0 0.3 
 OPA 137,285 67,208 1.6 0.8 
 Minor Arterial 14,768 10,517 0.4 0.3 
  Urban Subtotal 355,435 159,808 1.7 0.8 




Scenario 3: Distance-Based Fees to Cover the Current Expenditure and Future Needs 
INDOT’s business report (INDOT, 2005) concluded that Indiana’s highway system will require 
$25 billion over the 2006-2020 analysis period to maintain the system at desired performance 
level. For illustration purposes, annual funding needs by highway class in year 2010 are presented 
in Table 4.11. Applying VMT fee rates calculated in Table 4.10 to predicted amount of travel, 
projected revenues from the VMT fee scheme are determined. Then, the VMT fee rates needed to 
supplement the revenues from vehicle registration and related fees are determined (6th column in 
Table 4.11). Finally, it is concluded that additional VMT fee of 0.3 cents/mile will have to be 
collected to meet the future needs. This gives 2.5 cents/mile to replace both the state and federal 
fuel taxes; and 1.6 cents/mile to replace the current state fuel tax. 
Table 4.11 Mileage Fee Rate to Meet Future Needs in Year 2010                                      
(thousand dollars, vehicles, cents per mile) 
Location Functional Class 
Funding 
Needs 
VMT per year 
(in million) 
Projected Rev. 
(rates in Table 4.10)
Funding 
Gap 




Federal  State only
Rural Interstate 166,792 11,385 147,215 19,577 0.2 1.5 0.7 
 OPA 226,987 7,147 201,667 25,320 0.4 3.2 2.0 
 MA 185,613 5,621 164,619 20,995 0.4 3.3 2.2 
 MC 400,039 10,487 356,136 43,903 0.4 3.8 3.2 
  Subtotal 979,431 34,641 869,637 109,795 0.3 2.8 1.9 
Urban Interstate 268,840 8,903 238,347 30,492 0.3 3.0 1.4 
 OFE 13,809 1,250 12,148 1,661 0.1 1.1 0.4 
 OPA 191,454 10,756 169,087 22,367 0.2 1.8 1.0 
 MA 20,367 4,309 18,189 2,178 0.1 0.5 0.4 
  Subtotal 494,469 25,218 437,771 56,698 0.2 2.0 1.0 
Total (Average Rate) 1,473,900 59,859 1,307,407 166,493 0.3 2.5 1.6 
 
 
Recently, Indiana DOT has collected a great amount of upfront revenue from the long-
term lease of the Indiana Toll Road to a private concessionaire (issues and execution described in 
Section 2.4.2). Being solely dedicated for investment in highway system according to a new 
highway preservation and construction program, the “Major Moves,” the upfront revenue ($3.8 
billion) is expected to partially resolve the funding gap problem. In October of 2007 and October 




distribution formula. The rest ($3.65 billion) was to be used in reducing funding gap for the state 
highway system. For purpose of numerical analysis, it was assumed that the revenue is evenly 
distributed over the coming 10-year period, and among highway functional classes 
proportionately to the current funding gaps. Consequently, the required VMT fee rates can be 
adjusted as presented in Table 4.12. It was calculated that the additional revenue from the Major 
Moves can lower the required fee rates by 0.6 cents per mile on average. It is noteworthy, 
however, that the amount of fee adjustment would vary depending on the detailed expenditure 
plan. 
Table 4.12 Mileage Fee Rate to Meet Future Needs, Maintaining Vehicle Registration Fee   
(thousand dollars, vehicles, cents per mile) (Year 2010) 
Location Functional Class Funding Gap 
Annual revenue from 
the Major Move 
VMT Fee Rates (¢/VMT) 
Reduction due to 
additional revenue 
Rate 
(State + Federal) 
Rate 
(State only) 
Rural Interstate 19,577 42,919 0.4 1.1 0.3 
 OPA 25,320 55,508 0.8 2.4 1.2 
 Minor Arterial 20,995 46,027 0.8 2.5 1.4 
 Major Collector 43,903 96,248 0.9 2.9 2.2 
  Rural Subtotal 109,795 240,702 0.7 2.1 1.3 
Urban Interstate 30,492 66,848 0.8 2.3 0.7 
 OFE 1,661 3,641 0.3 0.8 0.1 
 OPA 22,367 49,035 0.5 1.3 0.5 
 Minor Arterial 2,178 4,774 0.1 0.4 0.2 
  Urban Subtotal 56,698 124,298 0.5 1.5 0.5 




Recent technological improvements in GPS and communication are expected to enable a more 
flexible and dynamic pricing scheme with lower administration costs. The suggested pricing 
scheme can be realized using the system described below, but is not necessarily restricted to this 
particular one. 
Each vehicle, equipped with an onboard computer, will receive GPS information at points 
where the rate changes. The vehicle odometer will measure the traveled distance between each 




computer will then calculate the fee based on pre-entered unit rates and accumulate the total 
amount owned. A traveler will prepay, receive a bill, or pay at gas stations for the total amount 
traveled, utilizing communication technology based on wireless connection or a smart card. For 
privacy protection purposes, all the raw data can be discarded from the system completely after 
calculating and billing the fees. According to the system status and pricing strategic goals, the 
rates can be adjusted, technically very easily, but only when it is legitimately approved. Other 
possible technological alternatives and system components are discussed in detail in Chapter 6, 
which provides a demonstration plan and transitory strategy. 
The characteristics of this alternative are summarized in Section 4.3.3. 
 
4.3.2. Future Adaptation of VMT Fees – Comprehensive Pricing 
 
A nationwide road use metering system has been suggested as a part of long-term road financing 
strategy. Under this federal level strategy, each state or sub-state jurisdiction can determine 
independently its own rate structure (TRB, 2005). The present study proposes a usage-based 
pricing scheme for the State of Indiana, tentatively called as Indiana’s Statewide Comprehensive 
Usage-based Road Pricing (ISCURP). The rationale of ISCURP is as the following: 
First, ISCURP will be designed as a statewide pricing for the entire roadway system of 
Indiana. Although tolls on individual facilities may solve site-specific congestion problems or 
improve revenue stream, it is important to understand their impact on other parts of the network. 
In this regard, tolling on particular road sections has to be planned and implemented in the 
context of the entire network. The intent is to have a pricing plan embracing all components in the 
statewide network considering interactions among them. 
Second, it is a usage-based pricing method. ISCURP will directly charge users based on 
their usage, according to the monetary cost they impose on the road system. 
Third, it is characterized by its comprehensiveness. ISCURP will identify every single 
vehicle-mile driven within the boundary of the state in terms of its location, jurisdiction, 
functional class, vehicle class, and weight. The expected congestion level, emission, and any 
other externalities can also be included. A given set of identifiers will be mapped to a particular 








where, i is road section identification, LOS is level of service or equivalent congestion index of a 
road section during a specific time period of a day, and c is vehicle class identification. Road 
section i’s are identified by location (urban/rural) and functional class. In defining vehicle classes, 
axle weight information will also be included, so that further price variations can be introduced 
based on distance-weight combinations, if needed. 
Having different costs of supply, it is more efficient to price various service levels 
differently rather than to charge every usage the same. The reasoning for price variation is 
discussed below: 
Location and Functional Class:  Rural Interstates generally accommodate more freight 
travel than urban systems and thus experience further road wear, while urban roads suffer more 
from congestion and higher peak hour concentrations of trips than the rural system. Also, each 
functional class of roadway system has different characteristics and requirements in their design 
and performance standards. In this regard, ISCURP can be designed to have expenditures 
required for the provision of service on a particular roadway system fully covered by revenues 
collected from relevant usage within that location and functional class. 
Vehicle Configuration:  Vehicle classes and weight categories are the most apparent and 
popular basis of price variation. It is generally accepted that road wear costs need to be shared on 
the basis of equivalent single axle load (ESAL) weighted VMT, while VMT or passenger car 
equivalents (PCE) weighted VMT is recommended to be used in distribution of non-load-related 
costs. Categorization of highway costs and their allocation rules are discussed in detail in the 
following sections. 
Congestion Level:  Externalities imposed on other users of the system are also important 
cost components of highway usage, congestion being one of the most prominent examples. In 
ISCURP, additional rates that reflect congestion level will be applied on the top of the basic fee 
rate structure. 
Recognizing all levels of price variation, ISCURP can be specified by a prototype rate 





Table 4.13 Prototype of ISCURP Rate Schedule 
Population 
Level 
Functional Classes Level of 
Service 
Vehicle Classes 
Auto Pickups/ Vans Buses 
SUT 
(<25K lbs) … 
CT 
(<50K) … Avg. 
Rural Interstates A ~ C # 
¢/mile 
…       
Area  D ~ E …        
  F         
 Other Principal 
Arterials 
A ~ C         
  D ~ E         
  F         
 Major Arterials A ~ C         
  D ~ E         
  F         
 Minor Arterials A ~ C         
  D ~ E         
  F         
 Average A ~ C         
  D ~ E         
  F         
Rural Average          
Urban Interstates A ~ C         
Area  D ~ E         
  F         
 Other Freeways/ A ~ C         
 Expressways D ~ E         
  F         
 Other Principal 
Arterials 
A ~ C         
  D ~ E         
  F         
 Minor Arterials A ~ C         
  D ~ E         
  F         
 Average A ~ C         
  D ~ E         
  F         
Urban Average          
Average           
SUT: Single Unit Truck; CT: Combination Trucks 
 
In order to provide reference values for possible unit rates, this research conducted a cost 
allocation analysis using the HCAS based on Indiana’s expenditure and demand data. The results 
can be interpreted as the initial structure for the ISCURP fee rates by location, road function 
class, and vehicle type. Two different vehicle type classifications are suggested in Table 4.14. 








Int OPA MA MaC MnC Average Int OFE OPA MA Collector Average
3-Vehicle Type Classification 
Auto 0.65 1.20 1.80 2.26 5.06 1.54 1.04 0.88 0.84 0.29 0.83 0.83 1.21 
SUT 1.91 7.95 12.31 19.65 32.12 9.72 7.65 7.29 9.91 5.58 20.91 8.26 9.18 
CT 6.38 30.27 53.18 109.90 135.69 18.79 33.29 37.09 62.12 27.64 71.86 37.02 23.54 
 Average 1.72 3.37 4.20 5.18 9.12 3.58 4.29 2.69 2.00 0.63 1.27 2.63 3.14 
20-Vehicle Type Classification 
Auto 0.63 1.07 1.59 2.04 4.93 1.40 0.86 0.75 0.66 0.23 0.74 0.67 1.07 
LT4 0.71 1.47 2.25 2.85 5.28 1.86 1.51 1.18 1.15 0.44 1.07 1.16 1.51 
SU2 1.73 6.60 10.57 16.15 25.01 8.04 6.78 6.72 9.12 4.04 16.00 7.61 7.86 
SU3 2.27 9.26 14.90 26.82 41.06 12.52 9.08 10.08 14.38 6.45 24.21 9.50 11.61 
SU4+ 3.32 14.58 23.83 42.94 64.22 15.84 15.16 17.31 25.30 11.55 44.63 15.88 15.81 
CS3 2.08 8.12 13.14 20.86 32.25 7.94 8.27 8.65 12.09 5.30 20.19 8.89 8.21 
CS4 2.49 10.16 16.53 27.96 41.59 8.48 10.93 11.72 16.78 7.64 28.38 12.19 9.74 
3S2 5.99 29.02 48.34 104.04 144.64 17.29 30.75 37.73 55.92 27.84 97.88 34.07 21.49 
CS5 5.44 25.36 42.64 80.48 112.54 15.06 28.21 32.88 48.53 23.63 84.56 30.86 18.98 
CS6 6.38 31.01 50.80 110.56 151.12 26.21 32.77 41.64 61.29 31.33 108.12 38.31 29.55 
CS7+ 8.36 42.04 69.55 156.17 205.31 35.51 45.15 58.16 84.00 44.67 156.97 52.85 40.32 
CT4- 2.66 11.17 18.04 31.67 48.34 12.58 11.50 12.66 18.12 8.27 31.86 12.61 12.49 
CT5 6.98 35.24 58.36 113.82 152.17 21.22 40.17 45.49 66.12 33.14 128.72 42.84 27.27 
CT6+ 3.81 16.65 27.21 55.81 78.89 9.87 16.63 20.99 31.27 15.12 52.54 16.78 11.49 
DS5 5.77 28.42 47.82 93.89 105.18 14.23 32.98 39.45 58.05 32.98 100.95 35.30 20.57 
DS6 5.98 30.30 50.67 118.74 109.50 14.69 34.20 45.39 67.51 44.12 105.08 36.81 20.30 
DS7 9.29 49.29 81.34 209.42 219.20 27.50 53.65 75.07 108.62 69.78 178.84 62.43 35.84 
DS8+ 8.16 41.94 69.58 182.15 184.76 23.96 44.34 66.08 94.63 62.89 152.20 52.50 30.83 
TS 7.60 37.52 63.95 138.98 139.53 18.20 43.61 58.42 84.23 54.07 133.89 48.85 25.65 
Bus 2.01 8.27 13.41 25.50 32.82 13.57 7.80 8.72 12.91 5.88 20.07 9.15 11.75 
 Average 1.72 3.37 4.20 5.18 9.12 3.58 4.29 2.69 2.00 0.63 1.27 2.63 3.14 
OPA: other principal arterial; MA: minor arterial; MaC: major collector; MnC: minor collector; OFE: other freeway 
and expressway 
Auto: automobiles and motorcycles; SUT: Single Unit Truck; CT: Combination Truck; LT4: pickups, vans and other 
light 2-axle, four tire vehicles; SU2, SU3, SU4+: 2-, 3-, and 4- or more axle single unit trucks; CS3, CS4, 3S2, CS5, 
CS6, CS7+: 3-, 4-, 5-, 6-, and 7- or more axle tractor-semi-trailer trucks with two categories of 5-axle vehicles, one 
with standard tandem axles and one with split tandem axles; CT4-, CT5, CT6+: 3-, 4-, 5-, and 6- or more axle truck-
trailer combinations; DS5, DS6, DS7, DS8+: 5-, 6-, 7-, and 8- or more axle twin trailer/semi-trailer combinations TS: 






4.3.3. Overall Assessment of Alternative 3 
 
The pricing schemes introduced in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 are not necessarily two different 
approaches. Rather, both are based on the same perspective, and the latter one can be considered 
an elaborated version of the former one. Thus, this part of the report summarizes the features of 
this innovative pricing scheme as one framework. 
 
Adequacy as Revenue Sources 
As seen from the analysis results described above, the agency can come up with an adequate fee 
rate plan that yields sufficient revenue by researching the needs and demands. Supported by 
proper authority, the suggested fee system can be earmarked for transportation purposes to insure 
its accountability. The plan’s stability also depends on the fee rates, especially in the long-term 
and future demand. 
 
Cost of Implementation 
As seen in the previous section, the technology setup selected will determine the cost of 
implementation. The total costs of implementation consists of the capital cost for infrastructure 
and devices; operation costs for labor, any necessary upgrade, and maintenance; and 
administration costs for the initial setup of the bureaucracy, user enforcement, and more 
intangibly, inconveniences experienced by users while getting used to the new system. In terms of 
capital costs, usually more recently invented technologies (i.e., GPS and cellular communication) 
entail higher costs, but at the same time are more suitable to region-wide application and more 
flexible for future alterations. Therefore, selecting a system configuration should consider not 
only the out-of-pocket cost for the initial start-up, but also the potential costs for future 
adaptations. 
 
System Efficiency and Equity 
Since the rate plan intends to charge users directly based on their usage of the highway system, it 
could act as a proxy of market price. As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, assuming a perfect usage-




particular usage, the system will realize maximum efficiency. Provided that the system is 
designed to be capable of keeping track of the revenue generated by each road segment and each 
road user, then we can also apply abundant knowledge of the revenue distribution to make 
decisions on capacity expansion (Adams et al., 2001). 
 
Public/Political Acceptability 
Since this alternative is a completely new system that transforms the current paradigm of highway 
pricing, a study on users’ responses should be carried out to predict acceptability. A survey can be 
performed to reveal factors that hinder implementation of new pricing schemes and to understand 






CHAPTER 5. COMPARISON OF THE ALTERNATIVES 
According to the evaluation criteria established in Section 3.1 (Table 3.1), this chapter compares 
suggested alternatives. Criteria under which comparisons are made include the plan’s adequacy as 
a revenue source (sufficiency, stability, and accountability), its impact on system efficiency and 
equity, the costs of implementation, public acceptability, and policy alignment. After the 
comparisons are presented, a conclusion is drawn on which alternative would be the most suitable 
for the current situation and future trends. 
 
5.1. Adequacy as a Funding Mechanism 
5.1.1. Sufficiency and Stability 
 
The sufficiency of the revenues generated by each alternative funding scheme varies according to 
its detailed implementation plan. For example, the revenue sufficiency of the option to increase 
the current fuel taxes is a function of the amount of tax increase, which will be decided by 
policymakers. Therefore, the sufficiency of the revenue is not a dependent variable that can be 
measured or forecasted, rather it is an objective function that can be targeted and controlled by 
policy initiation and implementation. This section, instead of providing a direct comparison of the 
revenue sufficiency of each alternative, therefore will factor out the exogenous forces that may 








Alternative 1 – Adjusting Current Tax System 
In order to consider an adjustment of the current funding strategy to a level that will generate 
sufficient revenue, a fuel tax increase, inflation-indexing of the fuel tax, and an increase in 
vehicle registration fees, as well as increase or introduction of other taxes, will be considered. 
First of all, one of the most influential factors that affect the sufficiency and stability of 
the fuel tax revenue stream is improvement in fuel efficiency. The “Annual Energy Outlook” 
(EIA, 2007) provides projections of fuel efficiency by vehicle types for a reference case and for 
high and low energy price cases, which are presented in Table 5.1. Based on the reference case, 
the prediction is that fuel efficiency will increase at average annual compound rate of 
0.4%~0.8%. By calculating the annual compound rate of the reciprocals of these values, it is 
translated into a 0.4% ~ 0.7% annual decreases in per vehicle-mile revenues of fuel taxes. This 
trend is magnified if higher energy prices are expected, whereby fuel efficiencies are predicted to 
increase, with an annual rate of 0.5% ~ 0.9%. In this case, revenue per vehicle-mile will decrease 
0.5% ~ 1.0% annually with fixed rates of fuel taxes. We call this problem degeneration of per 
vehicle-mile revenue. Since the current fuel taxes are maintained as a major funding source, all 
the options in this tax adjustment category inherently share this revenue degeneration problem. 
Table 5.1 Fuel Efficiency Forecasts by Energy Price Scenario 
Vehicle Types / Energy Price Scenarios 2005 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 Annual rate (%) 
Light-Duty Vehicle 
(New) 
Reference case 25.2 25.7 27.3 27.9 28.2 28.9 29.2 0.6% 
High price 25.2 25.7 27.8 29.3 30.5 31.4 31.9 0.9% 
Low price 25.2 25.7 27.1 27.5 27.6 28.1 28.3 0.5% 
Light-Duty Vehicle 
(Stock) 
Reference case 19.6 19.7 19.8 20.6 21.2 21.8 22.2 0.5% 
High price 19.6 19.7 19.8 20.9 22.0 23.1 23.9 0.8% 
Low price 19.6 19.7 19.8 20.6 21.1 21.5 21.8 0.4% 
Trucks 8500–10000 
lbs (New) 
Reference case 14.6 14.8 15.8 16.4 16.7 17.2 17.4 0.7% 
High price 14.6 14.8 15.9 16.8 17.5 18.1 18.4 0.9% 
Low price 14.6 14.8 15.8 16.3 16.5 16.8 17.0 0.6% 
Trucks 8500–10000 
lbs (Stock) 
Reference case 14.1 14.2 14.7 15.5 16.2 16.7 17.0 0.8% 
High price 14.1 14.2 14.7 15.7 16.5 17.3 17.9 0.9% 
Low price 14.1 14.2 14.7 15.5 16.1 16.4 16.7 0.7% 
Trucks over 10000lbs 
(Overall) 
Reference case 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.7 0.4% 
High price 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.6 6.8 6.9 0.5% 
Low price 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.5 6.6 0.4% 





Degeneration of revenue will become more severe if the fuel tax rate remains as non-
indexed to the inflation rates. As pointed out in Section 4.1.1, in order to uphold the buying 
power of the gasoline fuel tax, which was 15 cents per gallon in 1988, the current (2006) rate 
should be adjusted to 26 cents per gallon, which is a 44% increase. Assuming a 2.98% annual 
increase in the CPI (which is the average increase rate for the past two decades), the non-
inflation-indexed fuel tax rates of 2006 will generate 89% of per gallon revenue in 2010, 66% in 
2020, and only 49% in 2030. 
When vehicle registration fee increases are considered, we should take into account the 
possibility of avoidance of in-state registration due to higher registration fees compared to the 
adjacent states. Pratt and Hoffer (1985) analyzed the responsiveness of heavy vehicle 
registrations to tax differences to conclude that there are no evident interstate variations in 
registration fees and vehicle taxes. The study found that the state registration fees and taxes 
accrue only 2% of the total annual operating costs of trucking companies, and that the primary 
decision factor for location of vehicle registration was the state’s demand for transport services. 
Therefore, when it is modest, an increase in vehicle registration fees will not necessarily result in 
repulsion of registration frequency at the interstate level. 
Appropriations from general accounts, such as sales tax, income tax, and property tax, 
entail less stability of the revenue stream than earmarked sources.  First, strenuous competition 
between governmental expenses exists, including education, medical care, environmental 
controls, etc. Also, the taxed activities of general accounts are usually poorer indications of 
highway financing needs than highway related activities. For instance, it could be the case that, in 
a particular year, revenue from sales tax is fairly low due to an economic recession, but the 
highway financial needs could exceed the average trend due to newly launched rehabilitation 
projects. Local option taxes, which are usually established with fixed sunset dates, are inherently 
disadvantageous in terms of stability because approval from voters is required after its expiration. 
In addition, it should be noted that appropriations from general sources are not significant 
portions of the total highway budget. 
In conclusion, the factors that adversely affect the sufficiency and stability under future 
revenues of options in the first category include improvement of fuel efficiency, inflation, and 
competition between governmental expenses. If the fuel tax based financing is to be continued, it 




registration fees. In addition, long term local option taxes for local governments should be 
considered, 20 years for example, as used in some other states (NCHRP, 2006). 
 
Alternative 2 – Current Fuel Tax Supplemented by Other User Fees 
As the current fuel tax based system is maintained, problems with fuel taxes—degeneration of 
per mile and per gallon revenue—linger in this alternative as well. By introducing other user fees 
to supplement fuel taxes, however, the sufficiency and stability of the revenue stream can be 
enhanced. 
As a first option, legislation can be established to allow tolling of newly constructed 
highways and bridges for the financing of their construction and maintenance. If tolls are well 
designed to earn enough to cover the costs associated, the revenues from other sources only need 
to support the maintenance and operation of the rest of the system. In this case, demand on tolled 
roads is a key variable that determines the sufficiency and stability of the revenues. If realized 
demand is less than expected or fluctuates more than assumed, then this additional funding source 
will not be able to significantly enhance the sufficiency and stability of the revenue stream. In 
planning toll roads, therefore, issues such as competing or complementing relationships between 
the toll roads and adjacent non-tolled routes, the demand elasticity to the toll level, the forecast 
for future demand, and the period the tolls are in effect, need to be addressed. 
Uncertainty of travel demand can be an even larger issue that impairs adequacy if a toll 
road is privatized. To share possible risks, leasing contracts are occasionally observed to include a 
revenue preservation clause, under which the public agency should guarantee the minimum level 
of revenue to a private concessionaire, while excessive revenue beyond a certain level would be 
contributed to a governmental budget. If the actual demand is too low to yield the agreed 
minimum revenue, then the public agency will suffer the burden of paying the private consortium 
the revenue shortfall. 
With the third option, a fuel tax supplemented by VMT fees, the fee rates can be 
determined at any level that is analyzed to generate target revenue. When supported by sufficient 
resources to research adequate fee rates, there will not be any significant factors that can 
undermine sufficiency and stability of the revenue stream. It should be noted that processes such 
as data collection and analyses on cost/demand and the choice of a VMT fee rate, may necessitate 





Alternative 3 – Replacing Fuel Taxes with New Pricing Schemes 
By replacing the current fuel tax-based revenue structure, this alternative actually eliminates the 
disadvantages of the current system. As discussed and analyzed in Chapter 4, revenue sufficiency 




Accountability is a legal and institutional matter, unlike the sufficiency and stability problems, 
which are generally approached by analytical methods. Also, it is a problem not only of revenue 
generation, but also of revenue dedication (expenditure) strategy. 
Rephrasing the definition of accountability given in Section 3.2.2, a financing mechanism 
is perfectly accountable if its payers are identical to its recipients. Evaluation of the accountability 
of the alternatives thus varies, depending on the level of payers/recipients aggregation. Viewing 
highway users as one homogenous group, the issue is to assess whether a particular financing tool 
receives revenue only from highway users and pays only for the highway system. In this regard, 
many of the current funding mechanisms, including motor fuel taxes, vehicle registration fees, 
and tolls, are transportation-dedicated, so therefore are accountable revenue sources. Also, 
proposed direct user charging schemes, including VMT fees, which can be expected to be 
earmarked as replacements of fuel taxes, are also accountable. Other highway related general 
taxes may not be accountable since their payers are not always highway users. Whether and how 
much of a portion of general taxes should be spent on the highway system is a complex problem, 
which often requires subjective assessments. 
We can elaborate further on accountability by disaggregating payers/recipients into 
subgroups, such as rural/urban residents, highway/transit users, tolled/non-tolled roads users, etc. 
With this setup, an ideal accountability is to spend the revenue from a subgroup only in benefiting 
that specific subgroup. For an extreme example, we can imagine a budgeting system that consists 
of a number of exclusive accounts belonging to each subgroup of users, e.g., rural interstates 
truckers fund, county motorcycle user account, etc. The financial efficacy and efficiency of a 




level of accountability should be targeted to achieve the best financial efficiency and can only be 
attained when coupled with a relevant expenditure plan. 
Overall, from the perspective of the present study, better accountability is attributed to 
earmarking the generated revenue for transportation (or highway) purposes. In other words, an 
alternative that includes earmarked revenue sources is better in terms of accountability than those 
which depend on general (non-earmarked) sources. Local option taxes, in this regard, could be 





5.2. System Efficiency and Equity 
5.2.1. System Efficiency 
 
The impact on system efficiency of each alternative can be compared from two perspectives. 
First, as mathematically demonstrated in Section 3.3.3, a financing structure that self-finances the 
system is one that maximizes the total social welfare (i.e., the system efficiency). From this 
viewpoint, system efficiency is closely related to revenue sufficiency at an aggregate level. Given 
that the assessed need is optimal, if a suggested financing method procures adequate revenue to 
meet the need, then it can be said to be efficient. As acknowledged, each alternative can be 
designed (by selecting relevant tax increases, toll rates, or per mile rates) to secure target revenue 
if the only aim is revenue sufficiency. Therefore, we are not directly comparing in this study 
whether or not each alternative is self-financing. 
Second, a suggested pricing scheme should function as a price signal to users. In other 
words, a specific fee/tax rate plan should be structured to encourage socially beneficial activities 
and to restrain the opposite. As an illustration, a trip by a heavier vehicle that causes increased 
road wear or a trip on a congested road should be charged a higher price, for it incurs higher costs 
to the system.  Although theoretically, a market mechanism works best when the marginal cost is 
priced, it is not quite feasible or practical to measure and apply the exact marginal cost for each 
highway usage. Chapter 6 discusses the difficulty of calculating and implementing marginal-cost-
based pricing, the drawbacks of a fully responsive pricing structure, and a compromise solution. 
The following paragraphs discuss and compare competence as a market force of each alternative. 
 
Alternative 1 – Adjusting Current Tax System 
The current fuel tax based system generally works as a proxy of highway usage, although it is 
distorted in a sense in that vehicles with higher fuel efficiency pay less than what they actually 
used and those with lower efficiency pay more. Thus, this first alternative, which maintains fuel 
taxes as the major revenue source, can modestly fulfill system efficiency. However, since other 




the role as a price signal to users could be compromised. As pointed out in Section 4.1.3, the 
impacts on system efficiency can differ conditionally depending on the mixture of tax treatments. 
 
Alternative 2 – Current Fuel Tax Supplemented by Other User Fees 
Being supplemented by other revenue sources such as usage-based fees, this alternative will 
generally better function as a market force than the first alternative. Nevertheless, caution is 
needed since poorly designed fee structures can misrepresent the market mechanism and may not 
necessarily promote efficient utilization of the system. For example, in the toll road option, road 
sections to be tolled and the rates to be charged should be carefully determined based on the 
demand level and in a way that approximates the marginal cost. 
 
Alternative 3 – Replacing Fuel Taxes with New Pricing Schemes 
Based on the above, ISCURP could be the best in attaining system efficiency, but the fee 
structure must be well designed. A detailed implementation scheme and research agenda are 
addressed in Chapter 6. 
 
5.2.2. Modal Equity 
 
Equity between modes under the current highway funding strategy is best represented by equity 
ratios calculated by a Highway Cost Allocation Study, the national level reference values for 
which are summarized in Table 3.7. It has been found that the fuel tax-based current system is not 
equitably distributing the cost between mode users, and in fact, passenger vehicles in general and 
lighter trucks are subsidizing heavier trucks. 
Similarly, the present study evaluates equity between road functional classes by applying 
the concept of the self-financing ratio as discussed in Section 3.4.2 (Oh et al., 2007). The results 
presented in Table 5.2 are based on state expenditure and revenue data for Indiana. These values 
indicate how much each road functional class is paying compared to the revenue received from. 
For instance, comparing the rural average (1.06) and the urban average (0.92), we can conclude 




highways. Also within the rural highway system, the rural interstate system is the major 
subsidizer, while other functional classes are paying less than the expenditures they incur. 
Table 5.2 Self-Financing Ratio under Current Fuel Tax System by Road Function Class 
Location Functional Class With respect to the whole system 
Within subsystem 
(rural/urban) 
Rural Interstate 2.19 2.07 
 OPA 0.86 0.82 
 Major Arterial 0.99 0.93 
 Major Collector 0.52 0.49 
  Rural Average 1.06 1.00 
Urban Interstate 1.00 1.08 
 OFE 1.70 1.84 
 OPA 0.90 0.98 
 Major Arterial 0.32 0.34 
  Urban Average 0.92 1.00 
Average Rate 1.00 - 
 
 
Based on the above, it can be concluded that both the first and second alternatives, which 
retain the current fuel tax system, entail a certain level of inequity between different classes of 
users. Highway systems using these alternative funding schemes are tolerating cross-subsidy 
between different classes of users. 
If a pricing structure makes every value of equity ratios and self-financing ratios identical 
to one, then it can be said to realize perfect modal equity. Consequently, equity between vehicle 
classes and road function classes will be best achieved with the suggested comprehensive VMT 
fee structure shown in Tables 4.14 (a) and (b). 
 
5.2.3. Equity between Income Groups 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4.1, equity between income groups is a challenging criterion to evaluate 




particular income group support or be supported by others? In other words, how 
regressive/progressive should a highway fiscal policy be? The question becomes more complex 
considering that equity is also greatly influenced by revenue allocation policy. Hence, 
quantitative evaluation and comparison of equity requires more rigorous and extensive study, 
which is beyond the scope of this research. In the following paragraphs, however, commonly 
accepted wisdom on each alternative is summarized. 
Fuel taxes are generally considered to be regressive when measured by a common 
indicator, the fraction of income taken by the fuel tax. However, it is often pointed out that the 
regressive nature of fuel tax is exaggerated (Wachs, 2003). As a matter of fact, people in higher 
income groups usually drive more and therefore pay more fuel taxes. By allocating fuel tax 
revenue in such a way to support public transit systems, which are generally used more by lower 
income groups, fuel taxes can benefit them as well. 
Using the same indicator, sales taxes have been evaluated to be generally as regressive as 
fuel taxes (Wachs, 2003). However, dedicating revenue from sales taxes to highway purposes is 
often said to be regressive, considering that highway users, who more often than not own their 
vehicles, are generally wealthier than non-users. In other words, that part of the sales tax revenue 
that would have been spent on other purposes, including medical support, education, etc., is spent 
on highways to support the relatively higher income segment of the population. 
Although tolls are often considered a regressive tax, user fees can be designed to convey 
a certain level of progressivity by introducing fee discounts/exemptions for specific income 
groups. Also, a system under which different services are priced differently will provide more 
travel choices to the users and will eventually make the wealthier, which usually have a higher 
willingness-to-pay, pay more. Again, more in-depth analysis on equity between income groups 
becomes possible only when equipped with an expenditure plan, and in turn, the flows of tax 






5.3. Cost of Implementation 
 
As specified in Section 3.3.2, two components of implementation costs to be compared between 
alternatives are physical cost and administration cost. The former includes the cost to install, 
deploy, operate, and maintain a system and its components, while bureaucratic and enforcement 
costs are categorized as administration cost. 
 
5.3.1. Physical Cost 
 
The feasibility and implementation costs of technological options receive a great deal of attention 
as important decision-making factors. Remarkable advances in the areas of information and 
communication technology in the past decades, however, have taught us that costs of technology 
should not be considered as restricting constraints. This is especially true regarding a long-term 
strategy that will be implemented over the course of at least 20 years of a highway financing 
policy. History tells us that, for many types of technology, the cost of production and deployment 
drops drastically as the market matures. Echoing this sentiment, a financially infeasible option 
from a present day perspective may become reasonably available in the future. 
Currently, regarding pricing options for state-wide level applications, only a handful of 
pilot studies have been conducted as illustrated in Section 2.3. Due to the lack of information on 
implemental experiences, the discussion in this section does not go much beyond reviewing the 
cost analysis results available to date, foreseeing future potential, and discussing associated 
problems. 
 
Alternative 1 – Adjusting Current Tax System 
Implementation of the options under this category does not necessarily involve significant 
changes in a system or adoption of new technologies. Therefore, a public agency’s out-of-pocket 





Alternative 2 – Current Fuel Tax Supplemented by Other User Fees 
With this approach, the cost depends on the type and scope of the supplementing user fees. When 
toll roads are considered, the cost of toll collection is known to range from about 10% of the toll 
revenue when electronically collected and up to 40% with traditional tollbooths (VTPI, 2005c).  
For options under this category, either implementing a toll or privatizing road segments, 
system integration is an important factor for consideration. A consistent and interoperable 
configuration for each tolled segment facilitates lower costs for initial installation, operation, and 
maintenance, as well as the cost borne by users for the purchase of vehicle equipment. Issues 
related to system consistency and future adaptation is discussed in the following paragraphs 
regarding new pricing schemes. 
 
Alternative 3 – Replacing Fuel Taxes with New Pricing Schemes 
In order to illustrate the cost of a state-wide usage-based charging scheme, this study has largely 
referred to one notable project which currently is under demonstration in Oregon (Kim et al., 
2002). Three scenarios were examined in detail in the Oregon study: 1) collecting VMT data 
using GPS and radio frequency automatic vehicle identification (RF-AVI) tags and to have a fee 
collection center (FCCTR) for information synthesis and billing; 2) utilizing vehicle odometer 
and RF-AVI to gather VMT data and to have FCCTR; and 3), utilizing vehicle odometer and RF-
AVI for VMT data collection and to calculate and charge fees at gas station (without a fee 
collection center). 
For each scenario, the cost, system durability, reliability/accuracy, and possibility of 
future expansion were analyzed, and the important findings are summarized as follows: 
• A GPS configuration entails much higher on-vehicle equipment costs than an odometer-
based configuration. 
• It is much cheaper to collect, calculate, and collect VMT tax at a gas pump than to have a 
fee collection center. 
• The tested on-vehicle units (GPS-based device, readers and antennae in a RF-based AVI 
system) are all very durable. 
• The GPS system had problems with signal loss and increased signal acquisition time in 
the presence of obstacles such as tall buildings, trees, and mountainous surroundings. 




however. On the other hand, the odometer and RF-AVI suite were tested and were shown 
to be 99.9% accurate, which is quite acceptable for implementation. 
• In terms of future expansion, a GPS-based system has more potential than an odometer-
based system. For example, a comprehensive pricing scheme that discriminates VMT tax 
rates according to geographical regions can be more easily implemented with a GPS-
based system than with an odometer system. 
 
More recent research results have recommended having GPS-based data collection 
supplemented by a redundant vehicle odometer to adjust possible GPS system errors and to 
communicate and charge at fuel pumping stations (Whitty et al., 2006). With the suggested 
technological configuration, the capital cost was estimated as shown in Table 5.3, assuming 1,800 
fueling stations statewide. The most expensive tasks are installation of data transferring 
equipment at each fuel pump and improvement of the point-of-sale system. Although it is not 
based on actual data, the state system capital cost is not significant at approximately $32 million 
for 1,800 fueling stations. 
Table 5.3 VMT Fee Capital Costs Estimates 
Cost Items Estimates 
Data Transfer:  
Equipment $3,874,000  
Software $2,250,000  
Installation $10,800,000  
Other Fueling Station Infrastructure:  
Point-of-Sale System Improvements $9,171,000  
Dedicated Telephone Lines $236,000  
Contingencies $5,270,000  
Total Fueling station Capital Costs $31,601,000  
State System Capital Costs, Including Contingencies $1,200,000  
Total Capital Costs $32,801,000  





5.3.2. Administration Cost 
 
As outlined in Section 3.5.1, administration costs consist of the bureaucratic cost and the 
enforcement cost. Generally, introducing a new system incurs higher costs to the agency for 
legislation, a change and update of routines, and employee education. 
As for enforcement cost, the more complicated a pricing scheme is constructed; the more 
expensive it will be to enforce. For example, the simplest fee structure that charges every user in 
the system the same amount, the enforcement task will consist of only monitoring whether or not 
a user paid. On the other hand, more complicated pricing schedules, such as HOT lanes, will 
require an enforcement system consisting of several tasks, e.g., vehicle identification, vehicle 
occupancy observation, and deferred fee calculation. The cost of enforcement will generally rise 
as the pricing structure becomes more complicated. As discussed in Section 2.5.2, however, the 
cost of enforcement varies also according to the target accuracy of violation detection. Usually, 
the given status of technological feasibility, the marginal cost of accuracy enhancement tends to 
increase as the accuracy level rises. In other words, pursuing a 100% trustworthy detection 
system may be neither financially viable nor efficient. The effectiveness of enforcement, which 
can be represented as the voluntary compliance rate of users, depends on a combination of 
detection accuracy and fines for violation. Thus, the level of detection accuracy can be 
compromised if accompanied by a penalty that is high enough to urge users to comply with the 
rule. 
 
Alternative 1 – Adjusting Current Tax System 
This alternative does not add any new pricing mechanism to the current tax system so the costs of 
administration will be negligible. As mentioned in Section 4.1, some of these options may include 
costs for legislation, public outreach, and ballot measures. 
 
Alternative 2 – Current Fuel Tax Supplemented by Other User Fees 
In many toll road implementation cases (Section 2.2.2), it was found that administration and 




discussed above, enforcement costs can be lowered if the system configuration is designed with 
relatively low detection accuracy and a high violation fine. 
 
Alternative 3 – Replacing Fuel Taxes with New Pricing Schemes 
According to Whitty et al. (2006), the administration cost of a mileage-based pricing scheme 
varies depending upon the scenario. Whitty showed that the two fee collection methods compared 
in Sections 4.2.3 and 5.3.1 presented significant difference in their administration costs. First, it 
was found that the centralized data and fee collection (i.e., a system with FCCTR) may be cost- 
prohibitive. Alternatively, fee collection at fueling stations was analyzed to be much more 
efficient and cost-effective in that it has very low enforcement costs and low evasion by users. 
Currently, the Road User Fee Task Force (RUFTF) of Oregon is searching for a better 
enforcement program for the FCCTR configuration through assessment of traffic fines and access 
to a private debt collection system (Whitty et al., 2006). 
In conclusion, if well designed, the administration costs for the VMT fee system can be 






5.4. Public Acceptability 
 
Several recent surveys carried out in different parts of the U.S. were reviewed to gain insight to 
the level of public support for various forms of transportation funding sources, including taxes, 
fees, and tolls. The respondents’ experience and knowledge certainly influence their attitudes and 
perceptions so survey results may vary by regions and socio-economic characteristics. The 
conclusions and findings of each public opinion study therefore will be discussed in consideration 
of the background of the surveys and the socio-demographic and transportation-related 
characteristics of the respondents. The information will then be synthesized to a structured 
comparison between the suggested alternatives in terms of their prospects for public acceptability. 
In most cases, the studies utilizing a survey consisted of two parts of experiments: a 
quantitative survey and a qualitative focus group. The former is characterized by a questionnaire- 
based survey on a sample population that is used as a basis to project opinions of the whole 
population. The latter was conducted with a small group of interviewees, who were selected 
carefully to represent a sampling of the whole population. The goal in this second approach was 
to reveal how people think, facilitated by providing detailed information and interactive 
communication (Lawrence, 2006). 
 
Texas 
Kockelman et al. (2006) conducted a survey in Texas in 2005, where 2,111 residents across the 
state were asked their preferences between several transportation funding options, of which 324 
completed the questionnaire. As a complement to this survey, focus groups were conducted to 
more deeply communicate with the users and to learn important factors that determine a user’s 
attitude toward pricing policies. Following is a summary of the major findings: 
• The main proponents for new transportation pricing policies are those who are more 
exposed to toll experience and congestion problem, i.e., regular toll road users and more 
frequent peak-hour drivers. 
• Tolls are preferred to gas taxes; the improvement of existing roads before building new 




• Education matters; disseminating more accurate and detailed information on 
transportation funding helped increase public awareness of the necessity/legitimacy/ 
benefits of tolling. General opposition was observed to the idea of converting currently 
free roads into toll roads. 
• Well-planned revenue dedication is one of the key factors that can help the agency win 
public acceptance. 
• Plausible reasons to defend conversion of existing roads into toll roads are congestion 
reduction and road improvements. 
• Likely proponents of road pricing are those who are older, more educated, or employed 
part-time, or who commute long-distances. 
• Distrust of government officials was clearly observed. 
• Order of preference among options: (1) sales tax, (2) emission fee, (3) taxes on 
automobile parts, (4) taxes on heavy vehicles, (5) congestion pricing, (6) toll revenues, 
(7) property taxes, (8) state income taxes. 
 
Washington 
Both the telephone survey of 1,118 residents and the six focus group activities, each of which had 
six to eleven participants, were held in Washington State (Lawrence, 2006). Questions in the 
telephone survey and issues in the focus group discussions were designed to understand the 
prevailing attitudes toward transportation issues. Important lessons obtained are as follows: 
• It is generally perceived that additional funds to supplement the current fuel taxes are 
needed for upkeep of the highway system, but would not be needed if government would 
spend the revenue more efficiently. 
• Conditional acceptance of tolling was observed. Tolls are acceptable when applied on a 
project-by-project basis, when revenue is spent on the tolled facility, and when there are 
alternative free routes. 
• Strong opposition against imposing tolls on existing roads was observed. 
• Cynicism about government spending is one of the main obstacles of novel options. 
• Cordon tolling and an annual mileage fee are considered unacceptable and unfair. 
• A statewide tolling system generates apprehension because of its complexity and fears of 




• For participants of focus groups, support for toll roads substantially improved, as they 
were more informed during the focus group activities about the problems and options. 
• The order of preference among the options: (1) tolls on new roads/bridges; (2) lane-
specific or optional tolls, such as HOT lanes, that allow options to users; (3) tolls on 
existing roads/ bridges; (4) increases in the gasoline tax; (5) cordon tolling; (6) replacing 




A general market survey and a stated-preference survey among residents of the Twin Cities area 
were carried out by Minnesota Department of Transportation (2006) as a component of a larger 
project to test the feasibility of mileage-based charges. Four hundred randomly-selected residents 
received a telephone call for the general market survey, where they were asked about their socio-
economic characteristics, trip attributes, attitudes, and knowledge, and their interest in a mileage-
based program. A subset of the participants supplied inputs to the stated-preference survey. It was 
found in this study that, generally, there was not great interest in mileage-based program in the 
Twin City metro area. However, one particular population group that appeared to be interested 
was those who plan to lease, rather than purchase, their next vehicle. 
 
California 
Dill and Weinstein (2007) conducted a public opinion survey in California in 2006. Residents 
received telephone calls asking their opinions on a range of revenue options to fund 
transportation, including taxes and fees, bonds, and tolling. It was revealed that there was fairly 
strong public support for some tolling options. 
• The most popular option was to increase the vehicle registration fee in a way to reflect 
the vehicle’s air pollutant emissions and gas mileage. 
• Options to increase the current fuel taxes, sales taxes, or vehicle license fees, enjoyed a 
similar level of support, about 40%. 
• Residents of regions with toll roads and HOT lanes tended to support these concepts 
more. 
• The income level did not have a significant influence on the level of support. 




Synthesizing the lessons learned from recent surveys, the alternatives of the present study 
were evaluated, as discussed below. 
 
Alternative 1 – Adjusting Current Tax System 
A fuel tax increase may not be the least popular policy, although it will generally face opposition 
from the public. Tax increases or new forms of taxes/fees, including vehicle registration fees, 
sales tax, and emission tax, may not be abhorrent approaches either. 
 
Alternative 2 – Current Fuel Tax Supplemented by Other User Fees 
The acceptance of toll roads is strongly conditional. Having a newly built toll road is not a bad 
idea, while converting currently free roads into toll roads may not be well received. Tolls are 
acceptable when users have another option that is free and when congestion is reduced 
effectively. 
 
Alternative 3 – Replacing Fuel Taxes with New Pricing Schemes 
Apparently, the public shows the least inclination to this new scheme; namely, potential problems 
such as double taxation, fraud, system malfunction, etc. However, the main cause of disfavor can 
be a lack in information and experience with this new policy. Also, focus groups results from 
other states tell us that education and outreach can improve acceptability considerably, especially 
when accurate and detailed information is communicated. 
 
The most important lesson here is that public acceptability is something that can be 
changed over time, as users’ experience accumulates and as substantial public outreach effort 
continues. As seen in most of the surveys, if a particular policy is well-designed to benefit the 
system and its users, then awareness usually entails support for it. In conclusion, we are not 
searching for an option that is the easiest in attaining public acceptability within the current level 
of market maturity and the general perception. Rather, an effort should be made for a selected 
strategy, which should be of course the best to meet the other criteria (system efficiency, financial 
viability, and equity between users), to intensively communicate with the public about the 
rationale and legitimacy of it. In other words, public acceptance should not be a crucial criterion 
that can eliminate an alternative that would have been preferred otherwise. Instead, it should be 




5.5. Policy Alignment 
 
Compatibility with Federal Policy 
As discussed in Section 3.7.1, the long-term goal envisioned by a TRB study (NCHRP, 2006) is 
to replace the current federal fuel tax system with a distance-based pricing scheme. The stepwise 
process proposed for federal strategy is shown in Figure 5.1. The proposal calls for the 
implementation of short-term funding mechanisms until 2015: indexing federal fuel tax, 
implementing motor fuel sales taxes at the federal level, indexing the heavy vehicle use tax, 
eliminating exemptions to the Highway Trust Fund (HTF), and recapturing the interest of HTF 
balances. 
 
Figure 5.1 Timeframe for Revenue Transition (NCHRP, 2006) 
Meanwhile, the timeframe indicates that federally supported research and demonstration 
of new pricing systems, including VMT fees, should be carried out. State and local governments 




studies. When the state/local level VMT fee system is mature enough, the federal government can 
piggyback on state VMT fees. 
Alternative 1 – Adjusting Current Tax System 
Based on the suggested federal strategy and timeframe, the options under this first category suit 
the federal level short-term actions. 
Alternative 2 – Current Fuel Tax Supplemented by Other User Fees 
This approach can be applied during the course of experimentation with tolling and VMT-based 
charging, and before fuel taxes are completely succeeded by new pricing schemes. Partially 
studied and evaluated options can take roles as supplemental revenue sources to the fuel taxes. 
Alternative 3 – Replacing Fuel Taxes with New Pricing Schemes 
VMT fees or the ISCURP structure suggested in Section 4.3 are compatible with the long-term 
federal strategy. The numerical analyses summarized in Section 4.3.1 (Tables 4.10, 4.11, and 
4.12) present two different VMT fee rates: one state VMT fee schedule; and the other 




In this chapter, the alternatives developed in Chapter 4 were evaluated according to the evaluation 
criteria suggested in Chapter 3. Table 5.4 summarizes the evaluation results to provide a concise 
comparison between alternatives, and the features of each alternative were shown as they pertain 
to each corresponding evaluation criterion. Also, with respect to each criterion, the best 
specification of each alternative is given when available. 
In conclusion, in terms of long-term revenue adequacy, system efficiency, and modal 
equity, complete replacement of the current fuel tax system with a new usage-based charging 
scheme is recommended. This new scheme will require considerable input for its implementation, 
such as knowing the physical and administrative costs for startup and maintenance, accumulating 
a considerable body of knowledge through research and experimentation, and continuous public 





Table 5.4 Comparison of Alternatives 
Criteria 
Alternatives 
Tax adjustments: fuel taxes, vehicle 
registration fees, sale tax, property tax 
Fuel tax supplemented by 
usage-based fees: tolls, VMT fees 
Complete replacement of current 




• Adequacy may not be achieved, 
especially in the long-term, due to 
several factors: enhancement in fuel 
economy; inflation (when not 
indexed); competition between other 
governmental expenses; and weaker 
indication of highway financing 
needs of general taxes 
• The best implementation: Indexing 
fuel tax and vehicle registration fee 
• Adequacy may not be achieved due 
to enhancement of fuel economy; 
inflation (when not indexed); and 
demand elasticity with respect to 
tolls (uncertainty of demand) 
• When supplemented by VMT fees, 
the rate can be calculated to meet the 
funding needs 
• The best implementation: Indexing 
fuel tax and establishing VMT fees 
on top of the fuel tax with adequate 
fee rates that can meet the funding 
needs 
• By selecting adequate VMT fee 
rates, sufficiency can be secured. 
• If continuous update of fee rate is 
allowed, stability is also attained. 
• The best implementation: The most 
adequate VMT fee rates considering 
recent expenditure are calculated by 
road function class and vehicle type 
  (with no other source) 3.1¢/mi; 
(with vehicle registration fee) 




• Does not give perfect price signal to 
users; taxes other than fuel taxes not 
being direct usage charge 
• Level of efficiency Depends on the 
mixture of tax treatment 
• The best implementation: Indexing 
and increasing fuel tax, i.e. less 
depending upon other taxes, which 
are not usage-based 
• With well designed toll/VMT fees, 
can give proper price signal users 
• Level of efficiency depends on the 
toll/fee levels 
• The best implementation: Indexing 
fuel tax and adding efficient toll 
pricing/VMT fees based on the 
marginal costs, which counts 
impacts of externalities (e.g. 
congestion, emission) 
• Has the highest potential to achieve 
system efficiency 
• Level of efficiency depends on the 
fee rate plan 
• The best implementation: The 
ISCURP fee schedule, of which 
revenue covers the total expenditure, 
and which reflects marginal costs 
that counts impacts of externalities 





Table 5.4  Comparison of Alternatives (Continued) 
Criteria 
Alternatives 
Tax adjustments: fuel taxes, vehicle 
registration fees, sale tax, property tax 
Fuel tax supplemented by 
usage-based fees: tolls, VMT fees 
Complete replacement of current 
system: VMT fees, ISCURP 
Equity 
(between modes, road 
functional classes, and 
income groups) 
• Does not guarantee perfect fairness 
between users  evidenced by 
equity ratio (by vehicle classes) and 
self-financing ratio (by road function 
class) of current fuel tax, both of 
which should have had value of one 
(1) otherwise 
• Level of equity depends on the 
mixture of tax treatment 
• The best implementation: Indexing 
and increase fuel tax  
• Does not guarantee perfect fairness 
between users since it maintains fuel 
tax, with which equity ratio and self-
financing ratio are not all identical 
• Level of equity depends on the 
toll/fee levels 
• The best implementation: Indexing 
fuel tax and setting up toll/fee 
schedule that charges each user 
group for the cost it incurs to the 
system 
• Better spatial/modal equity between 
user groups can be achieved by fee 
schedule reflecting different costs 
imposed by each group 
• Depends on the fee rate plan 
• The best implementation: A pricing 
scheme where a price for unit 
demand is identified according to its 
characteristics (i.e. vehicle type, 
road function class, location, 
jurisdiction, congestion level, etc.) 
System Cost 
(physical/administration) 
• No physical cost; negligible 
administration cost 
• Physical cost depends on system 
configuration and technology type 
• Administration cost depends on 
system configuration but may not be 
significant 
• Initial capital cost for statewide 
VMT fee was estimated to be $33 M 
for 1800 gas stations  2.5% of 
annual highway revenue ($1.3 B) 
• Admin cost depends on system 
configuration; may not be significant 
Public acceptability • Relatively less reluctance and 
disapproval than VMT fees 
• More support when the use of 
revenue is up-front to the public 
• Converting existing non-tolled roads 
into toll roads are distasted 
• Tolls are supported when it is to 
support building new roads; when 
there is alternative toll-free options 
of travel and congestion is reduced 
• The public is not generally inclined 
to this unfamiliar policy 
• Education and communication can 
make difference 
Policy Alignment  • Compatible with proposed short-term 
federal strategy 
• Compatible with proposed medium-
term federal strategy 






CHAPTER 6. IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
As discussed and compared in Chapters 4 and 5, some of the alternatives are more viable for 
immediate implementation due to their relatively low initial investment and negligible startup 
barriers. On the other hand, while a completely new system could fundamentally solve long-term 
highway financing problems, it has the drawback of needing a substantial period of time for 
incubating, researching, and accumulating experience with such a system. 
Considering the complicated nature of the problem, no one particular action can be 
selected as an alternative to the current system. Instead, building a strategic plan is recommended, 
which would deal with the problem in a stepwise manner and eventually could realize the policy 
goals with maximum efficiency and effectiveness. 
There are three strategic approaches with attendant timelines and they overlap with one 
another. In the following paragraphs these approaches are presented.  
 
6.1. Short-Term Strategy (2007 ~ 2015) 
 
Goal 
To resolve the current revenue shortfall relying on the present framework of highway 
funding 
The near-term strategy for Indiana can be to implement a combination of options under the first 
alternative category. Effort should be made to improve the current system, with the objectives of 
revenue adequacy and system efficiency. 
 
Possible Actions 




The gasoline tax in Indiana was 15 cents per gallon from 1988 to 2002 when it was increased to 
the current level of 18 cents. Since 1988, diesel tax and motor carrier surtax (MCST) have 
remained 16 and 11 cents per gallon, respectively. Any increase in fuel taxes would attempt to 
catch up to inflation loses from 1988 to a particular selected year. Table 6.1 compares, on the 
basis of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the fuel tax revenue predictions for three scenarios: 
accounting inflation losses from 1988 to (a) 2000; (b) 2005; and (c) 2007. For example, if tax 
rates are adjusted to account for the inflation impact since 1988 to 2000, then the gasoline tax rate 
would be 19.8¢/gallon, diesel tax rate 21.1¢/gallon, and the MSCT rate 14.5¢/gallon, with an 
increase in total fuel tax revenue of 19.0% in each year over the base case. 
Table 6.1 Forecast of Annual Revenue for Fuel Tax Increase Cases (CPI-Based) 
Type Rate (¢/gallon) 
Revenues in 2005 constant dollar (thousand) % increase 
w.r.t base 
case 2008 2010 2015 2020 
Gasoline 18 (base) 538,889 538,694 546,368  573,892   
19.8 (catch-up to 2000) 592,831 592,617 601,059  631,338  10.0% 
25.1 (catch-up to 2005) 750,988 750,717 761,412  799,768  39.4% 
26.6 (catch-up to 2007) 796,366 796,078 807,419  848,093  47.8% 
Special Fuel 
(Diesel) 
16 (base) 171,569 162,081 196,204  194,450   
21.1 (catch-up to 2000) 226,491 213,965 259,012  256,697  32.0% 
26.8 (catch-up to 2005) 286,915 271,048 328,112  325,179  67.2% 
28.4 (catch-up to 2007) 304,251 287,426 347,938  344,828  77.3% 
MCST 11 (base) 120,477 131,401 163,246  202,807   
14.5 (catch-up to 2000) 159,044 173,465 215,504  267,730  32.0% 
18.4 (catch-up to 2005) 201,474 219,743 272,997  339,156  67.2% 
19.5 (catch-up to 2007) 213,648 233,021 289,492  359,649  77.3% 
Sum Base case 830,934 832,176 905,818  971,149   
Catch-up to 2000 978,365 980,048 1,075,575  1,155,764  19.0% 
Catch-up to 2005 1,239,376 1,241,508 1,362,520  1,464,103  50.8% 
Catch-up to 2007 1,314,264 1,316,525 1,444,849  1,552,570  59.9% 
Base case prediction source: Sinha et al. (2005) 
- Inflation impact since 1988 to a selected year is incorporated based on CPI (Consumer Price Index). 
- CPI beyond 2005 was assumed to increase 3% annually. 
 
 
While CPI is commonly used from highway users’ perspectives as it indexes prices of 
retail goods, the agency’s cost to provide and sustain state highway system may be more closely 
related to Producer Price Index (PPI). In this regard, fuel tax revenue was predicted applying the 
same procedure but on the basis of PPI as presented in Table 6.2. Overall, predicted revenues are 




are adjusted to reflect inflation impact from 1988 to 2000, the gasoline tax rate would increase to 
18.6¢/gallon, diesel tax rate 19.9¢/gallon, and the MSCT rate 13.7¢/gallon, thereby the total 
annual revenue would increase by 11.9% over the base case revenue. 
Table 6.2 Forecast of Annual Revenue for Fuel Tax Increase Cases (PPI-Based) 
Type Rate (¢/gallon) 
Revenues in 2005 constant dollar (thousand) % increase 
w.r.t base 
case 2008 2010 2015 2020 
Gasoline 18 (base) 538,889 538,694 546,368 573,892  
18.6 (catch-up to 2000) 557,457 557,256 565,194 593,666   3.4% 
21.6 (catch-up to 2005) 646,935 646,702 655,915 688,957 20.0% 
22.9 (catch-up to 2007) 686,334 686,086 695,860 730,914 27.4% 
Special Fuel 
(Diesel) 
16 (base) 171,569 162,081 196,204 194,450  
19.9 (catch-up to 2000) 212,976 201,198 243,557 241,380 24.1% 
23.0 (catch-up to 2005) 247,161 233,493 282,651 280,124 44.1% 
24.5 (catch-up to 2007) 262,213 247,713 299,864 297,184 52.8% 
MCST 11 (base) 120,477 131,401 163,246 202,807  
13.7 (catch-up to 2000) 149,554 163,115 202,645 251,754 24.1% 
15.8 (catch-up to 2005) 173,559 189,297 235,172 292,164 44.1% 
16.8 (catch-up to 2007) 184,128 200,825 249,494 309,957 52.8% 
Sum Base case 830,934 832,176 905,818 971,149  
Catch-up to 2000 919,986 921,569 1,011,396 1,086,800 11.9% 
Catch-up to 2005 1,067,655 1,069,492 1,173,737 1,261,245 29.9% 
Catch-up to 2007 1,132,676 1,134,624 1,245,218 1,338,055 37.8% 
Base case prediction source: Sinha et al. (2005) 
- Inflation impact since 1988 to a selected year is incorporated based on PPI (Producer Price Index). 
- PPI beyond 2005 was assumed to increase 3% annually. 
 
Inflation-Indexing of Fuel Tax 
In addition to the changes discussed above, inflation-indexing of fuel taxes can be considered. In 
the revenue prediction results presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, the 2006 rates are adjusted upward 
to keep up with an inflation rate of 3% per year, starting from the modified rates presented in 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. An inflation rate of 3% is relatively conservative as the most 
recent trend reveals a rate increase of 6~7%. Table 6.3 shows that, by adjusting for inflation, the 
revenue from fuel tax in 2015 could increase by 22.3% to 64.3%, depending upon the year used 
to adjust initially the existing rates. When based on PPI, the range of revenue increase would be 





Table 6.3 Revenue Forecast for Fuel Tax Indexing Cases (CPI-Based) 
Type Rate (¢/gallon) in 2006 Revenues in 2005 constant dollar (thousand) % increase in 2015 w.r.t base case 2008 2010 2015 2020 
Gasoline 18 (base) 538,889 538,694 546,368 573,892  
19.8 and index afterward 610,615 610,395 619,091 650,278 13.3% 
25.1 and index afterward 773,518 773,239 784,254 823,761 43.5% 
26.6 and index afterward 820,256 819,961 831,642 873,536 52.2% 
Special Fuel 
(Diesel) 
16 (base) 171,569 162,081 196,204 194,450  
21.1 and index afterward 233,285 220,384 266,782 264,398 36.0% 
26.8 and index afterward 295,522 279,179 337,955 334,935 72.2% 
28.4 and index afterward 313,379 296,048 358,376 355,173 82.7% 
MCST 11 (base) 120,477 131,401 163,246 202,807  
14.5 and index afterward 163,815 178,669 221,969 275,762 36.0% 
18.4 and index afterward 207,518 226,335 281,186 349,330 72.2% 
19.5 and index afterward 220,057 240,011 298,177 370,438 82.7% 
Sum Base case 830,934 832,176 905,818 971,149  
Catch-up to 2000 and index 1,007,716 1,009,449 1,107,842 1,190,437 22.3% 
Catch-up to 2005 and index 1,276,558 1,278,754 1,403,396 1,508,026 54.9% 
Catch-up to 2007 and index 1,353,692 1,356,021 1,488,194 1,599,147 64.3% 
Base case prediction source: Sinha et al. (2005) 
- Inflation impact since 1988 to a selected year is incorporated based on CPI (Consumer Price Index). 
- CPI beyond 2005 was assumed to increase 3% annually. 
Table 6.4 Revenue Forecast for Fuel Tax Indexing Cases (PPI-Based) 
Type Rate (¢/gallon) in 2006 Revenues in 2005 constant dollar (thousand) % increase in 2015 w.r.t base case 2008 2010 2015 2020 
Gasoline 18 (base) 538,889 538,694 546,368  573,892   
18.6 and index afterward 574,180 573,973 582,150  611,476    6.5% 
21.6 and index afterward 666,343 666,103 675,592  709,625  23.7% 
22.9 and index afterward 706,924 706,669 716,736  752,842  31.2% 
Special Fuel 
(Diesel) 
16 (base) 171,569 162,081 196,204  194,450   
19.9 and index afterward 219,365 207,234 250,864  248,621  27.9% 
23.0 and index afterward 254,576 240,498 291,130  288,528  48.4% 
24.5 and index afterward 270,080 255,144 308,860  306,099  57.4% 
MCST 11 (base) 120,477 131,401 163,246  202,807   
13.7 and index afterward 154,040 168,008 208,724  259,307  27.9% 
15.8 and index afterward 178,765 194,976 242,227  300,929  48.4% 
16.8 and index afterward 189,652 206,850 256,978  319,256  57.4% 
Sum Base case 830,934 832,176 905,818  971,149   
Catch-up to 2000 and index 947,586 949,216 1,041,737  1,119,404  15.0% 
Catch-up to 2005 and index 1,099,685 1,101,577 1,208,949  1,299,082  33.5% 
Catch-up to 2007 and index 1,166,656 1,168,663 1,282,574  1,378,197  41.6% 
Base case prediction source: Sinha et al. (2005) 
- Inflation impact since 1988 to a selected year is incorporated based on PPI (Producer Price Index). 





Increase in Vehicle Registration Fees 
Vehicle registration fees, the second largest revenue source for the state highway system, are not 
indexed for inflation. If vehicle registration fees are indexed to the CPI inflation rate, results 
would be as presented in Table 6.5. For example, if vehicle registration fees were increased to 
account for inflation loss since 2000 and the fee rates are then indexed annually for inflation 
thereafter, then the expected revenue could increase by as much as 69.9% in 2015. 
Table 6.5 Revenue Forecast for Vehicle Registration Fee 
Scenario Revenues in 2005 constant dollar (thousand) % increase in 2015 w.r.t base case 2008 2010 2015 2020 
Base case 324,939 337,575 371,017 409,567  
Accounting loss since 2005 & Indexing 354,830 390,904 497,498 635,946 34.1% 
Accounting loss since 2000 & Indexing 449,493 495,190 630,222 805,606 69.9% 
Base case prediction source: Sinha et al. (2005) 
- CPI beyond 2005 was assumed to increase 3% annually. 
 
Portion Dedication of General Sales Taxes 
As illustrated in 4.1.2, dedication of 0.5% of the sales tax revenue will generate approximately 
$25 million of additional revenue.  
Local Government Strategies 
Local option taxes are available in Indiana for transportation purposes. Forty six (46) out of 92 
counties have adapted a Local Option Highway User Tax in Indiana. However, the amounts 
collected are not substantial. Also, other miscellaneous sources can be utilized, such as dedication 
of a portion of property tax revenues, lottery income, cigarette tax, wheel tax, etc. (NCHRP, 
2006). 
Charging Alternative-Fuel or New-Technology Vehicles 
Alternative fuel vehicles also cause road wear and should contribute to highway maintenance 
(TRB, 2005). A legal basis for charging those vehicles can be established and a relevant fee level 
can be selected. However, the number of such vehicles can be expected not to be significant in 







As discussed in Section 5.4, public acceptance can be won through continuous efforts of outreach 
to the public and advertising proposed policies and their benefits. A recent TRB workshop on 
transportation financing innovations, held in January 2007, observed that one of the most 
fundamental impediments is the public skepticism toward government spending in general. At 
this stage, it is absolutely imperative to prepare a long-term procedure to rectify this mindset. 
It is suggested that efforts should be taken to build public trust in the state government’s 
capability and integrity in financing state’s highway system. A possible forum can be to release a 
“Transportation Budget Report” to the public on a regular basis, which can be made available in 
newspapers or on-line. The report can include the following items: 
State Highway Program 
• Revenue Information: List highway revenues by source. 
• Expenditure Information: List expenditures by program, project, and item. 
• Performance Information: Report performance in terms of expenditures and 
improvements in pavement and bridge conditions, safety, and level of service. (For 
example, how many dollars of expense in pavement maintenance enhanced pavement 
quality for how many miles of I-65) 
• Financial Balance Information: Provide debt information, if any. 
• Disbursement Information: Note the state’s disbursement to each locality. 
Local Highway Program 
• Revenue Information: List highway revenues at local level by source. 
• Expenditure Information: List expenditure of local government by program, project, and 
item. 
• Performance Information: Report aggregated data. 
 
Open and regular communication can only improve public support for a pricing policy, 







During near-term period, an effort should be made to collect accurate and systematic data as a 
preparation for future implementation of comprehensive road pricing. Given that the eventual 
goal is to implement a user-fee-based funding structure, the crucial question is basically “how 
much to charge each road use?” The numerical analyses presented in Section 4.3 (Table 4.9 
through Table 4.11, and Table 4.14) are reference values for the initial implementation only. The 
numbers should be further elaborated with more accurate and detailed data. In order to find better 
answers, efforts should be made to know more about the system cost and demand. First of all, a 
highway cost allocation study needs to be accomplished not only at the state level, but also at the 
local level. This task is associated with methodical and regular collection and analyses of 
highway expenditure, revenues, and demand data. As we obtain results from a cost allocation 
study, we will be equipped with improved knowledge to better determine how much to charge for 
road usage. 
Research seeking the basis for appropriation of revenues from other general taxes is 
recommended as well. For example, as briefly addressed in Section 4.1.2, the value of a property 
boosts when it has better transportation access. Such research could provide evidence to support 
appropriation of a portion of property tax for transportation systems and how much that 
appropriation should be. Also, since the highway network is one of the major infrastructures that 
sustain economic growth, a certain portion of the state’s income could be attributed to the 
highway system. Research seeking quantification of the impact on income of a highway or 
transportation network, could help justify such appropriations from income tax. 
 
6.2. Medium-Term Strategy (2010 ~ 2020) 
 
Goal 
To prepare and organize for the implementation of Indiana Statewide Comprehensive 
Usage-based Road Pricing (ISCURP) 
As concluded in Chapter 5, the potential benefits of a new pricing scheme as a complete 
replacement of the current fuel tax system are enormous. Delays in developing these alternative 
financing tools would be costly (TRB, 2005). The possible benefits can be materialized, however, 




funding needs, and demand influence, and public opinion surveys and outreach, to pilot studies 
and experimentation. Meanwhile, other user fees, such as tolls, could be a supplementary revenue 
source, as suggested in the second alternative. 
 
Possible Actions 
Toll Road Development 
As evaluated, tolls can supplement fuel taxes, which are increased and/or indexed for inflation as 
the near-term strategy is implemented. It was indicated in Section 4.2.1 that tolls on new highway 
are better defended in terms of legitimacy and public acceptability than those imposed on existing 
roads. At the national level, it is desirable for the states to experiment with wide variety of toll 
development and the SAFETEA-LU gives state governments full discretion to select roads to toll 
and the rates. 
Tolling combined with loan guarantees and bonding is expected to attract additional 
capital investment from governments as well as the private sector (NCHRP, 2006). One of the 
advantages is that this combination of financing tools can expedite project delivery. Recalling the 
calculation in Section 4.2.1, annual earnings of $35 million for a 10 mile toll road can be a 
reference to approximate the funding need from tolling to meet financial adequacy. However, 
selecting road sections to be tolled and planning a toll schedule require a great deal of study on 
network impacts and demand responses. Moreover, in the case of leasing a toll road to a private 
consortium, the concession agreement should be carefully designed in order to protect the 
benefits of the public while enjoying innovative and efficient procurement and delivery. 
Indiana Statewide Comprehensive Usage-based Road Pricing (ISCURP) Pilot Study 
A pilot study to provide the basis for future implementation of ISCURP is needed during this 
period. Following is a stepwise procedure for this pilot study: 
Phase 1: As the first step, the technological standards for ISCURP should be configured 
along with a timeline for information gathering and a plan for assessment and evaluation. Each 
potential option will be defined and examined to determine its benefits and costs. The specific 
criteria will include administrative ease, user convenience, fuel retailers’ and distributors’ 
convenience, costs of start-up and operation after the system matures, privacy protection 




evaluating options based on these criteria, the best alternative should be selected as a standard 
technological configuration and the necessary infrastructure should be constructed. 
Phase 2: As a next step, system accuracy and reliability should be tested by installing the 
necessary equipment on probe vehicles. This stage will require hundreds of probe vehicles, which 
will be mostly government-owned. The accuracy and reliability of the system need to be assessed 
for criteria that include accuracy of vehicle identification, reliability of vehicle locating ability, 
accuracy of distance measurement, and reliability of communication capability and capacity 
(travel and billing information). In case the proposed system cannot achieve a satisfactory level of 
accuracy and reliability, any possible pitfalls of the system should be investigated and resolved. 
After confirming that the system yields adequate performance, any required preparation for 
system-wide implementation can be accomplished. 
This phase will require determination of the costs to construct the infrastructure, to 
deploy in-vehicle devices to probe vehicles, and to install the system at stations, either centralized 
or scattered, according to the system configured. The selection of a demonstration scope will 
determine its cost. The spatial scope of the experiment will affect the boundary of highway 
segments where infrastructure should be built. Also, the number of probe vehicles to be included 
in the study will determine the cost of in-vehicle unit installation. The trade-off between the cost 
of demonstration and the quality of the results should be given a great deal of consideration in 
order to design the most relevant size of experiment. 
 
Public Outreach 
Public opinion surveys on a regular basis can help the implementing agency track changes in the 
attitude of the public over time. Also focus groups can be utilized to gauge the public attitude 
toward various financing tools in a more quantitative manner. 
Effort should be continuously made to publicize fiscal policy for transportation, probably 
by releasing Transportation Budget Report suggested earlier. However, other advertising tools 




To pursue a complete statewide implementation of road pricing, a feedback structure for the 




initiation, a system needs to be designed to continuously update the cost of the system and the 
unit rates to be charged. 
One possible problem in a pilot study lies in the complication that arises at state borders, 
given that the systems of adjacent states may be dependent upon technological suites that are not 
compatible with Indiana’s. Efforts should be made at the federal level to select and support 
technically proven designs for mileage charging (TRB, 2005) so coordination with the federal as 
well as other state governments can be accomplished. 
 
6.3. Long-Term Strategy (2015 ~) 
 
Goal 
To complete ISCURP implementation 
The long-term goal is to fully implement a new pricing scheme in about 20 years from now. The 
system should be gradually adapted with several implementation steps, including technical trials, 
pilot experimentation, full-scale but not fully functional, and full-scale as well as fully functional 
implementation. As the pilot experimentation launched in the first two phases should be returning 
feedback at this point, the infrastructure of a technically proven system could be expanded 
statewide, but deployment to users will need a longer time frame for full implementation. 
 
Possible Actions 
Statewide Implementation of ISCURP  
The pilot study discussed in Section 6.2 having been completed, the statewide implementation 
should follow. 
Phase 3: In this phase, newly registered vehicles can be mandated or recommended to 
install equipment with appropriate incentive. For example, financial support can be provided in 
the purchase of on-board equipment. It should be noted that certain technology options for 
retrofitting vehicles, such as GPS, are currently expensive (Whitty et al., 2006). Thus, retrofitting 
vehicles should be carried out over a long time frame. 
Phase 4: This phase will require all vehicles in the state to be equipped with relevant on-






Required Information Base 
After phase 3 is completed, a mid-term evaluation of the ISCURP pilot study should be 
performed. A change in pricing scheme influences various stakeholders, and thus, dealing with 
their conflicting interests is the key to success. Therefore, an organized effort should be made to 
allocate sufficient resources to surveys, data collection, and research in order to observe any 
problems that may occur with actual implementation. Also, possible conflicts will be identified 
and resolved through the participation and observation of stakeholder groups, ensuring 
transparency of the system to the public. 
Ironically, a perfectly responsive pricing structure, which dynamically updates unit rates 
synchronized with the marginal cost, may lose its virtue as a pricing signal. For instance, if the 
system has only two-fold rates, one for peak hour, the other for non-peak, then the market works 
very straightforwardly. Those who have lower willingness to pay than the peak price will shift 
their travel to some other time. Or going a little further, the rate plan can distinguish three time 
slots: non-peak, peripheral peak, and peak. With this pricing scheme, users’ responses to prices 
will also have three layers: peak to periphery, peak to non-peak, and periphery to non-peak. In an 
extreme case where the price fluctuates, (e.g., every five minutes) however, users would hardly 
be able to decide when to travel. Consequently, instead of reasonably adapting their choice of 
travel to the prices, the users will be confused. Therefore, a fully dynamic and responsive pricing 
system may not serve the purpose and therefore should be modified in the actual implementation. 
A study of the users’ responsiveness to pricing signals and design of a pricing structure 
addressing this should be undertaken. 
The final outcome of a new pricing scheme can be one that allows each jurisdiction to set 
up its own fee rate plan and to fund its highway system solely with the fee revenue. At that stage, 
the state government might want to control the highway policies of local governments, not in a 
direct way, but rather by guiding long-term statewide goals. This situation resembles the 
discussion on the relationship between the federal and state governments in Section 3.7. As the 
federal government reassigns its responsibilities for this new era, guidelines for establishing a 






CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The current and projected highway deficits at the state level can be solved by adopting several 
financial mechanisms. This study suggests three alternatives: adjusting the current tax system; 
maintaining the current fuel tax system supplemented by other forms of user fees; and replacing 
the current fuel tax system with a new usage-based pricing scheme (ISCURP). 
Pricing and financing strategies have enormous impacts not only on financial 
effectiveness but also on the efficiency and equity of the highway system. Considering the 
breadth and depth of the problem and reviewing preceding studies, this study proposed an 
evaluation framework for alternatives. The major criteria include the adequacy of revenue 
sources, the impacts on system efficiency and equity, the cost of implementation, public 
acceptability, and compatibility with federal policy. 
Possible alternatives were evaluated and compared based on the framework. The most 
innovative approach, to replace the current fuel tax system, appears to have the best potential in 
achieving revenue adequacy, system efficiency, and equity. On the other hand, the 
implementation of this alternative could be cost-prohibitive as well as could face strong 
opposition from the public at this time. Experience has shown, however, that implementation 
costs likely will decline as the necessary technologies mature in the market and public attitude 
changes over time. The long-term federal goals align very well with the alternative of a 
comprehensive pricing scheme. 
This study suggests, as a possible option, stepwise adaptation of a new system, targeting 
a long-term goal of having a usage-based comprehensive road pricing. Hypothesizing that the 
entire process of system overhaul would require 20 years, the time frame should consist of short, 
medium, and long-term goals. In the short-term, funding tools that require negligible cost to plan 
and launch should be implemented, including an increase of and inflation-indexing of the fuel tax 
system, indexing of the vehicle registration fee system, along with other minor tax adjustments 




short and medium-term periods, there needs to be a strategy constructed to inform and educate the 
public as the new system is gradually ushered in. 
In the long-term, a structure needs to be designed whereby highway agencies can 
estimate reliably preservation and maintenance costs by facility type and user classification. It 
also should be technologically possible to charge users fees/taxes distinctively. To implement 
such a system, data acquisition and analysis modules are needed that interactively calibrate 
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Appendix A. Forecasting Toll Revenue on a Typical Interstate in Indiana 
 
Revenues from the tolls on an interstate corridor were forecasted using Indiana Statewide Travel 
Demand Model (ISTDM), the TransCAD based macroscopic transportation simulation. The 
model includes over 20,000 links (11,200 miles) of state highways within the state border. Also 
the model network connects 4,720 internal traffic analysis zones via 9,900 centroid connectors. 
Tolls on road segments can be incorporated within the model network by modifying the 
link-by-link database. In particular, cent-per-mile rates can be established by entering values in 
the link attribute, “toll road”. One drawback of the methodology is that, within the structure of 
ISTDM database, a particular link can be assigned only by a single value of toll rate. In other 
words, toll schedule with different rates by vehicle type cannot be directly modeled using ISTDM. 
In this regard, this study conducted indirect analysis on toll revenue based on demand 
elasticity with respect to tolls. In order to obtain demand elasticity values of the users on a typical 
interstate (the characteristics of typical interstates are given in Section 4.2.1), the model was run 
for several toll rate scenarios, varied from no toll to 5 cents-per-mile rate for all links of an 
interstate. Toll scenarios were run with two assumptions on the monetary value of travel time: 
one is the default value of ISTDM (version 4.0), $16.44 per hour; and the other value, $23.03 per 
hour, was obtained by getting VMT weighted average of the values from Frokenbrock and 
Weisbrod (2001), converted to 2006 dollars. The calculation procedure is presented in Table A.1. 
Table A.1 Average Travel Time Value Calculation 
 Small auto Medium auto 4-tire truck 6-tire truck





comb truck Total 
A. On-the-clock 
(25% of total demand) $34.33 $34.70 $24.77 $30.61 $33.13 $36.02 $36.70  
B. Off-the-clock 
(75% of total demand) $17.54 $17.58 $18.50 $30.61 $33.14 $38.04 $38.73  
C. 0.25A + 0.75B $21.74 $21.86 $20.07 $30.61 $33.14 $37.54 $38.22  
D. Annual VMT 
(in thousand) 29,036 13,147 2,747 1,037 1,562 1,475 49,004 
E. C ×  D $631.17 $263.82 $84.08 $34.37 $58.64 $56.38 $1,128.47
F. Average Value $1,128,470 / 49,004 = $23.03 




Results of toll impact analyses are presented in Tables A.2 and A.3, in terms of annual 
VMT and toll revenue, respectively. Introducing tolls and increasing toll rates would result in 
decrease in annual VMT. Since the demand is inelastic, however, the revenue generated would 
increase. Furthermore, it is observed from the results that, as the higher the travel time value, the 
demand is more inelastic, since the same amount of toll would be equivalent to less amount of 
generalized travel cost. These relationships are revealed in Figures A.1 and A.2. 
Table A.2 Toll Impact on Demand (annual VMT in 1000) by Vehicle Type and Travel Time 
Value 
Toll Rate (¢/mile) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Travel Time Value: $16.44/hr 
Auto 1,606 1,468 1,346 1,214 1,085 973 
Single Unit Truck 266 260 253 241 228 218 
Combination Truck 211 197 179 166 136 103 
Total 2,083 1,925 1,778 1,621 1,448 1,249 
Travel Time Value: $23.03/hr 
Auto 1,606 1,502 1,411 1,324 1,231 1,148 
Single Unit Truck 266 261 257 251 243 235 
Combination Truck 211 199 191 177 168 158 
Total 2,083 1,963 1,859 1,752 1,642 1,541 
Table A.3 Toll Impact on Annual Revenue (in $1000) by Vehicle Type and Travel Time Value 
Toll Rate (¢/mile) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Travel Time Value: $16.44/hr 
Auto 0 14,680 26,916 36,424 43,390 48,667 
Single Unit Truck 0 2,600 5,060 7,240 9,109 10,882 
Combination Truck 0 1,966 3,580 4,980 5,421 5,160 
Total 0 19,246 35,556 48,644 57,921 62,436 
Travel Time Value: $23.03/hr 
Auto 0 15,024 28,221 39,724 49,227 57,382 
Single Unit Truck 0 2,613 5,141 7,536 9,717 11,747 
Combination Truck 0 1,993 3,827 5,313 6,719 7,919 






















































      (a) Travel Time Value = $16.44/hr             (b) Travel Time Value = $23.03/hr 






























































    (a) Travel Time Value = $16.44/hr             (b) Travel Time Value = $23.03/hr 
Figure A.2 Toll Impact on Revenue by Vehicle Type and Travel Time Value 
As a next step, arc elasticities of demand and revenue with respect to tolls were assessed 








































Based on the simulation results above, arc elasticity values were calculated for the 
changes in toll rates as shown in Tables A.4 and A.5. For example, demand elasticities for the toll 
change from 3 to 5 cents per mile are -0.44, -0.21, and -0.93 for automobiles, single unit truck, 
and combination truck, respectively, when travel time is assumed to be $16.44 per hour. Overall, 
demand is inelastic, that is, the absolute values of demand elasticity are less than 1, and therefore, 
as the toll rate increases, the revenue also increases. It is noted that the demand becomes more 
elastic at higher toll rates, in a sense that the absolute values increase, as graphically depicted in 
Figures A.3. Due to this trend, revenue elasticity decreases as the toll rate increases, as Figure A.4 
shows. 
Table A.4  Arc Elasticity of Demand with Respect to Toll Rate 
Toll Change (¢/mile) 0 ~ 1 1 ~ 2 2 ~ 3 3 ~ 4 4 ~ 5 0 ~ 2 1 ~ 3 2 ~ 4 3 ~ 5 0 ~ 3 1 ~ 4 2 ~ 5 0 ~ 4 1 ~ 5 0 ~ 5
Travel Time Value: $16.44/hr 
Auto -0.04 -0.13 -0.26 -0.39 -0.49 -0.09 -0.19 -0.32 -0.44 -0.14 -0.25 -0.37 -0.19 -0.30 -0.25
Single Unit Truck -0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.20 -0.20 -0.03 -0.08 -0.16 -0.21 -0.05 -0.11 -0.18 -0.05 -0.11 -0.10
Combination Truck -0.03 -0.14 -0.19 -0.71 -1.22 -0.08 -0.17 -0.41 -0.93 -0.12 -0.31 -0.63 -0.12 -0.31 -0.34
Total -0.04 -0.12 -0.23 -0.40 -0.67 -0.08 -0.17 -0.31 -0.52 -0.12 -0.24 -0.41 -0.18 -0.32 -0.25
Travel Time Value: $23.03/hr 
Auto -0.03 -0.09 -0.16 -0.26 -0.31 -0.06 -0.13 -0.21 -0.29 -0.10 -0.17 -0.24 -0.13 -0.20 -0.17
Single Unit Truck -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.12 -0.15 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.13 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06
Combination Truck -0.03 -0.06 -0.19 -0.19 -0.26 -0.05 -0.12 -0.20 -0.22 -0.09 -0.14 -0.22 -0.09 -0.14 -0.14
Total -0.03 -0.08 -0.15 -0.23 -0.28 -0.06 -0.11 -0.19 -0.26 -0.09 -0.15 -0.22 -0.12 -0.18 -0.15
Table A.5  Arc Elasticity of Revenue with Respect to Toll Rate 
Toll Change (¢/mile) 0 ~ 1 1 ~ 2 2 ~ 3 3 ~ 4 4 ~ 5 0 ~ 2 1 ~ 3 2 ~ 4 3 ~ 5 0 ~ 3 1 ~ 4 2 ~ 5 0 ~ 4 1 ~ 5 0 ~ 5
Travel Time Value: $16.44/hr 
Auto 1.00 0.88 0.75 0.61 0.52 1.00 0.85 0.70 0.58 1.00 0.82 0.67 1.00 0.80 1.00
Single Unit Truck 1.00 0.96 0.89 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.94 0.86 0.80 1.00 0.93 0.85 1.00 0.93 1.00
Combination Truck 1.00 0.87 0.82 0.30 -0.22 1.00 0.87 0.61 0.07 1.00 0.78 0.42 1.00 0.78 1.00
Total 1.00 0.89 0.78 0.61 0.34 1.00 0.87 0.72 0.50 1.00 0.84 0.64 1.00 0.79 1.00
Travel Time Value: $23.03/hr 
Auto 1.00 0.92 0.85 0.75 0.69 1.00 0.90 0.81 0.73 1.00 0.89 0.79 1.00 0.88 1.00
Single Unit Truck 1.00 0.98 0.94 0.88 0.85 1.00 0.97 0.92 0.87 1.00 0.96 0.91 1.00 0.96 1.00
Combination Truck 1.00 0.95 0.81 0.82 0.74 1.00 0.91 0.82 0.79 1.00 0.90 0.81 1.00 0.90 1.00



























































      (a) Travel Time Value = $16.44/hr             (b) Travel Time Value = $23.03/hr 

























































    (a) Travel Time Value = $16.44/hr             (b) Travel Time Value = $23.03/hr 
Figure A.4 Arc Elasticity of Revenue with Respect to Toll Rate 
 
As mentioned above, results obtained directly from the ISTDM simulation are only for 
the scenarios where the same per mile tolls are imposed regardless of vehicle types. More 
practical toll schedules were established as in Table A.7, comparably to the current toll rates of 





Table A.6  Toll Rates of Indiana Toll Road by Vehicle Type (2007) 
Number of Axles 2 3 4 5 6 7 
cents/mile 2.97 6.37 11.15 14.34 16.89 31.39 
Table A.7  Established Toll Rate Scenarios 
Scenarios 
Toll Rates (¢/mile) 
Scenarios 
Toll Rates (¢/mile) 
Auto SUT CT Auto SUT CT 
1 2 7 14 4 3.5 8.5 17 
2 2.5 7.5 15 5 3.5 9 18 
3 3 8 16 6 4 10 20 
* SUT: Single Unit Trucks; CT: Combination Trucks 
 
 
In order to analyze toll impacts on demand and revenue under various toll structures, the 
elasticity values calculated above were referred to. Since the toll rates on automobiles of the 
established scenarios (2 through 4 cents per mile) are within the range of ISTDM scenarios (0 
through 5 cents per mile), VMT’s and revenues of automobiles are obtained directly referring to 
the results from the ISTDM simulation runs. On the other hand, for estimation of truck demands, 
with trucks toll rates higher than 5 cents per mile in every scenario, elasticity values with respect 
to various rate changes were used. Especially, elasticity values that are associated with toll rate 
changes from 1, 2, 3, and 4 cents per mile to 5 cents per mile, respectively (i.e., the values in the 
shaded columns of Tables A.4 and A.5), were used in the analysis. 
On the basis of maximum and minimum possible elasticity values by vehicle type, the 
minimum and maximum values for VMT and revenue under each scenario were calculated, as 





Table A.8  The Minimum and Maximum Annual VMT by Scenario (in 000’s) 
Toll Schedule Scenarios Travel Time Value = $16.44/hr Travel Time Value = $23.03/hr 
Min VMT Max VMT Min VMT Max VMT 
1 
Auto: 2¢/mile 1345.79 1345.79 1345.79 1345.79 
SUT: 7¢/mile 184.94 222.69 195.97 229.91 
CT: 14¢/mile 26.09 111.06 80.23 138.05 
Total 1556.83 1679.54 1622.00 1713.76 
2 
Auto: 2.5¢/mile 1252.77 1290.34 1285.89 1308.59 
SUT: 7.5¢/mile 200.37 225.20 206.29 235.86 
CT: 15¢/mile 37.53 111.03 82.47 143.92 
Total 1490.67 1626.57 1574.65 1688.37 
3 
Auto: 3¢/mile 1214.13 1214.13 1214.13 1214.13 
SUT: 8¢/mile 197.83 220.26 204.59 228.40 
CT: 16¢/mile 15.04 108.45 81.59 136.59 
Total 1427.00 1542.84 1500.31 1579.12 
4 
Auto: 3.5¢/mile 1126.40 1169.18 1156.82 1183.45 
SUT: 8.5¢/mile 195.51 219.21 203.04 227.74 
CT: 17¢/mile 13.16 107.36 80.80 135.97 
Total 1335.07 1495.75 1440.65 1547.17 
5 
Auto: 3.5¢/mile 1126.40 1169.18 1156.82 1183.45 
SUT: 9¢/mile 193.38 218.25 201.60 227.15 
CT: 18¢/mile 11.49 143.78 80.07 151.84 
Total 1331.28 1531.22 1438.50 1562.43 
6 
Auto: 4¢/mile 1084.76 1084.76 1084.76 1084.76 
SUT: 10¢/mile 189.60 208.94 196.85 216.21 
CT: 20¢/mile 14.02 116.94 74.94 125.00 







Table A.9  The Minimum and Maximum Annual Revenues by Scenario (in thousand dollars) 
Toll Schedule Scenarios Travel Time Value = $16.44/hr Travel Time Value = $23.03/hr 
Min Revenue Max Revenue Min Revenue Max Revenue 
1 
Auto: 2¢/mile 26,916 26,916 26,916 26,916 
SUT: 7¢/mile 12,946 15,588 13,718 16,094 
CT: 14¢/mile 3,653 15,548 11,232 19,327 
Total 43,515 58,053 51,866 62,337 
2 
Auto: 2.5¢/mile 31,319 32,259 32,147 32,715 
SUT: 7.5¢/mile 15,028 16,890 15,471 17,690 
CT: 15¢/mile 5,629 16,654 12,371 21,588 
Total 51,976 65,803 59,990 71,992 
3 
Auto: 3¢/mile 36,424 36,424 36,424 36,424 
SUT: 8¢/mile 15,827 17,621 16,367 18,272 
CT: 16¢/mile 2,406 17,352 13,055 21,855 
Total 54,657 71,397 65,846 76,550 
4 
Auto: 3.5¢/mile 39,424 40,921 40,489 41,421 
SUT: 8.5¢/mile 16,619 18,633 17,258 19,358 
CT: 17¢/mile 2,237 18,251 13,735 23,116 
Total 58,280 77,805 71,482 83,895 
5 
Auto: 3.5¢/mile 39,424 40,921 40,489 41,421 
SUT: 9¢/mile 17,405 19,643 18,144 20,443 
CT: 18¢/mile 2,068 25,881 14,413 27,331 
Total 58,897 86,445 73,046 89,194 
6 
Auto: 4¢/mile 43,390 43,390 43,390 43,390 
SUT: 10¢/mile 18,960 20,894 19,685 21,621 
CT: 20¢/mile 2,804 23,388 14,989 25,001 






Appendix B. Calculation of ISCURP Fee Rates Using Highway Cost Allocation Study 
 
In order to implement the concept of ISCURP (Section 4.3.2), a comprehensive distance-based 
pricing scheme, it is required to establish toll rates that vary according to vehicle type, location, 
and road function class. The self-financing approach introduced in Section 3.3.3 stated that a 
pricing scheme is optimal in terms of system efficiency when the cost can be fully recovered by 
the revenue. Also, a self-financing pricing scheme can be achieved for each category of highway 
subsystems to obtain maximum efficiency as well as modal equity. 
As discussed in Section 3.4.3, highway cost allocation studies (HCAS) provide a 
framework that quantifies highway-related costs attributable to and user fee revenues contributed 
by each user group. The cost allocation analysis used in the present study adopted the State 
HCAS Tool developed by FHWA, supplied by Indiana-specific input parameters and modified as 
necessary. As results of the analysis, per-mile rates applicable for each vehicle type and each road 
functional class were determined. It should be noted that, however, there are several arguable 
assumptions associated with the classification and distribution of highway costs. In this regard, 
the present study performed sensitivity analysis with respect to the changes in inputs to provide 
ranges of fee rates, instead of using single values. 
 
Cost Items and Allocation 
According to the State HCAS Tool, highway cost items are classified as the following: 
- New pavement costs: Costs for new construction, relocation, reconstruction, and 
widening of road segments, separately for flexible and rigid surface types 
- 3R costs: Costs for restoration, rehabilitation, and resurfacing, separately for flexible 
and rigid surface types 
- Bridge-related costs: Costs for new bridge construction, replacement, and repairs 
- Minimum construction costs: Costs for right-of-way, engineering, grading and 
drainage, etc. 
- Non-load-related maintenance costs 
- Load-related maintenance costs: Separately for flexible and rigid surface types 
- Safety and enforcement related costs 
Non-attributable costs include non-load-related maintenance, safety and enforcement 




existence of the facility (directly or indirectly) are responsible for these costs, which can be 
allocated in terms of total vehicle-miles, axle-miles, or passenger-car equivalencies, depending on 
the source of these costs (Sinha et al., 1984). 
Activities directly related to highway usage include new construction, repair, and 
rehabilitation of pavements and structures and load-related maintenance. These costs can be 
defined as attributable and they are allocated on the basis of an incremental approach (FHWA, 
2000c; Sinha et al., 1984). Using this approach, costs associated with the minimum requirements 
of facility design, in terms of, for example, pavement thickness or width, that meets the 
operational and safety needs of the smallest or lightest vehicle, is assigned to all vehicles on the 
basis of a selected cost-allocator. Following the allocation of minimum costs, further incremental 
costs are allotted to vehicle classes requiring design elements additional to the minimum. 
 
Cost Allocation Guidelines 
Non-Attributable or Common Costs: In principle, not only the highway users, but also the rest of 
the society receives benefit from a highway system, indirectly through improved mobility, 
economic development, safety, etc. Quantifying non-users’ benefit, however, is conceptually 
unclear and technically difficult since the benefit of non-users are mostly intertwined with those 
of users. Also, it is hardly feasible to obtain information that traces every link of economic 
activities, i.e. entities involved and benefits they receive, in relation with a highway system. In 
this regard, it has been common to limit the scope of the analysis to the users’ benefit, assuming 
that other markets will function to reflect non-users’ indirect benefit in accordance with changes 
in transportation market. For example, increase in highway user fees will cause change in 
shipping costs, which will eventually be transferred to end customers. 
The scope of the problem being restricted to direct highway users, the amount of usage 
has been traditionally considered as a proxy of the benefit. According to the methods used in the 
federal HCAS, the most general measure of system use, non-weighted VMT, is recommended as 
a common cost allocator (FHWA, 2000c). Some of the common costs associated with the 
effective roadway space occupied by various vehicle types are allocated on the basis of passenger 
car equivalent (PCE) weighted VMT. 
New Pavement Costs: Both in the federal and Indiana studies, thickness incremental 
method was applied for allocation of new pavement cost. According to this method, the minimum 




basic cost component. In the Indiana study, the following thicknesses were considered as the 
minimum: For flexible pavement, surface course 1 inch, base course 3 inches, and sub-base 
course 4 inches; and for rigid pavement, 4-1/2 inches (Sinha et al., 1984). These values are 
comparable with the recommendations in the federal study: 2.08 to 3.1 for flexible pavement 
structural number and 4 to 6 inches for minimum concrete slab thickness (FHWA, 2000b). 
Pavement costs incurred by the construction of the minimum thickness are allocated on the basis 
of VMT. 
Load-related portion of pavement costs, i.e. incremental costs, are generally allocated on 
the basis of ESAL miles, as in Indiana’s study in 1984 and 1989. In the 1997 federal HCAS, the 
results from the National Pavement Cost Model (NAPCOM), representing relationships between 
axle weights and pavement distresses, were adopted (FHWA, 2000b; Owusu-Antwi, 1997). In 
NAPCOM, separate models were estimated for each of four distress types, two surface types, and 
ten road functional classes. 
Bridge Related Costs (Structure Costs): In the federal study, bridge costs included new 
bridge construction, bridge replacement, and bridge repair. This classification is akin to that in the 
Indiana study, which included costs for structure construction, replacement and rehabilitation. 
Similar to the logic of the thickness incremental approach, the structure design that is adequate to 
accommodate light vehicles only is considered a common structure cost and shared by all vehicle 
classes. Vehicle classes that are successively larger and heavier are responsible for incrementally 
increasing costs. 
Table B.1 Bridge Design Increment Used in the Indiana Study in 1984 
Design Vehicles Operating Weight Range (thousands of pounds) 
Single Unit Trucks Combinations 
HS20 40 and over 54 and over 
HS15 30 to 40 40.5 to 54 
H15 20 to 30 27 to 40.5 
H10 10 to 20 13.5 to 27 
H5 5 to 10 6.25 to 13.5 
H2.5 0 to 5 0 to 6.25 
 
Critical Input Parameters and Assumptions 
Allocation of highway costs requires several input parameters and rules that should be determined 




Portion of Non-Attributable Costs: There are cost items for which it is often arguable 
whether they are attributable or non-attributable, or what portion of the cost, if not the whole 
amount, is attributable. In this regard, maintenance cost would be the one of the most 
controversial items. Although traffic load is one of the major causes of road wear, environmental 
impact such as severe climate condition can also considerably degrade pavement quality. Cost 
item categorization for the FHWA HCAS tool requires distinction between load-related and non-
load-related costs, while most of the available data sources do not provide that information. 
Therefore, it is critical to determine the portion of maintenance cost for which the weather is 
responsible. 
The Minimum Construction Requirements: As mentioned above, in order to allocate 
attributable costs using the incremental approach, minimum design requirements need to be 
determined. Changes in the minimum requirements would cause changes in cost responsibility 
between vehicle classes: The higher the minimum thickness, the greater is the cost responsibility 
of light vehicles and the smaller is that of heavy vehicles.  
Relationship between Pavement Deterioration and Traffic Load: In order to allocate load-
related costs, the cost-allocator that reflects impact of vehicle loads on pavement deterioration 
needs to be determined. As discussed above, relationships between load and deterioration by 
distress and surface type established in the NAPCOM study provide a source of this information. 
Changes in load equivalency factor (LEF) values will result in changes in cost responsibility. 
 
Data Acquisition and Manipulation 
The State HCAS Tool requires two important input data: state expenditures by highway 
functional class and by cost allocation category; and VMT values by vehicle configuration and 
highway functional class. Highway expenditures by cost category and by road function class were 
obtained from Highway Statistics published by FHWA. To smooth out fluctuations in the data, 
the study used the averages of the recent three and five years of highway expenditures, converted 
into 2006 dollars using construction price index, as shown in Table B.2. Annual VMT data by 
vehicle type and road functional class were obtained from Highway Performance Monitoring 




Table B.2  Annual State Highway Expenditure by Road Functional Class (in thousand dollars) 
 Rur Int Rur OPA Rur MA Rur MaC Rur MnC Urb Int Urb OFE Urb OPA Urb MA Urb Coll Total 
3-year Average Expenditure (2003~2005) 
New rigid pavement 11,384 26,228 46,528 58,236 195 89,143 2,450 13,071 1,715 497 249,449
New flexible pavement 28,093 55,105 33,194 9,679 5 134,129 8,504 57,155 6,927 1,428 334,220
3R flexible pavement 3,434 12,234 21,703 146,185 491 8,031 1,464 7,810 1,025 284 334,220
3R rigid pavement 8,475 25,704 15,483 24,296 13 12,084 5,081 34,151 4,139 816 130,241
New bridge 668 5,067 4,967 4,064 12 1,282 73 468 58 483 17,142
Replacement bridge 621 5,981 5,863 33,247 98 16,589 1,512 9,693 1,193 0 74,798
Bridge repair 8,353 2,784 2,729 21,274 63 10,303 1,436 9,204 1,133 2 57,281
Residual construction 20,391 10,687 10,475 27,665 82 25,297 1,934 12,399 1,526 1,052 111,507
Non-load-related maint. 31,072 20,792 20,371 41,094 8,807 5,269 1,954 12,264 1,664 32 143,318
Load-related flex pave maint. 13,441 10,057 17,834 52,856 12,863 3,155 655 3,424 495 12 114,794
Load-related rigid pave maint. 33,167 21,130 12,723 8,785 348 4,748 2,275 14,972 2,001 35 100,184
Total 159,100 195,770 191,870 427,382 22,977 310,029 27,339 174,612 21,875 4,642 1,535,594
5-year Average Expenditure (2003~2005) 
New flexible pavement 14,201 28,699 50,896 35,009 119 97,139 2,665 14,213 1,867 385 245,193
New rigid pavement 35,042 60,297 36,310 5,818 3 146,160 9,251 62,148 7,543 1,104 363,677
3R flexible pavement 6,372 17,925 31,789 126,699 431 55,885 1,868 9,963 1,309 453 252,696
3R rigid pavement 15,723 37,661 22,679 21,057 12 84,088 6,485 43,566 5,287 1,301 237,859
New bridge 443 3,523 3,452 2,129 6 1,205 81 518 64 313 11,734
Replacement bridge 412 12,592 12,339 34,114 102 21,873 1,617 10,363 1,277 0 94,689
Bridge repair 10,724 13,617 13,343 32,720 98 8,950 2,592 16,611 2,047 1 100,705
Residual construction 18,156 13,400 13,130 37,058 111 26,252 2,905 18,618 2,294 938 132,863
Non-load-related maint. 33,293 25,591 25,253 54,453 6,729 6,886 2,482 15,669 2,099 42 172,496
Load-related flex pave maint. 9,601 8,253 14,738 46,693 6,552 2,749 555 2,916 416 11 92,484
Load-related rigid pave maint. 23,692 17,339 10,514 7,760 177 4,137 1,927 12,752 1,682 31 80,012
Total 167,661 238,898 234,444 403,511 14,341 455,325 32,426 207,338 25,886 4,581 1,784,409
Int: Interstate; OPA: other principal arterial; MA: minor arterial; MaC: major collector; MnC: minor collector; OFE: other freeway 
and expressway; Coll: collector 




Table B.3 Annual VMT by Vehicle Configuration and Road Functional Class (2005) (in million) 
 Rur Int Rur OPA Rur MA Rur MaC Rur MnC Urb Int Urb OFE Urb OPA Urb MA Urb Coll Total 
Auto 4,713.1 3,295.6 2,728.3 5,403.5 145.8 4,338.8 621.9 5,110.5 2,384.5 257.0 29,036.2
LT4 2,079.3 1,625.3 1,311.8 2,029.7 90.0 1,665.6 252.6 3,032.1 943.1 102.4 13,146.7
SU2 679.5 311.9 247.7 489.3 5.4 432.7 90.6 423.6 63.6 1.7 2,746.9
SU3 185.9 211.4 111.5 152.4 3.6 132.7 12.9 43.0 66.6 1.7 922.1
SU4+ 36.6 19.9 10.5 14.3 0.2 23.6 1.0 3.5 5.4 0.1 115.2
CS3 12.6 5.4 3.8 3.6 0.2 10.4 1.3 2.3 1.5 0.2 41.3
CS4 20.5 13.9 3.2 3.0 0.3 16.9 2.5 5.0 1.6 0.2 67.2
3S2 805.1 163.6 55.9 56.6 3.7 302.5 18.6 42.6 4.1 0.3 1,453.1
CS5 66.1 12.7 5.0 5.1 0.3 24.8 1.0 3.6 0.5 0.0 119.2
CS6 60.6 24.3 9.6 9.7 0.2 30.8 1.9 7.1 0.9 0.1 145.1
CS7+ 35.4 13.8 5.4 5.5 0.1 17.8 1.1 4.2 0.5 0.0 83.8
CT4- 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
CT5 52.0 3.8 5.0 5.1 0.2 21.0 1.9 2.2 1.0 0.1 92.3
CT6+ 8.3 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.5
DS5 110.7 12.9 7.4 6.2 0.1 52.0 1.9 4.8 0.4 0.0 196.7
DS6 75.3 8.4 6.8 2.6 0.1 29.0 0.2 2.4 0.2 0.0 124.9
DS7 71.9 10.5 8.5 3.3 0.1 24.6 0.4 4.5 0.3 0.0 124.1
DS8+ 152.0 22.6 18.3 7.1 0.2 52.6 0.8 9.7 0.7 0.0 264.0
TS 44.0 4.9 4.0 1.5 0.0 15.0 0.2 2.1 0.2 0.0 72.0
Bus 34.7 41.5 20.2 48.5 1.4 34.8 3.7 30.0 23.6 0.7 239.4
Total 9,243.8 5,803.1 4,563.7 8,247.8 251.9 7,228.9 1,014.6 8,733.1 3,498.6 364.7 49,004.3
Int: Interstate; OPA: other principal arterial; MA: minor arterial; MaC: major collector; MnC: minor collector; OFE: other freeway 
and expressway; Coll: collector 
Auto: automobiles and motorcycles; LT4: pickups, vans and other light 2-axle, four tire vehicles; SU2, SU3, SU4+: 2-, 3-, and 4- or 
more axle single unit trucks; CS3, CS4, 3S2, CS5, CS6, CS7+: 3-, 4-, 5-, 6-, and 7- or more axle tractor-semi-trailer trucks with two 
categories of 5-axle vehicles, one with standard tandem axles and one with split tandem axles; CT4-, CT5, CT6+: 3-, 4-, 5-, and 6- or 
more axle truck-trailer combinations; DS5, DS6, DS7, DS8+: 5-, 6-, 7-, and 8- or more axle twin trailer/semi-trailer combinations TS: 
Triple trailer combinations; and Bus: buses 
Source: Highway Performance Monitoring System 
 
Cost Allocation Results: The Base Case 
For the critical input variables discussed above, base case values were established as the 
following: 
- Portion of non-load-related: Fwa and Sinha (1987a) studied Indiana’s data and 
concluded that 9.3% and 37.7% of maintenance costs were incurred by weather 
influence, respectively for flexible and rigid pavements. Rosalion and Martin (1999) 
found that 45% of road wear for flexible pavements was due to weather condition. 
Martin observed that the weather was responsible for 35% of maintenance cost based 
on recent data (Martin, 2002). In the present study, 40% was used as the weather 
impact for both pavement types. 
- Minimum pavement thickness: The present study followed the FHWA 
recommendations; structure number 2.1 was the minimum for flexible pavements, 




- Load Equivalency Factors: Indiana specific values from the NAPCOM study, some 
of which are presented in Table 3, were used as the base case input. 
 
Using the inputs described above, the base case results were obtained as summarized in 
Table B.4. The results indicated that the average per mile fee rate should be 3.14 cents to cover 
the total state highway expenditure. When applied to a 3-vehicle configuration, the rate for 
automobiles is 1.21 cents per mile, 9.18 cents for single unit trucks, and 23.54 cents for 
combination trucks. Results with a 20-vehicle classification are also found in Table B.4. 




Int OPA MA MaC MnC Average Int OFE OPA MA Coll Average
3-Vehicle Type Classification 
Auto 0.65 1.20 1.80 2.26 5.06 1.54 1.04 0.88 0.84 0.29 0.83 0.83 1.21 
SUT 1.91 7.95 12.31 19.65 32.12 9.72 7.65 7.29 9.91 5.58 20.91 8.26 9.18 
CT 6.38 30.27 53.18 109.90 135.69 18.79 33.29 37.09 62.12 27.64 71.86 37.02 23.54 
Average 1.72 3.37 4.20 5.18 9.12 3.58 4.29 2.69 2.00 0.63 1.27 2.63 3.14 
20-Vehicle Type Classification 
Auto 0.63 1.07 1.59 2.04 4.93 1.40 0.86 0.75 0.66 0.23 0.74 0.67 1.07 
LT4 0.71 1.47 2.25 2.85 5.28 1.86 1.51 1.18 1.15 0.44 1.07 1.16 1.51 
SU2 1.73 6.60 10.57 16.15 25.01 8.04 6.78 6.72 9.12 4.04 16.00 7.61 7.86 
SU3 2.27 9.26 14.90 26.82 41.06 12.52 9.08 10.08 14.38 6.45 24.21 9.50 11.61 
SU4+ 3.32 14.58 23.83 42.94 64.22 15.84 15.16 17.31 25.30 11.55 44.63 15.88 15.81 
CS3 2.08 8.12 13.14 20.86 32.25 7.94 8.27 8.65 12.09 5.30 20.19 8.89 8.21 
CS4 2.49 10.16 16.53 27.96 41.59 8.48 10.93 11.72 16.78 7.64 28.38 12.19 9.74 
3S2 5.99 29.02 48.34 104.04 144.64 17.29 30.75 37.73 55.92 27.84 97.88 34.07 21.49 
CS5 5.44 25.36 42.64 80.48 112.54 15.06 28.21 32.88 48.53 23.63 84.56 30.86 18.98 
CS6 6.38 31.01 50.80 110.56 151.12 26.21 32.77 41.64 61.29 31.33 108.12 38.31 29.55 
CS7+ 8.36 42.04 69.55 156.17 205.31 35.51 45.15 58.16 84.00 44.67 156.97 52.85 40.32 
CT4- 2.66 11.17 18.04 31.67 48.34 12.58 11.50 12.66 18.12 8.27 31.86 12.61 12.49 
CT5 6.98 35.24 58.36 113.82 152.17 21.22 40.17 45.49 66.12 33.14 128.72 42.84 27.27 
CT6+ 3.81 16.65 27.21 55.81 78.89 9.87 16.63 20.99 31.27 15.12 52.54 16.78 11.49 
DS5 5.77 28.42 47.82 93.89 105.18 14.23 32.98 39.45 58.05 32.98 100.95 35.30 20.57 
DS6 5.98 30.30 50.67 118.74 109.50 14.69 34.20 45.39 67.51 44.12 105.08 36.81 20.30 
DS7 9.29 49.29 81.34 209.42 219.20 27.50 53.65 75.07 108.62 69.78 178.84 62.43 35.84 
DS8+ 8.16 41.94 69.58 182.15 184.76 23.96 44.34 66.08 94.63 62.89 152.20 52.50 30.83 
TS 7.60 37.52 63.95 138.98 139.53 18.20 43.61 58.42 84.23 54.07 133.89 48.85 25.65 
Bus 2.01 8.27 13.41 25.50 32.82 13.57 7.80 8.72 12.91 5.88 20.07 9.15 11.75 
Average 1.72 3.37 4.20 5.18 9.12 3.58 4.29 2.69 2.00 0.63 1.27 2.63 3.14 
Auto: automobiles and motorcycles; SUT: Single Unit Truck; and CT: Combination Truck; LT4: pickups, vans and other light 2-axle, 
four tire vehicles; SU2, SU3, SU4+: 2-, 3-, and 4- or more axle single unit trucks; CS3, CS4, 3S2, CS5, CS6, CS7+: 3-, 4-, 5-, 6-, and 
7- or more axle tractor-semi-trailer trucks with two categories of 5-axle vehicles, one with standard tandem axles and one with split 
tandem axles; CT4-, CT5, CT6+: 3-, 4-, 5-, and 6- or more axle truck-trailer combinations; DS5, DS6, DS7, DS8+: 5-, 6-, 7-, and 8- or 





Cost Allocation Results: Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to assess the impact of changes in the critical input parameters, a sensitivity analysis was 
performed. 
Non-Load-Related (NLR) Maintenance Cost: Non-load-related portion of pavement 
maintenance cost was varied from 10% to 100% to get the results in Table B.5. As shown in 
Figure B.1, the more of maintenance cost is non-load-related, the higher is the cost responsibility 
of lighter cars. It was also found that for a 10% increase in non-load-related maintenance cost 
from the basic input value, the cost responsibility dropped by 0.65 cents per mile for combination 
trucks and 0.15 cents per mile for single unit trucks. 
Table B.5 Cost Responsibility with Various NLR Portion of Maintenance Cost (cents/mile) 
 
% of Non-Load-Related Maintenance Cost 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
3-Vehicle Type Classification 
Auto 0.98 1.03 1.09 1.15 1.21 1.26 1.32 1.38 1.44 1.49 
SUT 9.79 9.64 9.49 9.33 9.18 9.02 8.87 8.72 8.56 8.41 
CT 26.13 25.48 24.83 24.18 23.54 22.89 22.24 21.59 20.95 20.30 
Average 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 
20-Vehicle Type Classification 
Auto 0.83 0.89 0.95 1.01 1.07 1.12 1.18 1.24 1.30 1.36 
LT4 1.29 1.35 1.40 1.46 1.51 1.57 1.63 1.68 1.74 1.80 
SU2 8.29 8.18 8.07 7.97 7.86 7.75 7.64 7.54 7.43 7.32 
SU3 12.62 12.37 12.11 11.86 11.61 11.36 11.11 10.86 10.61 10.36 
SU4+ 17.32 16.94 16.56 16.19 15.81 15.43 15.06 14.68 14.30 13.92 
CS3 8.68 8.56 8.44 8.33 8.21 8.09 7.97 7.85 7.73 7.61 
CS4 10.48 10.32 10.16 10.00 9.84 9.68 9.52 9.36 9.20 9.04 
3S2 24.03 23.39 22.76 22.12 21.49 20.85 20.22 19.59 18.95 18.32 
CS5 21.03 20.51 20.00 19.49 18.98 18.47 17.96 17.45 16.94 16.42 
CS6 32.98 32.13 31.27 30.41 29.55 28.69 27.84 26.98 26.12 25.26 
CS7+ 45.11 43.91 42.72 41.52 40.32 39.12 37.92 36.72 35.53 34.33 
CT4- 13.58 13.31 13.04 12.76 12.49 12.22 11.95 11.68 11.40 11.13 
CT5 30.15 29.43 28.71 27.99 27.27 26.55 25.82 25.10 24.38 23.66 
CT6+ 12.48 12.24 11.99 11.74 11.49 11.24 10.99 10.74 10.50 10.25 
DS5 22.21 21.80 21.39 20.98 20.57 20.16 19.75 19.34 18.92 18.51 
DS6 21.96 21.54 21.13 20.71 20.30 19.88 19.47 19.05 18.64 18.23 
DS7 39.82 38.82 37.83 36.84 35.84 34.85 33.86 32.87 31.87 30.88 
DS8+ 34.13 33.31 32.48 31.66 30.83 30.01 29.18 28.36 27.54 26.71 
TS 28.10 27.49 26.87 26.26 25.65 25.03 24.42 23.80 23.19 22.58 
Bus 12.56 12.35 12.15 11.95 11.75 11.55 11.35 11.15 10.95 10.75 






























Figure B.1 Cost Responsibility with Various NLR Portion of Maintenance Cost 
Minimum Pavement Thickness: Minimum pavement thickness was changed as follows: 
from 2.1 to 3.1 for flexible pavement structure number; from 4.2 to 6.0 inches for rigid pavement 
slab thickness. The sensitivity analysis results are presented in Table B.6 and Figure B.2. With 
higher standards for minimum thickness, cost responsibilities of heavier vehicles decreased as the 
common cost to be shared by all vehicles got larger. Within the range of minimum thickness 
considered, however, the changes in cost responsibility of lighter vehicles were not significant. It 
was observed that 8% increase in minimum thickness would reduce cost responsibility of 




Table B.6 Cost Responsibility with Various Minimum Pavement Thickness (cents/mile) 
Min thickness (Flex structure 
number/ Rigid slab inches) 2.1 / 4.0 2.3 / 4.4 2.5 / 4.8 2.7 / 5.2 2.9 / 5.6 3.1 / 6.0 
3-Vehicle Type Classification 
Auto 1.15 1.18 1.21 1.24 1.27 1.30 
SUT 9.33 9.28 9.22 9.16 9.11 9.05 
CT 24.18 23.82 23.45 23.08 22.71 22.35 
Average 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 
20-Vehicle Type Classification 
Auto 1.01 1.03 1.05 1.07 1.09 1.11 
LT4 1.46 1.51 1.56 1.60 1.65 1.70 
SU2 7.97 7.92 7.86 7.81 7.76 7.71 
SU3 11.86 11.80 11.73 11.67 11.60 11.54 
SU4+ 16.19 16.01 15.83 15.65 15.47 15.29 
CS3 8.33 8.31 8.29 8.26 8.24 8.22 
CS4 10.00 9.95 9.91 9.86 9.81 9.76 
3S2 22.12 21.80 21.48 21.16 20.84 20.52 
CS5 19.49 19.20 18.90 18.60 18.31 18.01 
CS6 30.41 29.94 29.47 28.99 28.52 28.05 
CS7+ 41.52 40.79 40.07 39.35 38.63 37.90 
CT4- 12.76 12.65 12.53 12.41 12.29 12.18 
CT5 27.99 27.44 26.89 26.33 25.78 25.23 
CT6+ 11.74 11.67 11.60 11.54 11.47 11.40 
DS5 20.98 20.64 20.29 19.95 19.61 19.26 
DS6 20.71 20.41 20.10 19.80 19.49 19.18 
DS7 36.84 36.19 35.55 34.90 34.25 33.61 
DS8+ 31.66 31.18 30.71 30.24 29.77 29.30 
TS 26.26 25.81 25.36 24.92 24.47 24.02 
Bus 11.95 11.93 11.91 11.89 11.87 11.85 































Figure B.2 Cost Responsibility with Various Minimum Pavement Thickness 
Load Equivalency Factors: Various levels of Load Equivalency Factors were considered 
to assess the impacts of heavier vehicles. Having Indiana specific values of NAPCOM 
deterioration models as default, the study tested for 1, 25, 50, 75, and 99 percentile of the national 
average values of LEF. The results are presented in Table B.7 and Figure B.3. It was observed 
that at most 2.66 cents per mile of reduction in cost responsibility can be expected for 
combination trucks under the assumption that their LEF values were 99% of national values, 










1 percentile 25 percentile 50 percentile 75 percentile 99 percentile 
3-Vehicle Type Classification 
Auto 1.15 1.22 1.18 1.16 1.15 1.12 
SUT 9.33 10.27 10.72 10.88 11.06 11.50 
CT 24.18 21.73 21.69 21.72 21.70 21.52 
Average 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 
20-Vehicle Type Classification 
Auto 1.01 1.07 1.03 1.02 1.01 0.98 
LT4 1.46 1.55 1.50 1.48 1.46 1.42 
SU2 7.97 9.73 10.37 10.61 10.91 11.66 
SU3 11.86 10.75 10.72 10.69 10.60 10.27 
SU4+ 16.19 15.87 16.43 16.65 16.94 17.55 
CS3 8.33 10.10 10.52 10.65 10.83 11.30 
CS4 10.00 10.65 10.98 11.11 11.28 11.80 
3S2 22.12 18.60 18.20 18.09 17.84 16.98 
CS5 19.49 19.93 20.75 21.12 21.56 22.82 
CS6 30.41 24.82 24.12 23.87 23.60 22.43 
CS7+ 41.52 34.26 33.68 33.53 33.25 32.10 
CT4- 12.76 12.45 12.79 12.94 13.13 13.58 
CT5 27.99 27.51 28.88 29.56 30.39 32.82 
CT6+ 11.74 10.31 10.08 9.98 9.86 9.40 
DS5 20.98 23.91 25.36 25.93 26.72 29.14 
DS6 20.71 22.22 23.18 23.58 24.12 25.85 
DS7 36.84 32.33 31.86 31.74 31.52 30.64 
DS8+ 31.66 28.14 27.77 27.69 27.49 26.71 
TS 26.26 30.24 32.07 32.75 33.71 36.58 
Bus 11.95 11.98 11.98 11.93 11.84 11.50 
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Figure B.3 Cost Responsibility with Various LEF Values 
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